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1. Introduction
Western European countries have been hit to different extents 
by the recent economic downswing, but now unemployment is considered 
as one of the most serious problems in industrial societies. Govern­
ments and other institutions had realized that unemployment was, in 
most cases, not the fault of the individual affected, but rather was 
due to market imperfections. In order to maintain a subsistence 
income level, various strategies were gradually introduced to minimize 
financial hardship arising from joblessness. But the persistently high 
and growing levels of unemployment which we are currently experiencing 
have resulted in growing expenditures on income maintenance programmes 
for the unemployed. Table I gives an*impression of the magnitude 
of unemployment and expenditures by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
The secular rise in the relative level of unemployment benefits, 
coupled with the parallel rise in the number of individuals claiming 
them,have led to such benefits becoming an ever important part of 
public expenditure. In the Federal Republic of Germany, expenditures 
on unemployment compensation grew from 721 million DM in 1970 to
9.3 billion DM in 1979. Although small in relation to the gross national 
product, unemployment insurance has clearly become a major issue 
among the countries’ employment and welfare activities. Not surpris­
ingly, disincentive effects of unemployment compensation and the 
existence of unemployed ’shirkers* have become a topic of passionate 
discussion among economists, and still more in the general public.
Policy makers and academics have begun to reassess the impact of UI 
on the labour market. Increasing attention has been drawn to the 
question of whether unemployment compensation may not only be a remedy 
for unemployment but also part of the problem itself.
In countries with comprehensive and elaborate systems of UI, 
such as the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, dis­
cussion has been taking place for some time, but empirical research on 
the topic is limited.
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The aim of the present thesis is to answer the question of 
whether and to what extent unemployment is induced by unemployment 
insurance. The three countries, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom, were chosen for the analysis in view of 
the diverging and often opposing ways their unemployment has developed 
and their systems of UI have functioned. Empirical analysis in this 
thesis has been concentrated on the Federal Republic of Germany as 
reference for comparisons with both the United Kingdom and Italy.
The various studies made in Great Britain provide standards for 
comparison, while deficiencies in the data on unemployment and 
particular features of the social security system do not allow 
similar calculations for Italy. A period with extremely low and 
high levels of unemployment between 1960 and 1979, is covered in 
the research.
The thesis is organized into three major sections, the first 
being a description of unemployment and social security systems for 
the unemployed, the second the theoretical context in which unemploy­
ment and unemployment benefits can be placed, and the third consists 
of a review of empirical studies and their application to the West 
German case.
In Chapter 2, definitions and structural characteristics of 
unemployment are described. International comparisons of different 
systems of unemployment insurance and their effects on the labour market 
require a fair understanding of the methods of counting .unemployment. 
There exists no clear notion of full employment which can be considered 
as a reference for calculating 'real' unemployment as the difference 
between full employment and the existing level of employment. But 
comparisons of the three countries under examination cannot be re­
stricted to figures of officially registered unemployment. Amount and 
structure of registered versus ’hidden’ unemployment vary among countries 
as well as with the level of employment ♦ The extent to which unemploy­
ment is registered is not significantly determined by the existing 
type of unemployment insurance. Thus various forms of ’hidden’
- 4 -
unemployment and under-employment should be taken into account when 
overall levels of employment and unemployment are analysed.
Chapter 3 deals with social insurance schemes for the unemployed 
in the three countries. A historical: review of British unemployment 
and insurance schemes is included because in the inter-war period 
discussions have already started on disincentive effects of the 
British unemployment insurance. The different features of the three 
unemployment insurance schemes are summarized again in. Appendix £ 
in order to facilitate understanding of the empirical analysis. A 
comparison of social security schemes for the unemployed in the three 
countries concludes the descriptive part.
Chapter 4 analyses unemployment insurance and its impact os 
unemployment in the context of labour market theories. These are 
especially the basic neo-classical model of marginal utility and its 
extension to Job Search Theory, and a model of son-clearing markets is 
a disequilibrium approach. The latter theoretical model is thes 
transformed into an empirically testable model. In an appendix to 
Chapter 4 the concept of contract theories is outlined. While the 
other theoretical models intend to explain unemployment arising from 
the availability of unemployment benefits, contract theory claims to 
give interpretations of the variations in employment levels.
Theoretical and empirical analyses are concentrated on the supply side 
of labour markets. The effects of unemployment insurance on 
aggregate demand are only briefly described. An analysis of the 
stabilizing effects of unemployment insurance would require a dif­
ferent approach in the context of an econometric model of the entire 
economy which goes beyond the scope of the present study.
In Chapter 5 empirical studies dealing with the effects of 
unemployment insurance on the labour market in different countries are 
discussed and their general findings are summarized. Research on the 
impact of unemployment insurance has been conducted mainly in the 
United States where many recent labour market theories have also 
originated. However, many approaches are sot directly applicable to
- 5 -
Western European economies, as labour market legislation and functioning 
show considerable differences. In the United Kingdom the debate on 
unemployment inducing effects of unemployment insurance dates back to 
the early 1930s and has been revived more recently. The validity of 
time series data and the viability of the neo-classical approach have 
been discussed. In the Federal Republic of Germany only one study on 
unemployment insurance and aggregate unemployment has followed the 
approach most American and British analyses have applied.
In Chapter 6 the focus is on definitions and calculations of 
unemployment insurance components and the different methods used for 
measuring their impact on unemployment. The empirical analysis on 
unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is described in 
Chapter 7. Multiple regression analysis is based on time series 
data for the period 1960 to. 1979 . In general, the results do not 
indicate that unemployment insurance benefits have contributed to 
variations in unemployment. Regression coefficients for unemploy­
ment benefits are found to be insignificant in most of the estimated 
equations. The empirical analysis of unemployment insurance has 
been confined to time series data. This approach is disputable and 
its short-comings are indicated in several stages of the thesis.
But in the Federal Republic of Germany, time series are the only data 
available to estimate the effects of employment insurance and aggregate 
unemployment.
Ideally, one would wish to find a situation in which one group 
of individuals drawing benefits can be compared with another group 
of unemployed persons ineligible for unemployment payments. A similar 
situation does not prevail in reality. However , comparisons between 
the three countries with very divergent social security schemes 
ran improve the understanding of effects of unemployment benefits on 
unemployment and labour market participation. Chapter 8 provides 
evidence from the comparative analysis. The final conclusions 
indicate some political considerations concerning discussions on 
unemployment insurance.
The discussion on disincentive effects of unemployment insurance 
has provided arguments for reductions in benefits and for more 
restrictive handling of the rules governing eligibility, especially 
since financial tuptms of the insurance bodies are becoming scarce.
But empirical evidence on the effects of unemployment insurance on 
overall employment is not without ambiguity. This thesis presents 
an empirical contribution to the debate on unemployment and unemploy­
ment insurance, but further research on this topic is still required.
- 7 -
2. Statistics on Unemployment ip Context
2.1 Federal Republic of Germany
2.1.1 Definition and Calculation
The main source of data on employment and unemployment in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin are the statistics provided 
by the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Federal Labour Office). The activities 
of the labour administration were regulated in the Arbeitsförderungsgesetz 
(AFG) (Employment Promotion Act) from 1969, stating that the Bundesanstalt 
für Arbeit is the main administrative body responsible for dealing with 
labour market problems. — Paragraph 6/3 AFG, prescribes that the 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit has to prepare statistical reports concerning 
labour force, employment and unemployment. Placement agents, as well as 
staff at a lower level, collect the relevant data during several days 
each month. Twice a year structural analyses of unemployment are 
conducted by the labour office. Generally, these statistics are con­
sidered to provide reliable data on unemployment. They are also sub­
divided according to social structures.
Other series of unemployment statistics are based on surveys
published by the Federal Statistical Office in the "Mikrozensus” and
"Volks-und Berufszählungen” with samples on a quarterly or yearly basis.
They have different concepts and definitions of unemployment (Erwerbslosigkeit)
according to which those who are jobless but not registered at the
Labour Office, as well as some employed persons with very low incomes,
are counted. The numbers of unemployed (Erwerbslose) recorded through
micro-census have always been slightly above those registered with the
2/labour administration (Arbeitslose). —
—  ^ For a description of the structure and organization of the adminis­
tration of German labour markets see Krautkrâmer, U. (1978)
21— See Lippe, P. v. d. (1977), p.46 and Autoren-Kollektiv des IMSF 
(1974), pp.55 and 161.
- 8 -
Traditionally, the German labour administration is the 
institution responsible for the registration of the unemployed and allo­
cation of unemployment benefits. These tasks of the Federal Labour 
Office have their impact on the definition of unemployment. The people 
considered as unemployed are those looking for jobs as employees, are 
available to the employment agency and are under 65 years of age. 
Available for placement are those persons who are able to work under 
the general conditions of the labour market and who are willing to 
accept any adequate occupation they can fulfill. —  The employment 
aimed at must not be neglegible, must not be only in a certain plant, 
and must net be for less than three months. Statistically registered 
are flows and stocks of job seekers (able and willing to take up em­
ployment during the next three months) and among them the unemployed. 
This is done by counting the registration cards on a monthly, quarterly 
and yearly basis.
The unemployment rate is normally defined as the number of 
unemployed in relation to the working population or to employment. 
Because of the official definition of unemployment and the procedure for 
counting the number of unemployed followed by the Labour Office, one has 
to take into consideration that certain social groups among the actually 
employed are omitted from the official statistics.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the development of employment and 
unemployment from 1955 to 1979.
In the German labour market, part of the considerable reduction 
in employment is not identified in the official employment statistics.
—  See paragraphs 101, 102, 103 AFG. Changes in the definition of 
availability have occurred during the last years. See Goldberg/ 
Guther/Jung (1977), p.47.
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In Che FRG employment has decreased considerably during the last 
two years. Between 1973 and 1977 the total labour force declined by 
about 900,000 persons. Only recently do employment figures again 
show an upward trend. The decrease in the active labour force did not 
increase unemployment to the same extent. The most significant group 
in this context is the migrant workers leaving the FRG as there are 
hardly any job opportunities there. The situation on the labour market, 
the economic recession and the policy of an end to recruitment, which 
has been applied since November 1973 have led to a decline of more than
600,000 by 1977 in foreign employment form a peak of 2.5 million in 1973.—^
The decline in employment was only in part a result of the 
re-migration of foreign workers. A substantial number of people out 
of work did not register as unemployed but withdrew from the labour 
market.
The classic group in this respect consists of married women
who have no claim on unemployment benefits either because they do not
fulfill the qualifying conditions or because their husbands earn too
much. They do not see any advantage in registering with the Labour
Office. In 1976 the year of the lowest female employment, 200,000
2/women were estimated to be in this group. —
People at the beginning of their active working life, as 
far as they are not in need, and those who leave the educational system 
without employment or training contracts often do not register as un­
employed. In general, they cannot claim unemployment aid.
Former self-employed persons who have become jobless will not 
receive unemployment benefits as long as they are not in need, and 
therefore see no need to register.
— See Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (1978) p.2 41. 
2/ See IAB (1977)
- 10 -
Adult members of the family of foreign workers who did not receive, 
or have lost their work permits, are not counted in the work force, 
(estimates for 1976 were about 180,000 persons).—  ^ Foreigners who have 
lost their jobs and no longer have or never had work permits and are 
living illegally in the FRG are, of course, not registered in the official 
unemployment statistics.
Delayed entry into working life for university students as well 
as for students attending vocational schools, reduces participation 
rates in the labour market. High unemployment levels also lead to 
earlier retirement. Persons over 59 years of age who have been unem­
ployed for more than one year can receive anticipated retirement pay.
Persons who register as unemployed but attend vocational retraining, 
figure in separate statistics and during that period are not counted 
as unemployed.
Between 1973 and 1978 the number of the active working population
(Erwerbstätige) decreased from 26,985,000 to 26,074,000 while the number
of registered unemployed in the same period went up from 273,000 to about
one million, which is certainly less than the reduction of the working
population. According to estimates made in the Federal Labour Office
in 1978, there existed a so-called ’Silent Reserve' (Stille Reserve)
of more than 600,000 * discouraged workers'. This has to be seen as an
involuntary joblessness caused by the recession which exists, together
21with the openly registered unemployment. —
2.1.2 The Structure of Unemployment
In the absence of reliable data on hidden unemployment we have 
to concentrate on unemployed persons registered with the Labour Office. 
Figure 2 shows the development of the numbers of unemployed persons and 
vacancies. Apart from the short recession in 1967 and 1968, unemployment
1/ See IAB C1977)
2/ See Autorengemeinschaft (1978) p.54
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was decreasing continually until 1974. The excess supply of labour in 
the 1950s was partially caused by the inflow of refugees from Eastern 
Europe and Eastern Germany, which, in total, amounted to a net immigra­
tion of over three million persons. After that, until the scent 
recession, the West German labour market was characterized by an 
excess demand for labour, which, to some extent, has been reduced by 
the immigration of foreign workers. Since the beginning of the 
economic crisis in 1974, unemployment has been constantly growing and 
seems to remain at a high level. At the same time, the number of 
vacancies has shown an inverse development. In the year of highest 
unemployment during the period under consideration, there was on 
average only one vacancy for more than four unemployed persons.
Table 3 shows that the increase of unemployment was caused 
mainly by an increased duration of unemployment spells while the flow 
of unemployment showed much smaller variations over time.
Unemployment is unevenly distributed over different groups 
and sectors in the labour force. What is of interest in this research 
is an analysis of unemployment in respect to its social and demographic 
structure (especially in respect to sex and age) rather than a regional 
distribution or the incidence of workers with different skill levels.
Fwnale Unemployment
In all the countries of the European Community, men and 
women are hit differently by tin employment. Recently in the FRG, as in
most other Western European countries, female unemployment was in­
creasing at a faster rate than that of males. While in May 1975 
41.7 percent of the registered unemployed were women, in 1979 
female unemployment amounted to 55.5 percent of overall unemployment. —  ^
In May 1979 the rate of unemployment for females was 4.9 percent, 
for males it was only 2.4 percent. Assuming a higher proportion of
- See ANBA (1980)
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TABLE 3: SPELLS AND DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMP UNF ADUR CDUR
1962 155 1894 0. 000 0. 000
1963 186 2002 0. 000 0. 000
1964 169 1578 0. 000 0. 000
1965 147 1422 0. 000 0. 000
1966 161 1694 3. 91 0. 000
1967 459 2545 4. 64 1. 66
1968 323 1790 7. 58 2. 17
1969 179 1369 6. 61 1. 99
1970 149 1296 4. 92 1. 52
1971 185 1563 4. 25 1. 32
1972 246 1662 4. 55 1. 59
1973 273 1877 4. 95 1. 71
1974 582 2795 4. 46 1. 96
1975 1074 3450 5. 96 2. 79
1976 1060 3256 7. 44 3. 66
1977 1030 3315 7. 94 3. 54
197B 993 3081 , 8. 55 3. 73
1979 876 2844 8. 29 4. .01
Source: ¿NBA, various issues, IAB
Notes to Table 3: UNEMP - registered unemployed
UNF - flows into unemployment
ADUR - average duration of unemployment
CDUR - duration of completed spells of
■mpuip loyment
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women in the ' Silent Reservef, the female compared to the male un­
employment is, in reality, even higher than is shown in the official 
statistics.
In Hay 1979 23.5 percent of the male unemployed were without 
jobs for more than one year. The same percentage for women was
19.1 percent. It can hardly be assumed that it is easier and takes 
less time for a woman to find a job, but the figures reveal that women 
are pushed out of the labour market more quickly. Although the inte­
gration of women into active working life is mentioned in the Employment 
Promotion Act as a goal of labour market policy, the working activity 
of women is still regarded as only secondary to that of men. In lay­
offs, when ’social* points of view are taken into consideration, pre­
ference is given to the dismissal of a woman rather than a man. —
Many unemployed women are looking for part-time jobs which are very
scarce. Housewives who are interested in earning money in addition to
2/the male income are often not considered as 'real' unemployed. —
Youth Unemployment
In comparison to other Western European countries, the FRG 
does not seem to have been hit severely by youth unemployment.
Talking about youth unemployment, one refers in general to young people 
under 20 years of age. The unemployment rate of this age group does 
not differ much from the overall unemployment rate.. In 1979 it was
3.1 percent compared to 3.2 percent for all unemployed persons. This
age limit is, however, less meaningful since the raising of the 
school-leaving age has meant that those in the group of 15 and 16 year 
olds rarely seek employment. In most of the Länder of the FRG the tenth
compulsory year of school was introduced during recent years, partly 
as a policy measure against youth unemployment. Especially in the 
20-24 years age group, unemployment appears soon after the education phase.
See Offe, C. (1977) p.41.
“1J See Engelen-Kefer, U. (1978)
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The rate of youth unemployment calculated in the micro—census 
(also including young people out of work but not officially registered 
as unemployed) is one to two percentage points higher than the one 
published by the Labour Office for the group of 15 to 19 year olds. —  ^
This again shows that the young unemployed often do not register «tiH 
thus form part of the 'Silent Reserve'.
The duration of unemployment for young people is shorter than 
the average. Nevertheless, youth unemployment is of great importance 
for the FRG, because a high number of young people are affected by it.
Due to flexible anticipated retirement possibilities, seniority 
rights, and special protection against dismissals, older workers in the 
FRG are less affected by unemployment. But once unemployed, they have 
the longest duration. In May 1979, 37 percent of the unemployed above 
55 years of age were out of work for more than one year (against 21 per­
cent in all age groups).
Foreign Workers
As Table 2 shows, the number of foreign workers has decreased 
since 1973. Their unemployment was exported and, therefore, it is not 
recorded in the statistics. Only very recently has the outflow of 
migrant workers come to a standstill. The stopping of recruitment 
could only have a long-term impact on citizens from countries outside 
the conmnmity. Reduction of actual foreign employment required some 
time. It was impossible to dismiss and deport foreign workers directly, 
but laws for foreigners were applied more strictly and often other 
discriminatory measures were used. The Government of the FRG tries to 
enforce the willingness and ability of migrant workers and their families 
to return to their mother countries. In practice, there are often
—  See Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (1978) p.217. A high percentage of young 
job seekers who applied for apprenticeship programmes was found not to 
be registered as unemployed. See Backer, G./Engelen-Kefer, U./ 
Seifert,'H. (1977)
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manifold restrictions in the material and social living conditions for 
foreign workers, such as closures of the whole quarters to the entry of 
new foreigners (Zuzugssperre), refusal of working permits, or not 
allowing residence permits for family members arriving later. Apart 
from these facts, there exists a so-called assisted return in the form of 
severance pay, especially for those foreign workers who have earned the 
right to stay as they have been living for a longer time in the FRjG. — 
Furthermore, these measures were accentuated by ruling on precedence 
for natives (Inlanderprimat), stating that for the grant or prolonga­
tion of the permission to work, domestic job-seekers have to be considered 2/first. —  Practically the decision is left to the enterprises which
can dismiss or keep foreign workers according to their needs. The
crucial points of layoffs in sectors where foreign workers are concentrated,
as well as the selection of dismissals resulted in a proportionately higher
amount of unemployment of foreign workers. Data on unemployment rates
among foreign workers are scarce. In some publications, foreign unemploy-
ment is completely excluded, the argument being that it would bias the
3/overall picture of unemployment in the FRG. — The reduction of 
foreign employment is only to a small extent, reflected in registered 
unemployment. Since the beginning of the recession, the unemployment 
rate of foreigners has been above that for Germans (in September 1979 
it was 3.9 percent, compared to 3.4 percent of all unemployed persons).
The average duration of unemployment for foreigners, however,
4/has been lower than for Germans. — One may assume that many foreign
1/ On the legal situation for foreign workers see Gehmacher/Rubat/Mehrlander 
(1978) pp. 116. Foreign workers coming from other countries than the EEC 
are granted permits only for stay and also for work for one year which 
ordinarily will be extended always for one year. Foreigners already 
staying in the FBG for ten years are conceded unlimited working permission.
2/ See Hildebrandt, E. (1978) p.lll.
3J An example is the Infratest Sozialforschung, working on a sample without 
foreigners in describing the situation of unemployed persons.
4/ See Kuhl, J. (1981).
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unemployed leave the FRG after a relatively short search for new 
employment. This attitude has to be seen in connection with the 
restricted access of foreign workers to unemployment benefits and the 
delays in receiving work permits for family members.
2.2 Italy
2.2.1 Sources and Reliability of Data on Employment
The available statistical data on the Italian labour force and 
unemployment show more imperfections than statistics of other countries 
with similar levels of economic and administrative development. However, 
recently there has been a thorough revision of the statistical sources 
and-methods, and a change in the sample coverage which led to a more
reliable picture of Italian employment. The new figures are not
directly comparable to previous series, but they should be closer now 
to those provided by the other EEC countries. —
Statistics with sub-divisions according to social categories 
of unemployed do not exist for Italy to the same degree as for other 
countries. Data on the registered unemployed by age groups published 
by the Statistical Office of the European Community are missing only in 
the case of Italy. Furthermore, statistics on vacancies are not
collected by Italian authorities. Apart from general difficulties in 
collecting data on unemployment, such as psychological resentments in 
registering or insincerity in giving information to public agencies, 
the main confusion in Italy arises from the existence of two different 
official sources providing divergent results: statistics from the
Central Institute of Statistics ( Istituto Centrale di Statistics, ISTAT) 
and the Minister of Labour (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza 
Sociale). They have fundamental differences in the method of collection, 
in the definition, as well as in the presentation of the data. In Table
4, the new adjusted series on unemployment published by ISTAT are ccm-
—  ^See OECD, Italy (1979) p.10. This fact also explains the difficulties 
in finding consistent time series on Italian unemployment.
J
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trasted with the figures of the registered unemployed collected by the 
Minister of Labour. —^
Since 1952 the Central Statistical Office has been conducting
annual labour force sample surveys, and since 1957 on a quarterly basis.
In 1979 the two-stage stratified sample included 90,000 families resident
2/in 1,600 communes with at least 20,000 inhabitants. — In the first 
stage, these communes are sub-divided into homogenous groups out of which 
a sample is drawn. Then the families to be interviewed are decided upon. 
The labour force (forze di lavoro) is defined by ISTAT as the sum of the 
employed (occupati) and persons in search of employment (persone in 
cerca di occupazione). The unemployed are counted separately in the 
labour force. In the category of 'in search of employment1 a dis­
tinction is made between the unemployed (disoccupati) who have already 
had a job, but have lost it and unemployed persons searching for first 
employment (persone in cerca di la occupazione). All persons above 
14 years of age who in the relevant week of survey have declared them­
selves to be seeking work and are able to accept it (or will start to 
work in the week following the interview) are considered as unemployed.
Statistics on unemployment provided by the Ministry of Labour
are based on the numbers of people registered in the lists of the
placement offices. According to the law, everyone who is looking for
3/employment has to register with the labour office.—
— Before the revision of ISTAT statistics there was quite a considerable 
difference between the two data sources. Figures on the unemployed 
registered in category I in the lists of the Minister of Labour, were 
on average far superior to the numbers of unemployed (who have been 
in employment before) published by ISTAT. See Buchi, W. (1969) p.24.
- See ISTAT Bollettino (1980) p.140.
— See Legge 29 Aprile 1949 n.264.
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The unemployed are classified in four categories: Class I
comprises those whose unemployment is due to the 1q6S of a previous
job. Class II the unemployed looking for their first job; normally
young persons are counted. Contrary to figures on unemployment
after employment, the figures on youth unemployment in category II have
always been below those published by ISTAT. Young unemployed often
do not see any advantage in registering with the Labour Offices.
This did not change very much with the law on youth unemployment by
which young people between the ages of 14 and 29 were called to register
for employment. In Classes III and IV of the lists, housewives
2/and pensioners who are looking for employment are included. — 
Registration is not cancelled if a person declares that he is seeking 
employment but repeatedly refuses job offers.
In certain respects the statistics provided by ISTAT are
now considered to be more reliable than those collected by the regional 
3/labour offices. —  Population census data would be more realistic
measures of the stock of persons in search of employment than indi­
cations obtained from samples on the labour force. But they are made 
only every ten years, while sample surveys are now provided quarterly.
However, there are limits to the reliability of unemployment 
statistics provided by the two institutions, one being a by-product of 
an administrative activity, the other based on a rather restricted 
sample of the population.
2.2.2 Characteristics of Italian Employment
Compared to other countries with similar economic development 
and a corresponding demographic structure, Italy has a relatively low 
participation in employment. One may suspect that cases of registered 
inactivity often do not correspond to real inactivity, but rather to 
an economic activity which is not registered and thus illegal.
1/ See Legge 1° Giugno 1977 n. 285 
2/ See Allessandrini, P. (1978) p.90
3/ The Banca d* Italia bases its economic analyses on data of employment 
provided by ISTAT
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Surveys on single communes in Emilia—Romagna and Marche gave indications
of 15 to 20 percent difference between the official and the effective
activity rate. —  Research at the local level has up to now too
sporadic a character to be able to extrapolate the results on to the
national level. But one might assume that the official statistics on
unemployment and employment give an incomplete picture of the Italian
labour market. The presence of a rather relevant extent of 'black'
labour is a widely discussed problem in the Italian economy and as an
Italian economist said "Insomnia, mentre siamo ultimi nel lavoro
ufficialmente registrato saremmo primi in quello occulto, il che non
2/costituisce necessariamente un conforto." —
However, the overall activity rate and the one on female
employment is lower in Ireland and in the Netherlands. The Italian
activity rates for males are still higher than in France, the Netherlands 
3/and Ireland. —
A random survey carried through by CEN SIS - DOXA, covering
22,500 individual cases reveals an effective labour supply substantially
larger than the official ISTAT data indicate. Calculations show a
supply of 23,885 million in contrast to a figure of 19,337 million
which would move the percentage of labour supply in the resident
4/population from 35.5 to 44 percent. —  After the thorough revision of 
statistical methods and sources by IS TAX, the rate of working activity 
rose from 35.9 to 38.9 percent because of the change in the calculation 
of the labour force. —
For the group between the ages of 60 and 65, the low official 
participation rate in the labour market is due to the Italian retirement 
system. People can retire after 35 years of employment with contribu­
tions p*id to the old age insurance. But retirement pensions are often 
too low to secure adequate continuity in the standard of living. There-
1/ See Fua, G. (1976) p.30
2/ Fua, G. (1976) p.36. See also Bellacci, M. (1977)
3/ See Eurostat (1979)
4/ See Frey, L. (1977) and Bruno, S. (1978) p.42
5/ See Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaf ten (1978) p. 61 and Pettenati, P. (1979^
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fore, and in order not to lose retirement payments, pensioners often 
work under illegal conditions. In the case of women, the inadequacy 
of social infrastructure explains to some extent the low participation 
rate. —^
Reasons for the considerable degree of 'non-institutional ’ work
also lie in the labour market rigidities which make it almost impossible
for an enterprise to dismiss workers once hired, and in the high labour
costs in relation to productivity. Italian productive capacity is below
average of the European Community, but salaries and other costs, especially
contributions to social security,are similar or even higher than in more
2/developed countries in Western Europe. —
In the context of this research it would go too far to 
examine more thoroughly the extension and reasons for black labour in 
Italy. But this phenomenon has to be kept in mind in the analysis of 
Italian unemployment.
Employment has increased steadily since 1966, although not as 
fast as the total labour force. The return of migrants, as well as 
demographic developments, have contributed to this increase. Unemploy­
ment did not rise as sharply as in many other countries in spite of the 
decline in employment in agriculture which had to be absorbed by the 
industrial sector. (See Table 5).
As in most Western European countries, the incidence of un­
employment is particularly high among women. More than half of the
3/unemployed in 1979 were female. — The category of unemployed young 
people has shown the largest increase in unemployment. (See figure 3).
To make it easier to place young people in jobs, the Law 285 was passed
1/ See OECD, Italy (1979) p.16
2/ See Fua, G. (1976) p.66 and Salkowsky, H. (1977) p. 19 
3/ See ISTAT, Bolletino (1980)
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in 1977, whereby their names were entered in a special register. The
number of young people registered in the labour offices increased and came
closer to ISTAT data. But the Law appears to have little effect
because of a lack of convergence between demand and supply of labour. —^
Between 1977 and 1979 unemployment of first job seekers has increased
by almost 200,000. The number of unemployed who had previously held
jobs showed little change during the recent period. This is explained
by the drop in the rate of turnover in large firms, indicating the
rigidity of the Italian labour market. The increasing resort to working
shorter hours and the difficulty of laying off workers have secured
jobs for those who are employed but makes new entry into the labour
2/market almost impossible.-*
Victims of the employment crisis in Italy are especially to
be found in the economically backward regions, a result of the failure
of the industrialization programme for the Mezzogiomo. More than
in the Northern parts of Italy, young people are affected by unemployment.
Here the educational system clearly fulfilled a waiting-room function,
since the proportion of the population attending upper secondary
schools, and in particular universities, is distinctly higher in the
3/South than in the industrial!zed parts of the country. —
the Italian labour market is characterised by substantial 
inequalities among regions as well as among different groups of 
society, in respect to age, sex and economic sectors.
2.3 United Kingdom
2.3.1 The Collection of Statistics
From 1913 statistics on unemployment among persons insured in 
the National Ins cur an ce Act of 1911 became available. But until the 
1920 Unemployment Insurance Act was passed, no reasonably accurate figures
1/ On the question of youth unemployment and the Law 285, see also 
“ DeMasi, D./Signorelli, A. (1978), pp.80-83
2/ See Mazzo chi, G. (1981). The 'Statuto dei lavoratori’ approved in 
1970, to fundamental changes in the labour market institutions. 
See Valli, V. (1981)
3/ See Birtig, G. (1976) p.18
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on unemployment were available. From 1921 two main series of unemploy­
ment existed. The first showed the numbers of unemployed persons who 
signed the register of the Employment Exchanges and who were seeking 
employment and capable of work. The second series showed the extent 
of unemployment among insured persons. It was, in fact, a physical 
count of ’unemployment books' which the worker had to obtain from his 
employer and lodge in at the Employment Exchange in the case 
of unemployment. -
Presently in the United Knigdon, there exists a monthly series 
of official unemployment statistics published by the Department of 
Employment. Each month, on the 'reference day', the Department of 
Employment conducts a count of those persons registered in local employment 
offices or careers offices, who on that day have no job, and are capable 
of and available for full-time work. There exists no age limit above 
which people may not be included on the register, but persons who have 
retired may not be registered as unemployed. Unemployed persons who 
are seeking part-time jobs of less than 30 hours per week or a job of 
brief duration, as well as people who have stopped working temporarily, 
are excluded from the register. People who become unemployed and find 
a new job within the interval between two counts (four weeks) and 
therefore are not unemployed on any reference day are not counted.
The chance of being placed in a job is one incentive to register, 
but more importantly is the fact that 'signing on' is the'precondition 
for the receipt of UI benefits and supplementary benefits. The UK sta­
tistics of registered unemployment are not really a measure of the numbers 
of people out of work and looking for jobs. They are, in fact, a 
by-product of two administrative processes which are the payment of un­
employment benefits and the placement function of the employment offices..
The lack of alternative information on unemployment makes the 
official register of the unemployed the main source for employment 
analysis. The Population Census provides comprehensive information, 
but takes place only every ten years. The General Household Survey of
1/ See Buxton, N.K. (1977) p.55
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12,000 households is too small to give an accurate picture of unemploy­
ment because it has a high, degree of sampling variation. —  ^ The
General Household Survey defines as unemployed, persons too said that 
during the reference week they were not in paid employment, but were
looking for work or waiting to start a job or intended looking for
2/work but were prevented from doing so by temporary sickness. —
The EEC Labour Force Sample Survey is larger but it is undertaken only 
every other year and for the UK since 197S.
I
In recent years there has been considerable discussion of the 
usefulness of the official monthly unemployment statistics as an indicator 
of labour supply and a measure of unemployment. The level of unemploy­
ment can be over-estimated by the statistics because no distinction is 
made between different categories of unemployed such as those who are 
not genuinely seeking work, disabled persons, and fraudently unemployed.
On the other hand, data on unemployment are not sufficently comprehensive
as they include only those unemployed who are registered and, consequently,
3/underestimate the numbers of unemployed. —
Married women especially often do not register when unemployed.
There are a number of reasons why they might not join the unemployment
register. The flat-rate benefit they would receive is lower than
for men, they may not claim supplementary benefits and cannot get any
increase for dependants. Until 1977 married women had the choice of
paying contributions at a reduced rate, and would not then be entitled
to unemployment benefits. Thus the number of unemployed women is
because of their low propensity to register when unemployed,4/which in 1977, was assumed to be 56 percent. — _
1/ See Nickell.S.J. (1979c)
2/ See Office of Population Census and Surveys (1980) 
3/ See OECD (1979 a) p.229
4/ See Amranand, P. (1979) and Donaldson, A. (1978)
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Since 1972 the presentation of the unemployment statistics has 
frequently been reviewed, and since March 1976 adult students register­
ing for vacation employment are excluded.
The unemployment statistics do not specify reasons for being 
unemployed. However, the concept of redundancy Is an important one 
in Britain because the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act provided for a 
lump sum compensation related to weekly pay and length of service.
The officially published unemployment rate is defined as the 
number of registered unemployed as a percentage of total employees 
(employed plus unemployed).
2.3.2 A Picture of Employment and Unemployment
Unemployment was the most serious problem of the British 
economy between the wars. Following a short sharp boom in 1919-20, 
between 1921 and 1929 on average 14 percent of the insured work force 
was unemployed. Once the depression began there were never less 
than one million workers out of a job. There were over two million 
insured workers registered as unemployed in December 1921 and in 
January 1933, the worst month of all, there were 2,979,000. —
Present unemployment figures are now (September 1981) exceeding those 
of the inter-war period. But, of course, the labour force is much 
larger now, as pre-war figures did not cover all of the unemployed.
From 1946 to 1966 the level of unemployment was broadly stable at 
around 400,000, but in the years since then, registered unemployment 
in the United Kingdom has increased dramatically, from 615,000 
in 1974 to 1.39 million in 1979 (and to 2.85 million in July 1971).
(See Table 6 and Figure 4.)
The response of employment to the down swing in the economy 
however, is only evident since the latter part of 1979. Employment 
fell from 1974 to 1976 but has increased slightly then until the end of 
1979, Despite an unfavourable labour market situation the total 
labour force grew by 863,000 between 1974 and 1979. A part of this
1/ See Constantine, S. (1980) p.3
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growth can be explained by the increase in the population of working 
age (about 520,000), reflecting demographic factors and, to a lesser 
extent, a fall in net emxgration. Another part is attributable to the 
increase in the total activity rate, which was 72.7 percent in 1974 and 
73.5 percent in 1979. —{ Within the overall activity rate there have 
also been considerable shifts between males and females which have 
influenced not only the levels of unemployment but also the longer-run 
trends in employment and unemployment. The female activity rate has 
risen steadily. Equal pay, the decline in real average earnings 
between 1974 and 1979 which increased the desire to supplement family 
income, and rising demand for part time work all contributed to the 
acceleration of female entrants to the labour force.
The official statistics understate the rise in unemployment,
as certain people (especially school leavers and young people) who are
attending special employment and training programmes axe excluded, from
2 /the unemployment register. —
The information obtained from the General Household Surveys 
makes it possible to estimate approximately the extent of unregistered 
unemployment. The unregistered unemployed are those who describe them­
selves as out of work but are not registered for work at an Employment
3/Office. This 'hidden unemployment' amounted to 24 percent in 1978. — 
Those unemployed men who fail to register are likely to be between jobs. 
They either do not bother to claim UI for a short period or'are in­
eligible for benefits because of quitting their jobs voluntarily.
In fact, a large proportion of the unregistered unemployed in the 4/General Household Survey had been unemployed for less than six months. —
With all their weaknessess, the official figures still provide 
information about the hanging structure of unemployment and throw some 
light on the nature of the British unemployment problem. Firstly, 
they suggest that long-term unemployment is increasing particularly among
If See OECD United Kingdom (1981) and Donaldson, A. (1979)
If See OECD United Kingdon (1978)
3/ See Office of Population Census and Surveys (1980)
4/ See Donaldson A. (1979)
- 34 -
nen.— Secondly, they show that the rate of unemployment among young
people has been rising, so that the young are now disproportionately
represented among the unemployed. Youth unemployment shows a high
sensitivity to cyclical movements, which suggests that many young
workers are regarded as a marginal source of labour, but it may also
reflect changes in the propensity of young people to register as 
2/unemployed. — The increase of the absolute number of school leavers 
against a background of falling opportunities resulted in a rise in 
the rate of youth unemployment in relation to the average rate.
The redistribution of unemployment to the detriment of the younger 
age group up to 25 years appears to have already set in during the late 
1960s, and to have become more acute in'the 1970s recession. The 
probability of entering unemployment drops with age reaching its lowest 
level in the 40-to-54 age group before rising again in old age.
.The duration of unemployment is becoming longer with age
reflecting the increasing difficulty of finding suitable employment as 
3/individuals age. —  The 60 to 64 age group has a high unemployment 
rate. However, some economically inactive men of this age receive 
pensions from previous employers and register as unemployed for the 
purpose of drawing benefits.
3. Social Security Schemes for the Unemployed
3.1 Federal Republic of Germany
3.1.1 Legal Basis and General Features
In the Federal Republic of Germany the system of social 
security for the unemployed is quite elaborate and has undergone a number 
of extensions and modifications since its introduction. In 1927 a com­
pulsory contributory national UT programme was established by legislation 
for all wage earners and for lower-paid salaried employees. A new
1/ See Showier, B./Sinfield, A. (1981) pp.12 
2j See Hawkins, K. (1979) p.48 
2/ See Nickell.S.J. (1979c)
- 35 -
basis for labour market and employment policies was created in 1969 by 
the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsforderungsgesetz AFG). As its 
name indicates, its main aims lie rather in social and political 
measures that secure the highest possible standard of employment than 
in granting benefits for the unemployed. The executive body for 
social security in unemployment is the Federal Labour Office (Bundes- 
anstalt fur Arbeit)
Y
The prevailing system of social security for the unemployed
is based on the principle of contributions and provisions according to
income. Only persons who have paid contributions to the TJ1 scheme
for a certain period can unemployment benefits. Unemployed
persons who have no employment records and who are ineligible for UI
payments either have to be supported by their family or can apply for
social aid (Sozialhilfe). Social aid is granted without regard to
reasons of need but taking into account property as well as income and
2/wealth of close relatives. —
More fhan in any other system of social security in UI the 
level of expenditures depends on the economic situation. High un­
employment rates lead to a higher number of payments of UI benefits and 
vice versa. On the income side the contributions as a percentage of 
income can be lowered during boom periods. If the insurance fund had 
accumulated a certain sum, the imposition of contributions could have 
ceased for some time. Given the anti-cyclical movements of' UI and 
assuming that UI recipients have high propensity to consume, the social 
security system for the unemployed in the FRG is a stabilizing instrument 
according to the Keynesian theory. The general aim of performing an
1/ See Bundesminister fur Arbeit (1977) p.246 
2/ See Bundesminister fur Arbeit (1977) p.347
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active labour market policy, as expressed in the AFG, however, faces 
problems when the number of unemployed workers rises too high. Employ­
ment promotion and special programmes for Che unemployed are offered 
to people out of work in prosperous time while they have to be 
reduced when the economic down-swing is persisting. Programmes to 
secure full employment, training and retraining of the unemployed and 
rehabilitation programmes have been cut considerably during recent 
years.—  ^ The increasing numbers of the unemployed requires that an 
ever growing part of the financial means of the labour office is spent 
on salary compensation instead of on active labour market policies.
(See Table 7).
Compared to income compensation, the practical importance of 
active labour market policy is, and will probably be in future, very 
low because of the lack of means for this purpose.
The means at the disposal of the Labour Office are raised by 
contributions paid by the employers and the employees. Currently 
(September 1981) the employers' and the employees' rate of contributions 
each amount to 1.5 percent of the monthly net income. The base of 
assessment of contributions (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) is subject to an 
earnings ceiling. In 1979 it was the monthly income of 4,000 DM. The 
ceiling is adjusted annually to equal twice the national average of 
monthly earnings over the previous three years. Civil servants, 
students and pensioners are exempt from contributions. For employees 
with an income lower than one tenth of the ceiling amount, the con­
tributions have to be fully paid by the employer.
According to paragraph 187, AFG, the Federal Government is 
obliged to subsidize the Federal Labour Office in case of a deficit.
In the 1979 budget there was a deficit of 2,237 million EM.
1/ See Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (1978) p. 124
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/
With, the increasing levels of unemployment the base of assess­
ment and/or the percentage of contributions are modified. Up to 1973 
the number of persons covered by the UI scheme was continually growing 
(except in 1967). In 1974, 1975 and 1976 the number of contributors 
decreased, mainly because of the return of foreign workers and the 
lower female working activity. Recent years again show increasing 
tendencies in the numbers of contributors. In spite of a general 
decrease in the labour force, the proportion of employees, i.e. the 
active population that is obliged to contribute to UI, is growing.
3.1.2 Provisions and Eligibility
This research primarily analyses the impact of UI on unemploy­
ment, thus the accent is on income compensation from the UI scheme.
The Federal Labour Office also provides means- for promotion of vocational 
training (basic training, further education, and retraining), encouraging 
regional mobility of workers, the rehabilitation of handicapped persons 
and the maintenance of work places (short-time working compensation 
promotion of winter production in the building industry). —  The 
practical relevance of active labour market policy is presently quite 
limited in respect to the amount of money spent on it. The three main 
compensatory payments for unemployed workers are unemployment benefits 
(Arbeitslosenunterstutztmg, Arbeitslosengeld) unemployment aid (Arbeit s- 
losenhilfe) , and short-time worker compensation (Kurzarbeit ergeld) .
In addition, the Labour Office also pays outstanding earnings for the 
last three months in case of a firm going bankrupt (Konkursausfallgeld). 
In 1974 when this regulation was enacted the expenditures were 70.9 
million Mi (in 1979 they were 212.9 million). —
1/ See Bundesminister fur Arbeit (1977) p.249. 
2/ See ¿NBA, Jahreszahlen (1980)
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(a) Unemployment Benefits
Persons are entitled to unemployment benefits if they:
- are out of work;
~ are able and willing to work under the usual conditions 
o£ the labour market and also willing to accept a 
’reasonable' type of job;
- have completed the qualifying period of contributions;
- are under 65 years of age;
- have registered with the unemployment agency;
- - have made a claim on UX benefits. —
The qualifying period is fulfilled when a person was 
employed (with compulsory contributions to UI) for at least 
six months within the three years previous to unemployment.
The mari m m  period for which unemployment benefits are paid is 
determined by the length of time a person was employed and has 
paid contributions - at most one year. Unemployment benefits 
amount to 68 percent of the last 'normal1 net income before 
unemployment. Since 1976 the UI benefits in practice have 
been set by five earnings class schedules. They are deter­
mined annually by ministerial decree in accordance with classes 
2/of income taxes.—  UI benefits are 68 percent of .previous
income up to a mmrijman monthly compensation. In 1979 the 
ceiling for income replacement was 68 percent of 4,000 DM.
The ceiling for the «lariimm reference income is equal to the 
ceiling for the calculation of contributions to UI, and is 
adjusted yearly. UI benefits can last for up to one year and 
then are replaced by unemployment aid.
2J See AFG paragraph 100/1 
2/ See AFG paragraph 111
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(b) Unemployment Aid
Persons eligible for unemployment aid are those who:
- have not completed the qualifying period;
- are in financial need;
- have either received unemployment benefits the 
year before applying for aid or were at least 
ten weeks in paid employment;
- are at the disposal of the Labour Office. —
The definition of need is given in paragraphs 137 
and 138 AFG. The property of the~unemployed as well as 
the property of the spouse, the children and the parents, and 
the income of relatives living in the same household are 
taken into account in judging the need for financial aid. 
Unemployment aid, which is granted for an unlimited period, 
replaces the working income if there is no claim on unemployment 
benefits. It is at most 58% of the last net income. But 
since the income and wealth of the family members are taken 
into account the full amount is often not paid to the unem­
ployed person.
Table 8 shows the unemployment benefits and aid paid 
by the Labour Office in the past. In addition to UI benefits 
contributions to social insurance (health and pension) are 
paid by the Labour Office.
The placement agents at the Labour Office can decide 
on the question of whether a person seeking employment is 
'at its disposal*. Paragraph 103 AFG defines being at the 
disposal of the Labour Office as willingness to accept any 
suitable employment (zumutbare Beschäftigung). This 
flexible legal term has recently undergone some modifications
1/ See AFG, paragraph 134
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In 1976 new interpretations of the concept of suitable jobs 
have come into effect. Jobs offered by the Labour Office 
generally have to be considered as suitable. In several 
cases persons seeking employment have been forced to accept 
employment which was inconsistent with their personal con­
ceptions. If an unemployed person does not accept a 
suitable job offer, unemployment benefits can be denied for 
four weeks (Sperrzeiten). In 1979 in 55,000 cases, benefits 
were denied because of job refusals. If an unemployed 
person refuses a second time his entitlement to UI compen­
sations can be completely forfeited. —^
If an unemployed person, without valid reason,
voluntarily terminates his employment, or if by misconduct
on the job he gives his employer cause to dismiss him, he
is disqualified from receiving benefits during the first four
21weeks of his unemployment. —  In a case where the four- 
week disqualification would involve particular hardship, it 
may be reduced to two weeks.
(c) Short-time Worker Compensation (Kurzarbeitergeld)
Compensation for short-time workers is not considered 
as benefits for unemployment, but as a means to maintain 
working places. It is paid to employees in the case of 
reduction of working time due to economic developments.
Payment for short-time workers are only granted for a 
transitional period of under-employment and only under the
3/condition that by this measure the working places can be kept.—
1/ See Krautkramer, D. (1978) p.56
If See also Table 15. The development of the denial rates over 
time is discussed in Chapter 6.2
3/ See Bundeminister fur Arbeit (1977) p.261 and Deeke, A. (1979)
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Compensations are calculated according to previous regular 
incomes and are 68 percent of usual net incomes. The peak 
of short-tune working compensation was in 1975 with 2,207 
million DM and a yearly average of 773,334 workers. In 
1979 on average 88,000 workers received short-time compen­
sation.
3.2 Italy
3.2.1 General Features
The main insurance body of the Italian DI scheme is the 
Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale (INPS).—  ^ The INPS
is a self-governing body under the supervision of the Minister of 
Labour's Department of Social Security. Three schemes with separate 
funds and management are administered by INFS: the insurance for
involuntary unemployment (Assicurazione contro la Disoccupazione 
Involontaria), the fund for wage integration in industry (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni per l'Industria) and the fund for wage inte­
gration for agricultural workers (Cassa per l'Integrazione dei
2/Salari dei Dipendenti da Imprese Agricole). —
In reaction to the unprecedent drop in output and the rise 
in unemployment, the Italian authorities took measures to expand the 
insurance system for unemployment. During the past ten years 
the coverage of social and occupational groups, as well as the amount 
of payments were constantly increased. During recent years laws 
on active labour market policies have been introduced, aiming at the 
improvement of labour mobility and the creation of employment pos­
sibilities, especially for young people searching first employment.—  ^
However, the practical relevance of these legal regulations is quite 
limited so far.
If See OECD (1977a). For Journalists there exists a different 'ente 
sociale', the INPGI. See Fausto, D. (1978)
2/ See INPS (1978)
3/ See Legge 1.6.1977 n.285, according to which regional and local
authorities are obliged to create programmes opening job opportunities 
for young unemployed, and Legge 12.8.1977 n.675, which established 
special funds »-nrf commissions for labour mobility.
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Because of the low unemployment compensation as compared to 
UI in other Western European countries, short-time working benefits have 
been particularly important. Changes in 1968, 1972 and 1975 have extended 
considerably the number of hours of short-time working for which benefits 
can be obtained, and also the amount of payments.
The main elements of unemployment transfers and related payments
are:
- ordinary allowance (iadenita ordinaria) and special 
allowance (trattamento speciale) in the ordinary
■ insurance scheme;
- special allowance in the special insurance scheme for 
the construction sector;
- compensation for short-time unemployment and work suspen­
sion (integrazione salariale).
Insurance against unemployment protects the case of total 
unemployment as well as the reduction of income due to partial or tem­
porary unemployment.
Insofar as various groups have succeeded in their labour 
conflicts, their positions improved, but those with weaker bargaining 
power fell behind. As a consequence, inequalities were created among 
different socio-economic groups also in their rights to unemployment 
compensation. The weakness of bargaining power shows above all in the 
situation of the unemployed searching for first employment since they 
have no claim on any type of social security. The differences with respect 
to contributions and provisions that exist in the different sectors of 
the economy (industry, construction, and agriculture) make an analysis 
of the system of social security for the unemployed in Italy quite 
complicated.
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3.2.2 Unemployment Insurance
UI is compulsory for all workers and employees, except for public 
sector employees, seasonal workers, domestics and certain categories of 
agricultural workers.
The financing of UI depends on the type of scheme. Up to 1975
the contributions were 2.3 percent of income. In general it is now
1.3 percent of the gross earnings always paid by the enterprise.
The contributions are proportional to income, with no ceiling. In
industry an additional contribution of 0.3 percent of earnings is 
required for the special allowance and a further 15 percent have to 
be paid on overtime pay. —  ^ In 1977 there were about 10.3 million 
workers insured against unemployment which is about 50 percent of the total 
labour force.
The UI can be divided into the ordinary scheme and the special 
scheme for the construction sector. The first consists of the following:
- the ordinary allowance which provides a flat rate of 800 lire 
per day for a maximum time span of 180 days for non-agricultural 
workers^
- the special allowance for unemployed argicultuxal workers which
pays 66 percent of earnings lost for up to 90 days (however,
only if an employment contract for a determined tffeie of more
3/than 150 days exists)
- a special allowance for the unemployed in industry apart from
the construction sector. In a case of mass dismissals when 
firms have to close down, workers become eligible for 80 per­
cent of their previous income for a duration of up to 12 months,
1/ See INPS (1978). The contributions for agricultural workers are 0.25 
percent. For the 'trattamento speciale' in the construction sector, 
the additional contribution is 0.5 percent.
2/ See Legge 16.4.1975 n.114
3/ See Legge 16.2.1977 n.37
if they had been in paid employment before for at least 12 weeks or 
one trimester. —^
Furthermore, there exists an extraordinary allowance for the 
unemployed in exceptional cases or as a result of natural catastrophies. 
The level of benefits is determined by ministerial decree.
Through the special scheme for construction workers, those unem­
ployed are paid two-thirds of their last salary for the first 90 days 
of unemployment. Before the modifications introduced by the Law 425/1975, 
the benefits were only one-third of the last salary for 60 days of un­
employment.
The unemployed workers must have been registered for at least 
two years with a Ü1 scheme, must have paid contributions for at least 
one year during the two years preceding unemployment, and must register 
with the employment office, in order to qualify for the ordinary allowance. 
Extraordinary allowance can be received by unemployed persons who cannot 
claim ordinary allowance and who are working in certain areas or in 
professional or trade activities in certain categories laid down by 
ministerial decree. Five weekly contributions during the past two 
years must have been paid. During the period of unemployment, contri­
butions to other social insurances are paid by the INPS, In addition, 
allowances for each other member of the family are paid through INPS.
Periods during which the unemployed person has worked and paid
contributions in other countries of the European Community are taken
into account, however, only if he had become unemployed after having
2 /•started work in Italy. —
- 46 -
1/ See Legge 11.12.1979 n.624; according to Legge 5.11.1968 n.1115 
the unemployment compensation amounted to 66 percent of previous 
income.
2/ See European Communities (3.976) p.48
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There is a considerable gap between incomes of the active 
working population and unemployment benefits. Changes in the system 
of social security for the unemployed that were introduced during recent 
years have not been sufficient to compensate for Italian inflation 
rates or to satisfy the needs of the growing numbers of the unemployed 
(especially youth unemployment which is in no way covered by social 
security). The financial situation of the unemployed is quite dif­
ficult considering the flat rate benefit of only 800 lire which has been 
unchanged since 1974 , in spite of the fast growing cost of living. —  ^
(See Table 9). The contributions by employees to the ÜI schemes far 
from cover the expenditures. Subsidies for the State are growing 
continuously.
3.2.3 The * Cassa Integrazione Guadagni1
Since the period after World War II, a system of income compen­
sation to workers on short-time, the '*wage integration" (Integrazione 
Salariale) has been in operation for workers employed in industry.
The initial purpose of this insurance scheme was to cope with the re­
duction of labour caused by the war and the post-war restoration.
With the institution of special administration (gestione speciale) in 
the construction industry in 1963 and of the extraordinary interventions 
(interventi straordinari) in 1968, the system of wage integration became 
a generalized system of social security. Since 1972 agricultural 
workers are also covered. Important qualitative modifications 
introduced in 1968 amplified the interventions of the Cassa Integrazione 
on cases of labour reduction following economic crises of sectors or 
restructuring and reorganization of a plant. In 1975 the income
1/ Two factors which are to some extent a result of the inadequate 
UI benefits are anomalous numbers of invalidity pensions, 
above all in Southern Italy, and the spread of the practice of 
drawing several pensions at the same time. See Gambale, S. (1979). 
Invalidity pensions have been growing out of proportion during 
the last decade, in many cases, probably have been a form of 
disguised subsidy to social strata excluded from production or con­
fined to black labour. See Palazzi, P./Poli, A. (1979), pp.77
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compensation for wage reduction was extended to 80 percent of general 
earnings for up to a maximum of 40 hours per week. —  ^ In 1980 the 
ceiling of income compensations for workers anrf employees was raised to
600,000 lire per month. Contributions to other social security schemes 
are paid by the Cassa Integrazione.
Until 1978 firms in industry which less than 50 employees 
paid 0.75 percent of the wages, the others one percent. Now it is one 
percent and 1.3 percent. (In the construction sector the contributions 
are three percent for the 'edilizia industria’ and two percent for the 
'lapidei industria1.) Firms asking for compensation for short-time 
working have to bear eight percent of the salaries being compensated 
(four percent for firms with less than 50 workers, and five percent in 
construction). The sum which the State has to contribute as subsidy 
is fixed by law; initially, it was 20 billion lire and presently it is 
80 billion. —
There is a distinction between the ’ gestione ordinaria' and the
’gestione straordinarla1. The former applies to reductions or stops of
activities of a plant because of transitional difficulties of the en-
3/terprise or a temporary state of the market. — By the 'gestione
straordinaria' additions to salaries are paid where firms reduce or
cease working ring because of economic crises, which cannot be overcome
within a short time, restructuring (i.e. modernization and extension of
4/the plant) or re-organization of the enterprise. —
Ordinary benefits are normally paid for up to three months.
In exceptional cases, this period can be prolonged by three months up 
to a maT-imirm of 12 months. Extraordinary wage compensation (from the
— The actual difference between income and wage integration is, how­
ever, lower than 20 percent because no contributions to social 
security have to be paid.
2/ See Ministero del Bilancio (1981). The special benefits for short
~ t-fmg TOrk caused by structural factors are entirely financed by 
public funds. . See Mittelstâdt, A. (1975) p.16.
3/ See Legge 20. maggio 1975, n.164.
4/ See Legge 5. novembre 1968, n. 1115.
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’gestione straordinaria*) can., in some cases, be paid for virtually an 
unlimited period. By law, different maximum periods are determined 
according to reasons for wage integration. These are one year for 
cases of sectoral crises; for restructuring and reorganization there are 
no time limits other than the necessary duration of restructuring and 
fer a crisis of a plant the Minister of Labour can establish by decree 
the duration of wage integration. In the case of a firm's bankruptcy, 
the workers who would otherwise have been dismissed, are compensated 
two years income losses. A special provision extends the wage inte­
gration for workers who have been involved in public work in Southern 
Italy. If their employment has ceased they can claim income compensation 
for up to 39 months.
In agriculture the wage integration is paid for up to 90 days 
per year and the contribution shares are three percent of the earnings.
The existence of wage integration has made unemployment less 
severe than it would otherwise have been. By this .instrument, agree­
ments between management and labour unions can be reached to reduce 
working hours rather than dismiss large numbers of workers. The defi­
ciency of unemployment benefits in Italy made the eamings-protection 
function of wage integration schemes very important. The Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni has, nowadays, very much the same character as a 
social insurance for involuntary unemployment. The laws of the Cassa 
Integrazione provide that benefits are denied to workers who refuse to 
participate in retraining courses. However, so far very few of these 
kinds of courses have been started.
When the extraordinary interventions fox the short-time working 
were intxoduced in 1968, they wexe thought to pxovide a means of main­
taining the employment level and thus facilitating the restructuring and 
reorganization of plants, which were required for adjustments to technologi­
cal progress. But very rapidly this instrument was transformed into one 
for the defense of the workers T income. It emerged as a system where
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the remunerations rather than the employment of the workers were 
protected. It is now admitted that the basic purpose of the Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagxu. is to secure stability of employment and guarantee 
an income for the workers. By this means social tensions inside and 
outside of the enterprise could have been avoided. ^
The Cassa Integrazione Guadagni has meanwhile assumed the role of
subsidizing the immobility of the Italian labour market is adding
2/to the existence of an 'economia pompeiana’.— In many cases, employees 
who are out of work receive short-time compensation for periods of 
longer than one year and can, in fact, be regarded as unemployed. But 
as they are still engaged with the enterprise and are getting wage com­
pensation, they are completely ismobile on the labour market.
The entire system of compensation for short-time working has 
degenerated since orginally it was meant to secure the workers1 
salaries only in cases of special difficulties of certain enterprises and 
only temporarily. There are examples of enterprises which are inefficient 
and survive only because of payments coming from the Cassa Integrazione.
In a case of a crisis in the plant (crisi aziendale) there is in fact 
a possibility of extending the period of wage integration to up to 40 
months, without <-a1r-mg into account the time before with benefits from 
other schemes of the Cassa Integrazione.
The concession and prolongation of the ’gestione straordinaria' 
of the Cassa Integrazione Ha« very often become a political rather than 
an economic decision. politicians thinking of their re-election
will try to avoid large-scale s and support demands for wage
integration in their districts.
1/ See Ministero del Bilancio (1981) and Palmerio, G./Valimi, R.
2/ This expression, relating to the bodies of the Romans who died
under f lava in Pompei, has been used ^ y Tarantella., £• (1978) p«80
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The Cassa Integrazione Guadagni indicates again the dualism of the 
Italian economy with the cleavage between.North and South. The northern 
regions have experienced relatively more interventions of wage compen­
sations because of modernization and restructuring of plants, while the 
Mezzogiorno more frequently relies on extraordinary interventions for 
enterprises in times of a crisis. More often than in Northern Italy, 
firms in the southern regions rely on the Cassa Integrazione as a permanent 
income subsidy without hopes of new employment. Wage integration in 
cases where the entire staff has been suspended, is a frequent phenomenon 
especially in the south. In most instances there is a smal 3 probability 
of a reappraisal of the productive activity by the means from the Cassa 
Integrazione.
In general, workers in larger establishments and with higher
wages have benefitted more from wage integration than workers in smaller
1/enterprises with lower earnings.—
Problems associated with, unemployment statistics make it difficult 
to assess the possible unemployment-reducing effect to the scheme of the 
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni. Data are published only on the hours 
of wage integration, but not on the number of persons. The Minister 
of Labour does not provide any data on categories of demographic and 
social groups affected by short-time working.
Table 10 and Figure 5 show the development of the two ma ip types 
of wage integration. Changes in the two categories over time are due 
only in part to economic developments in Italy. They are rather, a 
result of modifications in the legislation and thus cannot be analysed 
on a purely economic base. The decrease in the number of ordinary 
interventions after 1975 has to be explained mainly by the limitation of 
concessions. But firms now apply more often for extraordinary inter­
ventions and these have actually surpassed the number of ordinary wage 
integration.
1/ See OECD (1977a)
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
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TABLE 10: HOURS OF WAGE INTEGRATION
(.in 1000s)
CASSA INTEGRAZIONE -  GESTIONE ORDINARIA 
ordinary extraordinary
interventions . total
95300
10894
8866
14130
39536
232763
74051
35940
27876
11898
20543
44836
34095
20915
51945
229625
130610
117246
140905
59005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2367
7636
7157
75215
63862
38360
39023
59082
77646
70360
110817
146607
9530
10S94
8866
14130
39536
232763
74051
35940
30243
19534
27700
120051
97957
59275
90968
288707
208256
187606
251722
205612
Ministero del Bilancio (1981)
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3.3 United Kingdom.
3.3.1 The 'Dole* in Inter-war Britain
Some contemporary observers attributed the main causes of high 
unemployment in the inter-wax period to the British system of social 
security. Recently this debate has been taken up again^ In order 
to refer to this discussion at a later point, the British UT scheme will 
be described in historical perspective.
In 1911, Great Britain became the first country to institute 
a national compulsory UI programme for manual workers, adapting the 
social insurance concept which was first applied earlier in Germany 
to protect workers against wage loss caused by inability to work due 
to sickness or injuries. The expression ’dole’ as used in colloquial 
English, is the name given to the UI scheme. It has its origins in the 
'out-of-work donation', which came into existence after World War I.
Initially intended for ex-soldiers it was, in fact, also made available
- 2/  to civilians. —
The UI programme was linked to the national unemployment
exchange system which had bees introduced earlier, and was financed
by contributions from workers, employers, and the Government. By
1920 all manna 1 workers, with the exception of domestic and agricultural
3/workers, were covered by UI. ~ Between 60 and 7 0 percent of the
4/work force was insured in the inter-war period. —
The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 replaced the 'dole' and 
increased weekly benefits from 11 to 15 shillings per week, which was 
little more than 20 percent of as average industrial wage. Is 1921 
the ma-r-imrm period for which benefits were paid was raised from 15 to 
26 weeks per year and in 1928 this amnia 1 limit was abolished. Nominal
1/ See Chapter 5.1
2/ See Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980)
3/ See Blaustein, S.J./Craig, 1.(1976), p.224 
4/ See Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980)
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benefits were raised on several occasions, primarily through increases 
in family allowances. —
In order to qualify for benefits from the ÏÏI scheme, an 
unemployed individual had to have made at least 12 weekly contributions and 
had to be capable and avail.able for work but unable to find suitable 
employment. From 1924 onwards, he also had to prove that he was 
* genuinely seeking work*. The high and long-term unemployment during 
the 1920s and 1930s forced the Government to take remedial actions.
The period of benefit support was extended and a supplementary UI with 
additional forms of unemployment assistance was introduced. This pro­
vided weekly payments identical in amount to those received by insurance 
beneficiaries.
By 1924 a worker who had made 30 weekly contributions at any 
time in his past employment could draw full UI benefits for an unlimited 
period. Because of the high deficits of the UI fund the generosity of 
the system was again curtailed in 1931; weekly benefits were cut, con­
tribution requirements were raised and the maximum duration of UI com­
pensation was limited again to 26 weeks.
Unemployed persons who had exhausted their unemployment benefits
were still entitled to apply for supplementary benefits. These payments
were means-tested and paid only in cases of financial need. By the
Employment Act of 1934, then again in 1935 and 1938, UI.benefits were
increased, Workers who had exhausted their claims or were not eligible
for UI benefits could apply for assistance from the newly established
Unemployment Assistance Board. The administration of the needs-related
component was particularly severe. Between 1932 and 1938 the proportion
of the unemployed who received only means-tested benefits was always
2/higher than 36 percent, and in 1933 it rose to 52 percent.—
1/ See Benjamin, D.K./Kochxa, L.A. (1979)
2/ See Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980)
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UI benefits differed according to sex and age but were not 
calculated in relation to previous income.
Any three days of unemployment during any six consecutive 
working days were regarded as 'continuous unemployment1. A pair of 
such three-day periods, occuring within three to ten weeks could be 
connected to constitute a six-day waiting period, that had to be 
served in order to claim UI benefits. This definition of 'continuous' 
unemployment fostered the widespread practice of 'short-time' working. 
Workers formed groups of five or six members who arranged with their 
employer to have one or two in each group to be temporarily laid off in 
turn, thus enabling them to retain continuous eligibility for UI 
benefits.—^
In the early part of 1930, the condition that benefit
claimants must show that they are 'genuinely seeking work' was dropped.
In his analysis of unemployment, Beveridge argued that the considerable
rise in the level of registered female unemployment in 1930 and 1931 to
80 and 90 percent of the rate for males (in most of the years between
1927 and 1937 it was about 50 percent), can find an explanation, not
2/in economic conditions, but in the changes in the UI scheme. —
Married women, particularly, were assumed to collect benefits 
even though they had no real intentions of returning to work. The 
Anomalies Regulations, instituted in October 1931, made the collection 
of benefits by married women more difficult. They had to satisfy sub­
stantially more demanding contributory requirements than those imposed
3/on other claimants. —  It appears that the Anomalies Regulations 
reduced 'counted' unemployment rather than the 'true* unemployment.
1/ See Benjamin, D.K./Kochin, L.A. (1979) 
2/ See Beveridge, W.E. (1936)
3/ See Benjamin, D.K./Kochin, L.A. (1979)
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3.3.2 The Current System of Social Security for the Unemployed
After World War II, the United Kingdom adopted a comprehensive 
National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Scheme which also included 
UI. It came into operation in 1948. Studies of the existing programmes 
and recommendations for a unified system of Social Security that were 
put forward in the Beveridge Report laid the basis for the new system. — 
The National Insurance system is administered by the Department of 
Health and Social Security.
The post-war benefit system, until 1966 called National 
Assistance, had the same structure as the pre-war system. Flat rate 
payments are related to family size. Supplementary Benefit is 
awarded to unemployed persons who exhaust their UI benefits or do not 
fulfill the qualifying conditions. It provides means-tested flat-rate 
benefits, a housing allowance and has more generous payments for the 
children of those out of work than does UI. Supplementary benefits 
define the subsistence level and if insurance benefits are lower, then 
supplementary benefits can be used to top-up the former.
In 1966 the UI scheme was substantially modified by the
introduction of an Earnings Belated Supplement ('ESS') . It is paid
in addition to the normal flat rate benefit, if previous earnings of the
unemployed individual are high enough (£500 in the tax year). The
contributions in the relevant tax year on earnings have to amount to
more than 50 times the weekly lower earnings limit for that year -
2/£19.50 for 1979-1980.— Benefits are a percentage of weekly earnings 
between a certain income range (in 1979: one-third of earnings between
£19*50 and £30.00, plus 15 percent of any weekly earnings between £30.00 
and the upper earnings limit - the maximum amount was £17.67 per week).
1/ See Beveridge, W.H. (1942)
2J See Blaustein, S.J./Craig, I. (1976) p.229 and Social Trends (1981) 
p.234.
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EES is paid after an initial waiting period of 12 days and for up to
26 weeks of unemployment. —  ^To qualify for the flat rate unemployment
benefit the claimant must:
- be unemployed and apply for benefits;
- be between 16 and 65 years of age (60 years for a woman);
- have paid during any past year (as an employee) contributions 
based on earnings equal to at least 50 times the minimum 
weekly earnings limit established for that year (£19.50 in 
1979). (This contribution condition also applies to EES);
- be capable and available for work. (This condition is 
generally accepted as being satisfied when the claimant 
maintains registration for work at an Employment Office.)
Conditions for receiving supplementary benefits are:
- the individual should not be in full-time work;
- his resources should be less than his requirements (con­
sidering the number of dependents and the level of rent);
- he should be fit for work and register at an Employment Office.
The flat rate amounts have been raised several times; they were 
26 shillings in 1946 and £18.50 for a single person in 1979. The 
weekly supplement for dependents, as of 1979 was £11.45 for one adult 
dependent and £1.70 for each child. The total weekly benefits payable 
taking together flat rate, supplements and ERS, may not exceed 85 percent 
of the claimants average weekly earnings. Table 11 shows the average 
benefits^ in relation to average income (replacement rates) for certain 
types of families, the first gives the replacement rate for a single man, 
the second for a married man with two children and the third is an average 
value for different family types.
1/ See Holden, K./Peel, D.A. (1979)
Year
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
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TABLE 11: REPLACEMENT RATIOS FOR DIFFERENT FAMILY TYPES
Replacement Rate 1 
Imputed for a married 
nan with 2 children
Replacement Rate 2 
Imputed for a single man
Replacement Rate 3 
An average of the 
imputed values for 
different family 
types
Replacement 
(Based on a 
benefits o
0.37 0.25 0.32 0.28
0.40 0.27 0.34 0.25
0.42 0.29 0.36 0.24
0.48 0.32 0.41 0.26
0.48 0.32 0.41 0.23
0.48 0.32 0.41 -0.27
0.50 0.31 0.41 0.22
0.50 0 30 0.41 0.29
0.53 0.31 0.44 0.17
0.54 0.30 0.44 0.26
0.50 0.28 0.41 0.30
0.51 0.28 0.41 0.32
0.53 0.30 0.43 0.32
0.55 0.31 0.45 0.32
0.57 0.30 0.45 0.37
0.56 0.30 0.44 0.36
0.56 0.29 0.42 0.29
U.S. S.B. U.B. S.B. S.B.
0.36 0.36 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.21
0.42 0.42 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.24
0.39 0.39 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.23
0.37 0.47 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.22
0.39 0.46 0.21 0.27 0.37 0.24
0.37 0.47 0.20 0.27 0.38 0.22
0.36 0.45 0.19 0.27 0.37 0.22
0.44 0.51 0.24 0.30 0.42 0.28
0.42 0.54 0.22 0.31 0.44 0.27
0.40 0.51 0.21 0.30 0.42 0.26
0.44 0.53 0.24 0.31 0.43 0.28
0.43 0.54 0.23 0.32 0.45 0.28
0.47 0.53 0.26 0.34 0.47 0.31
0.45 0.56 .. 0.24 0.32 0.44 0.29
0.49 0.59 0.27 0.36 0.49 0.33
0.53 0.61 0.32 0.38 0.51 0.36
0.57 0.63 0.34 0.39 0.53 0.40
0.54 0.63 0.33 0.39 0.53 0.39
0.54 0.62 0.31 0.38 0.52 0.36
0.58 0.61 0.31 0.37 0.51 0.37
0.56 0.62 0.33 0.38 0.51 0.39
0.56 0.60 0.34 0.35 0.49 0.38
0.56 0.59 0.31 0.36 0.48 0.38
0.54 0.61 0.32 0.35 0.49 0.37
0.54 0.61 0.31 0.36 0.50 0.35
0.54 0.60 0.31 0.37 0.50 0.35
Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980)
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NOTES TO TABLE 11
1. 1922-38, Benjamin and Kochin.
1951-76, Left-hand column! Standard rate of unemployment benefit + 25Z
of Earnings Related Supplement (ERS) + 
family allowances/child benefit t Net weekly 
income of male nianua] workers after deducting 
tax and National Insurance contributions, 
but including family allowances/child benefit. 
Department of Health and Social Security 
Abstract of Statistics (Internal Document).
25% of ERS is added because this is the approx­
imate proportion of the unemployed in receipt 
of it.
Right-hand column: Standard rate of Supplementary Benefit plus
rent addition 4- Net weekly income of manual 
workers after deducting tax and National 
Insurance contributions but including family 
allowances/child benefit.
2. 1922-38, Numerator imputed.denominator as in Benjamin and Kochin.
1951-76, Left-hand column.: As in 3 .
Right-hand column: As in 3.
3. This series is weighted average of the series for different family types.
More precisely it is 0.35 x single + 0.26 x married with no dependents +
0.11 x married with one dependent + 0.16 married with 2 dependents + 0.12 x 
married with 3 dependents. The separate replacement rates are computed as 
in 4. (Rtgh>-hanri f»rvi iwnns 1951-76) and the weights are the approximate 
proportions in the unemployed in 1972.
4. 1922-38, (Benefits plus Supplementary Payments to the Unemployed) / (Average 
number of insured unemployed on the register) (j^  of Average Annual 
Earnings of all Employees).
1951-76, (Total unemployment benefit paid) / (Number of unemployment benefit 
recipients) 4- (Net Weekly Income of male manual workers after deducting 
tax and National Insurance Contributions).
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Supplementary benefits are presently £18.30 for a single householder 
excluding the rent subsidies and family allowances.—  ^ Table 12 shows 
the percentages of male recipients in the different categories of unemploy­
ment benefits. It is readily apparent that the majortiy of the unem­
ployed do not receive ERS. During the 1970s an increasing proportion 
of the registered unemployed came to depend on supplementary benefits.
The standard rate of unemployment benefits is not payable for the 
first three days of a period of unemployment. It is paid for up to one 
year. If two periods of unemployment are separated by less than 13 weeks 
of employment, they are counted as one spell of unemployment, for purposes 
of benefit assessment as well as for the waiting period. Supplementary 
benefits are not tied to any time limit.
By the Social Security Act of 1975, the insurance schemes were 
restructured, and the flat rate system in the principle of calculating 
contributions was abolished. The employee's contribution and that of 
his employer are now earnings related above a certain floor. The con­
tributions to all social insurance schemes are a fixed percentage of
earnings equal for all wage classes, 5.75 percent for the worker earning
2/up to £120 weekly and 8.75 percent for the employer.— An important 
feature of the British Social Security System is that many of the main 
cash benefits (such as supplementary benefits) are financed out of 
general taxation.
An employee who is dismissed for misconduct, or who leaves his
employment voluntarily, may be disqualified from receiving benefits for
up to six weeks. A claimant is disqualified from benefits if, without
good cause, he refuses suitable employment, fails to apply for suitable
employment of which is is made aware or refuses to participate in re-
sonable training activity. The concept of 'suitable employment'
does not include employment too far from the claimants home or that which
provides a lower wage or less favourable conditions than those generally 
3/recognized.—
JL/ See Social Trends (1981) p.234 
2/ See DIW (1979)
3/ See Blaustein, S.J./Craig, I. (1976) p.227 and Donaldson, A. (1978)
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Until May 1977 married women had the choice of paying contributions 
to UI at a reduced rate, now they are no longer permitted to choose reduced 
liability. Since April 1978 the normal rate of unemployment benefits for 
married women who have fulfilled the contribution conditions is the same 
as for single women or men.
3.4 A Comparison of Social Security for the Unemployed in the 
three Countries
Cl exists to alleviate hardship experienced by workers during periods 
of unemployment. The extent to which income loss is compensated differs 
considerably from country to country. Although the three countries under 
consideration are among the first to have introduced a national compulsory 
Cl programme (Great Britain in 1911, Italy in 1919 and Germany in 1927), 
the three insurance schemes show very divergent developments in respect to 
concepts, coverage and benefit provision. Great Britain has the most com­
prehensive net of social security for the unemployed, while the Italian 
one shows most imperfections and gaps. Apart from some very special 
scehmes, only the income compensation from the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
has a level comparable with the standards of other EEC countries.
All three countries provide benefits to unemployed eligible workers 
regardless of their means, according to a social insurance approach under 
which covered workers or their employers contribute to a fund for financing 
benefits. Germany and the UK in addition provide some kind of social 
assistance to the unemployed, subject to a means test.
The way in which Cl operates in the different countries is also a 
result of the tradition of employment relationships, the availability of 
other social welfare programmes and the role and strength of labour unions. 
Little attempt is made here to describe how the three countries differ 
in these respects, although this fact should be borne in mind. Some 
points will be taken up in the discussion in a later part of this thesis.
- 65 -
Compared with other contingencies covered by social insurance programmes, 
unemployment is subject to much greater fluctuations and uncertainty in 
respect to incidence and timing. The financing of UI has to be organized 
in such a way as to cover the uneven and unpredictable costs through 
fluctuations in the level of unemployment with stable contributions. The
FRG finances UI benefits on a tripartite basis, with equal contributions 
paid by employer and employees, and the Government being obliged to cover 
a deficit of the fund. In Italy, the employers finance the social 
security schemes for the unemployed, but the state is contributing a 
growing part in order to cover the enormous deficits of the UI schemes.
The UK has a unified social security system where UI costs are covered 
by an overall contribution from employers, workers and the Government to 
all types of social insurances. —
In all three countries contributions are earnings related, in the 
FRG and the UK up to an income ceiling.
It is difficult to estimate the impact that the level and distribution 
of contributions to social security schemes has on labour costs and salaries. 
However, it appears that the redistributive aim in financing UI entirely by 
employers increases the tendency to 1 non-institutional' labour. High 
contributions to insurance schemes provide an incentive for Italian 
enterprises to reduce the labour costs by illegally employing workers.
Generally, UI systems maintain a reserve fund for the payment of benefits 
which accumulate surpluses able to cover deficits that may occur in times 
of high unemployment. Contribution rates often also vary is relation to 
the economic development. In the FRG, UI contributions have frequently
1/In West Germany the contributions to social security schemes are 
generally divided equally between employers and workers. The 
Italian employers pay relatively more also in other insurance 
schemes. In 1976 their overall contributions to social security were 
about 65 percent as against 15.2 percent paid by the employed 
workers. See Fausto, D. (1978) p. 150
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been modified following the movements in the labour market with a lag. —  ^
In Italy the share of income to be paid to UI could remain relatively 
stable (and was even lowered some years ago). This was possible for two 
reasons. An increasing part of the unemployed, mainly people searching 
first employment, cannot claim UI benefits and thus a higher unemployment 
did not result in correspondingly higher expenditures on UI payments. 
Secondly, public subsidies, financed by general taxes, were increasingly 
spent on the social security schemes and the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni.
In great Britain the problem of finding the financial means for growing 
unemployment is one for the state rather than for UI because many benefits 
are financed directly out of general taxation.
UI Benefit Provision
On average, UI benefits in relation to income are highest in the 
FRG. In Italy in some special cases of dismissals 80 percent of previous 
income is replaced, but in general, Italian UI benefits are extremely 
low. In the FRG,income replacement by UI is always 68 percent of previous 
net income, independent of family size, while in the UK replacement 
rates differ considerably by income level and between single persons and 
the unemployed with children because of family allowances. This may, 
in fact, lead to the phenomenon that married men with four or more children 
may be better off unemployed than they would be in work.
However, in most cases, workers who become unemployed have to face 
serious financial problems. This is quite obvious for most of the 
Italian unemployed. But also in the FBG, surveys among people out of 
work and receiving UI benefits suggest that only a small minority is 
satisfied with t-he material situation in unemployment. In spite of 
relatively high incase compensation, the majority of the unemployed had
1/ The persistent high levels of unemployment necessitated rises 
in contributions. In the recent debate, higher rates of con­
tribution to UI are discussed as a possible remedy for the now 
chronic deficit of the Federal Labour Office. In Great Britain 
National Insurance contributions have been increased in 1980, but 
it is not clear how much was attributable to higher unemployment.
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to cut down their personal expenses significantly and had to use up
savings. —  ^ British studies on the cost of unemployment stated that
for the unemployed life is often a constant battle to find money for
21food, clothing and essential bills. —
The network of social security can normally prevent extrema poverty, 
but with unemployment income falls considerably. Especially among low 
salary earners (who, in general, are over represented among the unemployed) 
an income loss of 40 to 50 percent during unemployment means a drastic 
cut in the standard of living.
In both Italy and the FRG compensation is also paid for partial 
unemployment under a UI programme, but the two schemes are not comparable 
in their functioning and importance for the labour market.
The duration of UI payments differs widely among countries. In 
most European countries there are special assistance programmes to protect 
those who remain without work and without means after they have exhausted 
their UI benefits (is the FRG, unemployment aid or social aid, is the 
UK, supplementary benefits). The FRG has the longest duration of regular 
besefits (up to one year, six months for EES is the UK). After exhaustion 
of UI benefits, unemployment aid or supplementary besefits in the FRG 
asd the UK, respectively, are grasted for as unlimited time. They are 
related, however, to other family members’ incomes. In Italy the unemployed 
who exhausted his benefit claims depends entirely os family support 
and, in most cases, for the duration c£ unemployment. In all three 
countries, family support becomes more important considering the increas­
ing duratios of unemployment and the growing percentage of long-term 
unemployed.
1/ See Briskaass, C. (1976), Infratest (1978), asd Buchtemasn, C.F./ 
v. Rosenbladt, B. (1981)
2/ See Daniel, W.W./Stilgoe, E. (1977)
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Coverage of PI
In Che FRG and Italy, unemployed persons without employment records 
are excluded by law from the receipt of UI benefits. In the UK supple­
mentary benefits are provided to all unemployed who are in need, but 
statistics reveal that a significant number of the unemployed who have 
registered and applied for benefits do not receive any unemployment 
compensation (in 1979 147,000). In May 1979, 22.3 percent of the un­
employed registered in the FRG did not receive UI payments. In the FRG 
and Italy, young unemployed persons who are looking for first employment 
cannot claim UI benefits. —  ^ Youth unemployment means' a noticeable 
reduction in the family budget. This fact is especially important if 
one considers that unemployed young people often come from less well-off 
families. Youth unemployment is becoming a more serious problem of 
Western economies (in the UK little less than half of all unemployed 
were younger than 26 years of age during the last four to five years 
and in Italy more than half of the registered unemployed are now in search 
of their first employment). But this group of unemployed is either not 
at all or only very inadequately covered by social security. Thus an 
ever growing part of the unemployed falls through the net of social 
security. When difficulties increase for young people in search 
of their first job, the social control by the fami 1 es lasts longer and the 
tendency towards an earlier independence is reversed.
In all three countries women often do not benefit from UI to 
the same extent that men do. In 1979 in the FRG, 26.4 percent of 
registered unemployed women did not obtain unemployment compensation as 
against 17.1 percent of men. In the UK the possibility for women to
opt out of UI until 1977 led to a lower registration of female unemploy­
ment. As many married women are financially secure because of their
husbands' incomes and not regarded as in need, they often withdraw from 
the labour market without registering as unemployed.
1/ A study from the German Labour Office showed that 64 percent of 
the unemployed under 20 years of age were financially dependent on 
their parents and that all unemployed school-leavers are financially 
supported by the family. See Schober, K. (1978)
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la Italy the high youth unemployment and the lack of social 
security for this group have the most important impact on family income.
In the FRG high female unemployment reduces the financial tno-ans of the 
family in many cases, also because the proportion of married women earning 
money in addition to the family income is higher.
General Tendencies
With a constantly growing level of unemployment, Governments 
increasingly face difficulties in providing the financial means to fill 
the gap between contributions and benefit payments of UI. As there is 
a limit to the financial burden of unemployment the working population 
is willing to bear, the material situation of unemployed persons will 
probably deteriorate in future. In the FRG as well as in the UK, 
discussions are continuing with a view to cutting down on provisions 
awarded to the unemployed. In the FRG restrictions on the performance 
of the UI system have been introduced during the last years. The 
definitions of availability to the labour market and of the concept of 
suitable jobs were narrowed, and unemployed persons entering the labour 
market after school and university attendance were excluded from the 
receipt of unemployment aid.
In the UK the election of a Conservative Government has brought 
about restrictions in public services. The Budget introduced to 
Parliament in early 1980 contained the intention to abolish ERS from 
January 1982 onwards and- an uprating of unemployment benefits far below 
those required for price-protection. And recently the notion of1 available 
for work' has been tightened up.
In Italy, starting from a lower level of social protection, 
recently there have been some qualitative and quantitative changes 
to the benefit of some groups among the unemployed. But new inequalities 
were created among different socio-economic groups and the different 
sectors of the Italian economy (industry, construction, agriculture), 
and one can, in fact, speak of a 'giungla retributiva'. — Various 
groups could improve their position in respect to unemployment compen­
sation because of their stronger bargaining power. The growing
1/ Gorrieri, E. (1972)
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proportion of unemployed people who have never had employment has weak 
bargaining power and hardly profits from the modifications introduced in 
Cl. In Italy, the 1949 employment policy still shapes today’s adminis­
tration. Forced to cope with frequent and severe employment problems, 
the state has implemented a short-sighted fragmented approach instead 
of reconstructing its policy and administrative structure.
In the FBG, the system of social security has grown in a rather 
systematic way. The Vest German and the British UI schemes now treat 
unemployment equally without regard to the former vocational class or 
economic sector of occupation. In reaction to increasing employment 
problems, the West German authorities shifted goals and capacities of 
their traditional administrative structure to a more active labour market 
policy. The high level of unemployment, however, has forced them during 
the last years to reverse this tendency and to concentrate on income 
compensation programmes.
One of the main problems of British employment policy in recent 
years has been youth unemployment. Much attention was paid to training 
programmes. Growing racial tensions, greater support for extremist 
groups and the increasing incidence of violent crimes have been seen as 
partly a result of high youth unemployment. In 1973 the Manpower 
Service Commission was established and made responsible for employment 
and training services. A new scheme in 1975 was designed to stimulate 
the employment of young job seekers, but cut-backs in the financial means 
led to some reduction in the services of the commission. —^
1/ See Duffy, J/ A. (1981). However, in November 1980,a package of 
new measures to help unemployment was announced by the Government 
and the Youth Opportunity Programme was expanded.
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4. The Effects of UI in the Context of Labour Market Theories
4.1 Introduction
In the two preceding chapters, the state of unemployment and 
the systems of social security for the unemployed have been described 
for the three countries with which this research is dealing. In this 
chapter the two aspects will be integrated in a theoretical framework. 
Some labour market theories and their explanation of voluntary as 
well as involuntary unemployment are discussed in the following para­
graphs. By introducing compensation payments from unemployment 
insurance into the models of the labour market the impact can be 
analysed.
The theoretical approaches in the economic analysis of un­
employment that are discussed in this chapter do not claim to be 
exhaustive. .They try, rather, to give a picture of the kind of 
reasoning that has been done so far in labour market theories and show 
where UI can be expected to influence the performance of labour markets. 
The aim is identifying a theoretical model that can serve as a basis 
for empirical analysis.
In the first place, effects of UI are analysed in the context 
of the neo-classical theory of the labour market. Job Search 
Theory as an extension of simple marginal utility theory is particularly 
relevant in judging the effects of UI on the supply side of the 
labour market. Although it fails to explain all components of 
aggregate unemployment, Job Search Theory sheds light upon the behaviour 
of unemployed workers. '
A more comprehensive model of the labour market would inter­
pret the type of unemployment that we are presently experiencing, namely 
long-term persistent unemployment. Rather than neo-classical theory, 
models on marketing with quantity-rationing seem to be adequate for this 
kind of analysis. An approach assuming labour market disequilibrium, 
due to demand deficiency will form the basis of an empirical analysis 
of the impact of UI on the labour market.
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Theoretical and empirical analyses are contrated mainly on 
the supply side in the labour market. Calculating the effects of 
UI on the demand for labour would not only imply a consideration of 
the costs resulting from employers' contributions to UI schemes, but 
also a research into the stabilizing effects of unemployment compen­
sation which is of more importance. Expenditures on UI have sig­
nificant repercussions on aggregate demand on product markets. The 
assessment of the overall effect of UI on the labour market cannot 
neglect demand aspects, i.e., the employment creating effects via a 
multiplier process. However, this research focuses on the supply be­
haviour of employed and unemployed workers. It will not explicitly 
deal with the effects of UI as a built-in stabilizer. —
More general research into the performance, of social security 
for the unemployed would require an entire econometric model for the 
national economy. In the context'of my doctoral thesis, this would 
be too ambitious an undertaking.
Contract Theory, an approach only recently developed in labour 
market theory,is presented in the appendix to this chapter. The 
models of implicit and explicit contracts on wages and employment 
can hardly be tested on empirical grounds. They give, however, 
interesting explanations for employment fluctuations and the impact 
of UI. Contract theories can serve as a theoretical basis which 
interprets different levels of employment in response to the social 
security schemes for the unemployed.
A deficiency in most of the theoretical approaches lies in 
their aggregate macro-economic level assumptions. The assumption of
,1/ On the importance of UI as macro-economic stabilizer see Furstenberg, 
G.M.v. (1976) and Clement, M.O. (1960)
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homogenous labour supply and identical behaviour of labour market 
participants do not correspond to observations from reality. At this 
point, the theories on segmentation of labour markets have to enter into 
theoretical discussion. ~  Job stability can be regarded as a source 
and index of the division between the different labour market segments. 
Among different demographic groups in the population, there exist 
great inequalities in the incidence of unemployment. Thus, reactions 
to UI will differ considerably between workers of different segments 
of the labour market. However, the Segmented Labour Market Theory is 
stronger in criticisms of the neo-classical orthodox theory than in 
advancing a coherent self-contained theory as a replacement. Accord­
ing to its representatives, historical and institutional dimensions 
of labour markets have to be taken into consideration. Different 
theories on unemployment are probably valid to different degrees in 
each segment of the labour market. But it is difficult to establish 
empirically any borders between primary and secondary labour markets. 
Thus, in this chapter the Segmented Labour Market Theory will not be 
discussed as a separate theory explaining the emergence of unemploy­
ment and the impact of UI. Its more descriptive approach will be 
taken into consideration in the later evaluation of theoretical and 
empirical results of the research.
Hence, the pre-eminent theoretical models for my research are 
Job Search Theory - describing the workers' supply behaviour - and 
the Disequilibrium Theory for non-clearing labour markets. . Empirical 
research presented in the following chapters is based above all on 
these theoretical approaches.
4.2 Neo-classical Theory
4.2.1. The Theoretical Model with Marginal Utility
The basic hypothesis that unemployment compensation Increases 
unemployment can be described theoretically in the framework of the neo­
classical labour market supply model. However, the neo-classical
If Prominent representatives of this approach are Doeringer, P.B./ 
Piore, M.J. (1971), and Gordon, D.M. (1972), see also the survey 
by Cain, G.G. (1976).
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approach in which labour supply is based on the assumption that workers 
are maximizing utility cannot explain the emergence of involuntary 
unemployment. The effective offer on the labour market depends on 
the prevailing wage rate. Unemployment does not occur because anyone 
who is willing to work at the wage resulting in the equilibrium point 
of demand and supply will find employment. Thus, any idleness is the 
consequence of voluntary leisure and represents only a shift in the 
labour supply schedule. In the neo-classical model, 'voluntary 
unemployment' is equated with leisure. A utility maximizing individual 
will prefer more leisure (and thus be 'voluntarily' unemployed) when 
leisure becomes relatively cheaper, as it may happen through lower 
wages as well as in the context of UI, through unemployment compensation.
The presentation of the model of the neo-classical labour 
market theory is justified mainly as giving the basis for models that 
go beyond its simplified assumptions. It is presented in this context 
and should be considered as a reference rather than as an explanation 
of the functioning of labour markets.
L. Robbins' classical article on the supply of labour in
terms of demand for leisure has led to the approach of analysing the
effect of income and prices or wage rates on the supply of labour. —
He divided the time of an individual into leisure and work activities
and noted that an increase in wages would raise the prices for leisure
relative to time spent at work. In general, a rational individual
will shift his consumption towards goods whose relative prices have
fallen, in this case.leisure, and away from other goods whose rela-
2/tive prices have risen. — If leisure is a normal good, an increase 
in the ratio of UI benefits to ordinary work income will tend to lead 
1/ See Robbins, L. (1930)
2/ Empirical studies showed that different flexibilities in trading 
off leisure time for income exist in different age and race groups.
A cut in wage rates of low income workers may lead to the desire to 
vork longer in order to maintain income, thus their indifference 
curve will show a sharp bend, illustrating an inflexibility or pre­
ferences in the choice behaviour. See Dunn, L.F. (1978)
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to higher consumption of leisure.
Using this framework of neo-classical marginal utility 
theory, I will examine how the existence of unemployment benefits 
influences the choice between work and leisure of an average 
worker. It is assumed that an individual does not have to search 
for a job because a single known wage offer is always obtainable at 
zero cost, and the worker can obtain employment at his previous 
wage at the instant he wants it. The basic model is presented in 
Figure 6. —^
FIGURE 6; INCOME, LEISURE AND UI BENEFITS
_1/ A similar model is presented in Grubel, H.G./Maki, D. (1976)
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The horizontal axis measures the number of days per period that are at 
the individuals’ disposal and can be spent either on work or on 
leisure. The vertical axis indicates the income per period. The 
slope of YX, the leisur e-in come trade-off, is determined by the indi­
vidual’s vage rate. If the worker does not take any leisure he 
has a potential income of OY.
The individual's preferences are reflected in the indifference 
curves Iq and 1^ . In the point of equilibrium he has chosen OY 
income and 0Xq days of leisure (or non-earning activities) which are 
assumed to be the number of weekends and legal holidays. Theoretically 
an individual could as well work overtime and by that realise less 
than days of leisure.
The Government then is assumed to introduce a UI. For the 
sake of simplicity it is assumed to be financed out of a general 
budget surplus. Hence, no shifts in the curves occur through increased 
taxation or contributions to social security schemes. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that the worker does not have to engage in job search 
activities in order to obtain unemployment benefits and that job 
search costs are zero. Under these assumptions, the introduction of 
TJI changes the leisure-income opportunity from YX to YEqABX in 
diagram 1. The slope of the line EqA relative to that of YX measures 
the ratio of unemployment compensation to income from employment.
Without UI the amount of X X_ leisure costs Y Y, income.o^  o 3
Because of unemployment benefits it now costs only Y Y.. The ratioo
of unemployment benefits to income fram work R = Y^Y^ /. Y^^ gives the 
replacement ratio. The maximum duration for which unemployment benefits 
are available, in £he diagram, is reflected in the horizontal
length of the line EqA. X ^  days of work are required in order to 
claim UI.
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If leisure is considered to be a normal good, a higher replace­
ment ratio will lead to a higher consumption of leisure according to 
this simple model. This may take place by employed workers initiating 
their own unemployment for some period or by unemployed poeple extend­
ing their period of unemployment. The quantity of leisure consumed 
is an increasing function of the ratio of benefits to income from 
employment.
A higher replacement ratio would result in a new equilbrium 
point above and to the right of E^ . In this point the consumption of 
leisure would be higher. The equilibrium point of non-income earning 
activities would lie somewhere between and 1^ .
"In the context of the present model we shall call 'induced 
unemployment' the increased amounts of leisure consumed by workers as 
a result of the introduction of an unemployment benefit plan.**—^
In this simple version of the model, changes in unemployment 
compensation tend to change the budget of the individual who is 
eligible for such payments. These changes will have both substi­
tution and income effects on the choice between labour and leisure.
The first results from changes in relative prices, i.e., from the 
lower cost of an additional day of unemployment. If the benefit is 
rsised, workers will be more likely to stay unemployed additional 
days, since the lost income from doing so is lower. The second effect 
occurs because TJI benefits raise the whole amount of resources 
available to the unemployed workers and enables him to buy more of 
all those goods he wishes to consume.
The decision process of an individual who is choosing between 
leisure and income from work can also be explained in the context of 
utility functions. Implicit in the interpretation is the assumption 
that the individual may purchase as much as he cares and likewise work
1/ Grubel, H.G./Maki, D. (1976) p.277
as many hours as he wishes at the known wage rate.
The conventional utility function of an individual can be 
described by:
u * u (x, 1)
with x * income from work 
and 1 = leisure.
It is assumed that the worker is able to work only tip to some 
maximum of hours, h. The utility for working of an individual 
who can decide either to work or not work is given by:
ux = u (“ £ , h - h),
with w the wage rate, h the legally fixed number of hours of work, 
p a vector of the prices of the commodities faced by the worker, and 
h the total time the individual has at his disposal.
The utility of the individual when out of work and eligible 
for UI benefits, B, is given by:
u5 * u dk h).2 P £Some kind of reservation wage w , i.e. a level of wages at which the 
individual would accept a job offer, if he is indifferent to 
having a job and being unemployed can be found by setting equal the 
two utility functions:
ui * «2:
u (wa h, h - h) = u h).
The reservation wage, accordingly, can be seen to depend on 
the fixed hours of work and the potential UI benefits:
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wa = f (h, B). 
P P
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The utility of an individual is taken as a function of labour 
income and leisure of the form:
u = A .
J
where the coefficients of ct and ¡3 determine an individual’s preference 
for work and leisure. The acceptance wage thus can be derived from:
A (wa h)a . (h - E)P * (£)a (h)P 
P P
(va h)a = (|)a (--- — )^
P P h - h
(va S) - (f) <— ---f a
~  p h - h
In' this equation the reservation income w h depends on the available 
HI benefits and the preference for leisure time. The lowest wage 
offer that will be accepted has to be at least as high as the UT 
benefits. However, the individual also has soms preference for 
leisure. The higher it is the more important becomes (jj~ £ )* *-e* 
the higher is the coefficient - In the case of (3= 0 the individual 
does not gain any utility from leisure and would accept any job offer 
that pays as much or more than UI benefits. — We may assume that an 
individual would be more willing to accept a job offer equal or a 
little higher than unemployment benefits when employment perspectives 
are worsening because he may consider a decreasing utility from 
leisure in prolonged unemployment. Thus {3 may fluctuate with the 
labour market conditions. The individual's acceptance wage depends 
on his preference for leisure expressed by the coefficients a and £ .
1/ However, in the income-leisure approach, work is never considered 
~ as pleasant. In this case the income effect of a lower price of 
leisure would be very different or absent, because money cannot 
buy more time. See Scitovsky, T. (1976) p.98. Also having a 
job is not seen as providing utility per se.
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The frequency of distribution of wages is often assumed to be 
known for any individual, <J> (w h), and the unemployed person is 
assumed to receive one job offer in every time period At * t^ - tQ. 
Then we can formulate the probability that the individual finds an 
acceptable job offer.
v  li w  IxThe probability that a wage offer (— —^) >  is given
by the plane to the right of the acceptance: wage. Without introducing 
any more complicated elements of job search, the basic idea of how UI 
benefits influence the decision process can be formulated.
The financing of the social security schemes for the unemployed 
too has to be taken into consideration. There exists a difference 
between private and social costs. The lowering of the private costs 
of unemployment for the most of the unemployed is assumed to induce higher 
unemployment in the neo-classical model. The worker initiating an 
unemployment spell or prolonging his unemployment does not take into 
account the cost in form of contributions to UI or taxes. "I believe 
that the relatively low cost of unemployment in these circumstances 
is a substantial cause of our high permanent rate of unemployment.
The social costs such as taxes and contributions have not much relevance 
in the individual's decision on income and leisure.
This is true, however, only to the extent that a system of 
'experience rating* is incomplete. In a situation where contributions 
to UI are calculated according to past experiences of unemployment spells, > 
as well as their duration and where they have to be brought tip by the 
potentially unemployed workers, also the cost side of UI may
1/ Feld stein, M. (1978)» However, this argument overlooks the effect 
which current unemployment has on future benefits, including pensions.
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be relevant for a choice between labour and leisure. In practice,
UI contributions are not calculated according to individuals1
probabilities of becoming unemployed.—  ^ How far rsm this model of
marginal utility as presented in this simple approach hf*lp us in the
research on effects of UI on unemployment ? It be regarded as a
first step for explaining a decision process in respect to supply
behaviour in labour markets. There exist several extensions of the
neo-classical model with utility maximization including some kind of
2/search and wait unemployment.— By introducing job search activities 
into the marginal model, the period of unemployment is divided into 
times of leisure and job search.
Another interpretation of the leisure-income approach is
3/given by the so-called auction model. — The unemployed workers are 
not devoted to searching for better jobs which they believe to be 
available but are enjoying leisure while waiting for the higher wages 
they believe they will be able to obtain in the future. According 
to this approach, utility maximization requires the taking into considera­
tion of future consumption. However, the extended and modified models 
still fail to explain why anyone becomes unemployed even if they 
explain how long someone will remain unemployed. It is regarded as 
being of voluntary nature resulting from a decision of the individual 
choosing leisure or engaging in job search. In the model the current
If Also the UI system in the United States which practices some kind 
of ’experience rating' does not calculate the individual contri­
bution of workers according to their past unemployment. Experience 
rating is carried out only on firm level and is of little relevance 
to the individual's decision on unemployment. In the three 
countries with which my research is dealing, contributions are 
exclusively levied in relation ot the income of the workers, 
charged to employers and workers.
2f In a second step, Grubel/Uaki modified their model by an adjust­
ment in respect to waiting periods after giving up the job 
voluntarily, job search cost and their documentation necessary to 
receive benefits.
3/ Negishi, T. (1979) pp.43 discussed this approach and its relevance 
for unemployment of Keynesian type.
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wage rate may be viewed by the unemployed as below the wage rate at 
which he would prefer income from work to leisure. This could lead 
to a temporary withdrawal from the labour, force, rather than to regis­
tered unemployment.
A.2.2 Job Search Theory
The basic neo-classical type of model over-simplifies the 
effects of UI an unemployment quite apart from the fact that it con­
siders unemployment as preference for leisure. Job Search Theory 
may be appropriate for explaining a 'frictional' component of unemploy­
ment which, however, is chosen by the unemployed who are assumed to 
be receiving plenty of job offers and could be employed if deemed.
In the Walrasian economy, each buyer and seller has .• complete 
information about his alternatives during transactions. The dis­
cussion on the functioning of labour markets, however, must go beyond 
perfect and instantaneous adjustments in markets in which large costs 
of movement, uncertainty and limited resources of households occur. 
Aspects of behaviour that are ordinarily excluded from basic economic 
models have to be taken into consideration. To obtain the large 
amounts of information necessary for making decisions on the labour 
market, and especially choices between job offers, substantial 
resources and time, are consumed by workers as well as by employers. — 
Job Search Theory points to the role of imperfect information on the 
job seekers' side. With imperfect information it is rational for 
unemployed workers not to simply accept the first job offered to them 
but to search until locating particularly attractive offers.
In the publication of E. Phelps' "New Macroeconomics" the
labour market is treated as a dynamic process of rational search by
2/unemployed workers for available vacancies. —  Imperfect information is
,1/ See Bolt, C.C. (1970) and Salop, S.C. (1979). The theoretical 
aspect of information in the search process in the labour market 
has first been elaborated by Stigler, G.J. (1962).
2/ Phelps, E.S. (1970). Comprehensive descriptions of Job Search 
Theories are given in Lippman, S. A./McCall, J.J. (1976) and 
Konig, E. (1979).
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a crucial element in the Job Search Theory, for it implies a need for 
rational search rather than simple market clearing in each, period. 
Disregarding the unrealistic neo-classical assumption of perfect 
knowledge about the labour market, one can consider unemployment as an 
investment in job search. Unemployment in Job Search Theory is due 
to friction in the search process and imperfections in the information 
rather than to any deficiency.in aggregate demand.
Two basic assumptions in C.C. Holt's Job Search Theory explain 
workers' behaviour on the labour market and are valid whether UT exists 
or not.—  ^ (1): The longer a worker is' unemployed, the more he will be
willing to accept a job offer, i.e., he has a declining aspiration level 
with the duration of unemployment. (2): The unemployed workers'
aspiration level is also influenced by changes in the general wage 
level and by the expected employment chances represented by the number 
of relevant job vacancies.
Belated to the concept of declining aspiration levels, empirical 
evidence shows that, in general, the average duration of job search and 
of unemployment is longer when the level of unemployment is high.
The intensity with which people are searching for jobs and the wage 
they are willing to accept are key determinants of the duration of a 
spell of unemployment. The payment of UI benefits, in turn will 
change the behaviour of. individuals and the length of spell * of unemploy­
ment.—^
The costs of job search are the direct costs that are required 
in job search, such as information and travel expenses plus
1/ See Holt, C.C. (1970) pp.60 
2/ See Baily, M.N. (1978) p.379
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the opportunity costs of a refused job offer, i.e., the difference 
between an income offer and HI benefits. When the costs of job search 
are rising because of decreasing unemployment compensation, the 
unemployed person will shorten the search and thus unemployment.
The quantity of labour offered by an unemployed worker who 
is head of a household will not only be affected by real wage rates.
His labour supply curve will not be rigid but rather influenced by 
his possibilities to finance the basic expenditures of his family.
The identification of the level of reservation wage (as a critical 
value above which a wage offer is accepted) has to take into account 
also other sources of income which are available to the unemployed 
worker. If a present job offer is good enough, wages, expected UI 
benefits and other things considered, a job-seeker is likely to 
accept it and forego the possible costs and rewards of further search 
and waiting. If a certain portion of unemployment is assumed to be 
due to the job search process, it is necessary to identify and 
measure the factors which influence the time it takes to successfully 
natch a job-seeker with a vacancy.
Since UI compensation lowers the worker's cost of unemploy - 
oent, it may increase the duration of unemployment, ceteris paribus.
A job-seeker's attitude towards risk in respect of his possibilities 
in the labour market has also an effect on his expected duration of 
job search. —  ^ UI will lower the material risk of remaining out of 
work for a longer period and by that prolong job search. For these 
reasons, UI can be regarded as a cause of frictional unemployment 
in the Job Search Theory. Assuming that an individual views the 
employment he eventually accepts as permanent, then a rise in UI 
payments or an increase in the potential benefit period may result in 
a higher reservation wage and a lower search intensity (i.e., less 
contacts with the labour exchange and potential employers). This
1/ See Feinberg, R. M. (1977)
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in turn will result in a higher expected duration of unemployment. -
Reservation wages presumably fall as the duration of unemploy­
ment lengthens« This pattern shows up more in a willingness to accept 
lower paid jobs. The cost to the worker of this bahaviour is diminished 
by the availability of UI. One may suggest that UI support enables 
workers to resist financial pressures for re-employment in relatively 
low-paying or unstable jobs. But the acceptance of lower-grade jobs 
is itself a form of under-employment. This indicates that an unem­
ployment-prolonging effect of UI compensation should be judged in the 
light of potential productivity gains attributable to UI-supported search 
in assessing the benefits and costs of such a support to the individual 
worker and society. UI can provide the :chance for more and more fruit­
ful contacts between job-seekers and employers. By allowing unemployed 
workers to 'shop around' before accepting employment, UI benefits can 
help to preserve work «jr-ms and so assist in the process of efficiently 
re-allocating labour resources. Thus, UI contributes to an optimal 
factor allocation in the sense of employment according to the level of 
skill and education of job seekers. UI would presumably* have some 
effect on the frequency distribution of wage offers. When there is 
no UI, a low-paying employer has chances of getting individuals who 
cannot afford to continue to sample the market. But with unemployment 
compensation, such a low-paying employer is less likely to find employees 
and is forced to tip wage offers, thus possibly reducing the dispersion 
of wages.
Unemployment benefits raise the level of wages unemployed 
workers are willing to accept in subsequent jobs. This suggests that
1/ See Barron, J.M./Gilley' O.W. (1979). Warner, J.T./Poindexter, J.C./ 
Fearn, R.M. (1980) found for the US that UI benefits have quite a 
strong negative effect on the probability of UI recipients leaving 
unemployment and effect is very much due to the impact on
search intensity. However, this positive relationship between 
replacement ratio and length of unemployment can simply come from 
those with lower earnings potential who, under the UK and US systems, 
tend to have a high replacement ratio, but having poorer employment 
prospects.
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the wages they receive in their post-unemployment job can exceed those 
received by individuals who do not draw benefits.—  Search unemploy­
ment has to be sees as important for economic efficiency and productivity. 
Voluntary unemployment can be viewed as a rational choice when speciali­
zation in job search would maximize the present value of future earnings.
In the models of search, unemployment, the alternative to accept­
ing a job is looking for another one. ' ’The corresponding idleness 
might be called 'wait unemployment'. In any real-life situation, 
unemployment is likely to be an admixture of search and leisure (and
some of the leisure may be spent is kinds of production, such as making
2/one's own meals or making home repairs)."'-* This 'wait unemployment' 
of workers who are expecting a generally higher wage level and better 
offers may be increased through UI payments.
At this point, it would be too much to go into depth on the
criticisms of Job Search Theory. But it has to be kept in mind that,
in general, most of the job search will start during employment rather
than after quitting a job and in a period of unemployment. Even if
a worker can claim UI benefits, on-the-job search may often be more
3/effective than off-the-job search. —  Thus, for a great deal of move­
ments on the labour market the existence of UI has little relevance.
Only under certain conditions will workers search for jobs during a spell 
of unemployment. Those unemployed workers are not likely to have had 
notice of job separation and enough time to conduct successful pre­
unemployment search, or they had advance notice of lay-off, but chose 
to specialize in search activities after becoming unemployed.
1/ See Burgess, P.L./Kingston, J.L. (1976)
If Phelps, E.S. (1970) p. 15
3/ In fact, estimates provided by Mattila, J.P. (1974) for the
United States suggest that between half and two thirds of all
job quitters have ensured new employment before quitting their 
previous jobs. On the critique of Job Search Theories, see 
also Bines, A.G. (1976).
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Re—employment experience would be expected to differ for persons who 
do and do not experience a spell of unemployment as a result of job 
separation. Unemployed workers who have been laid off will, in 
general, face greater problems in finding a new adequate job. Further­
more, employers often consider the fact of being unemployed for a long 
period as a negative attribute.
In the context of Job Search Theory one can also argue that 
UI creates incentives to shorten unemployment, because an employment 
record would affect future eligibility for UI benefits. This is 
relevant above all for the first job seekers, since claimants of UI need to 
have been employed for a certain time span in order to be eligible for 
UI benefits. Higher UI benefits are attractive also for people not in 
the labour market. They may be induced to join the labour force because 
of a latter possibility of collecting UI benefits (after having been 
employed and having paid contribution for some time).
Employment may be associated with the probability of becoming 
unemployed and receiving UI benefits in the future. Since potential 
gains from finding employment also consist of becoming eligible for UI 
payments, higher future unemployment benefits or a longer duration of 
these payments make immediate employment more attractive. For those not 
currently receiving UI compensation, search intensity may rise and the 
reservation wage may fall in response to an increase in the value of UI 
benefits. —  ^ This will be especially true for the reaction of UI by 
married women and unemployed young people. An impact of UI on the duration 
of unemployment may also be given by expectations about future unemployment 
benefits. Unemployment in one year may reduce (or remove) eligibility 
for UI benefits in the following year. It may also result in cuts of 
benefits from other social security schemes such as cash sickness benefits 
and old age pensions. Unemployed workers who are getting close to the 
ma-rimTm duration of UI payments or who have exhausted it, have to .be aware 
of the necessity of working a certain number of months .before .becoming eligible 
again.
II See Mortsen, D.T. (.1977)
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4.2.3 The Relevance of Neo-Classical Models
The marginal utility theorem of neo-classical labour market 
models can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory explanation for unem­
ployment. As Solow remarks ironically "... People who give the vague 
impression of being unemployed are actually engaged in voluntary leisure. 
They are taking it now, planning to substitute extra work later because 
they think, rightly or wrongly, that current real wages are unusually 
low compared with the present value of what the labour market will offer 
in the future. " —^
Apart from general critiques on the concept of utility maxi­
mization, there are some weak points in the income-leisure approach.
In reality the consumption of leisure (in the sense of unemployment) 
cannot.be considered as such a voluntary decision. The worker is 
normally facing layoffs which limit a choice by himself in favour of 
leisure and unemployment benefits.
The worker also has only limited flexibility in his labour 
supply because the labour market regulations generally determine certain 
well-defined working days and periods. Contracts with employers are 
for a certain time and normally it is impossible for the worker to 
decide on the number of days spent on leisure.
Even If UI benefits are available, in most of the cases of
unemployment the worker will not voluntarily choose to be out of work,
but he is constrained to idleness because of the dismissals and the lack
of employment opportunities. However, the neo-classical model can
give a theoretical description of the individual's decision process
2/when facing UI benefits. —
But we should not forget that the labour market is different 
from other markets in the sense that the objectives of the participants
1/ Solow, R. (1970) p.7
2/ In this framework, Ashenfelter, 0. (1979) calculates the unemployment 
compensation that is required, when time of unemployment is viewed 
as constraint on choice rather than a result of it.
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are not always 'the ocas we normally impute to economic agents, and 
some of the constraints prevailing in labour markets are not always 
the conventional ones. Choices between two market goods demand 
decisions different from the choice between leisure and income. "...We 
may predispose ourselves to misunderstand important aspects of unemploy­
ment if we insist on modelling the buying anW selling of labour within 
a set of background assumptions whose n»a-in merit is that they are very 
well adapted to models of the buying and selling of cloth. —^
As in the basic neo-classical model, an important point of 
critique on Job Search Theories lies in-the fact that a form of cyclical 
unemployment exists, that cannot be explained by these models. The un­
employment considered by neo-classical models is either voluntary or 
frictional, and the theories cannot be applied to depression periods 
with high rates of unemployment and long duration of spells. Empirically 
relevant is the fact that search models do not realize the existence of 
workers who have been laid off by employers, and thus do not give any 
answer to the essential problems of involuntary idleness. In fact, 
empirical studies point out that the bulk of unemployed workers did not
quit voluntarily but had been dismissed against their own will for one
2/reason or another. —
The microeconomic foundation of job search has contributed to 
the understanding of many aspects of the labour market, in spite of the 
limitations in respect of empirical relevance as a general labour market 
theory. It provides reasons as to why some unemployment may be voluntary 
and why it may be socially efficient.
Since my concern is the analysis of effects of UI on unemploy­
ment and its duration, job search models can serve as a theoretical
1/ Solow, R. (1980) p.3
2/ A study for the FRG found that about 60 percent of the unemployed 
interviewed in a sample survey had lost their former jobs through 
dismiggfli c by the former employers. However, only half of those 
who quit voluntarily did this without good reasons. See Infratest 
(1978). In a recent article, Burdett, K./Hortensen, D.T. (1980) 
developed a model that extends the theory of job search to include 
the case in which job prospects are characterized by layoff risk 
and where layoffs are explained by contract theory.
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basis for quantitative calculations. HI benefits lower the search costs 
and the risk of unemployment for those who undergo a period of unemploy­
ment. Job search models can give indications of the behaviour of 
unemployed individuals without claiming to explain how unemployment 
arises. In the framework of this theory the impact of UI on unemploy­
ment and especially on the duration can be analysed empirically. The 
duration of unemployment spells can be assumed to depend, ceteris paribus, 
on the cost of unemployment and on the general employment perspectives.
The general situation of the labour market and the demand for labour 
determine, among other individual factors, the employment possibilities.
A decrease in the number of vacancies available to the unemployed workers 
will tend to increase the average duration of unemployment spells, if ' 
the labour turnover rate does not change. On the other hand, the 
relative costs of unemployment depend on the amount of UI benefits in 
relation to income from work.
The search effort that is required to be eligible for unemploy­
ment compensation affects the cost and thus the duration of unemployment.
If the access to UI benefits is related to active job search, UI is less 
likely to induce 'voluntary' unemployment. The denial of unemployment 
compensation to certain claimants who are assumed to be out of work vol­
untarily (i.e., who have quit voluntarily or have refused job offers) 
will affect the -»titi-rai unemployment and duration of employment.
Findings in the United States showed that the denial of 
benefits to certain applicants has a clear influence on the unemployment 
rate. — More stringent administrative procedures could lower unemploy-
2/ment and more liberal benefits may lead to higher levels of unemployment. — 
When benefits are denied for some weeks, the average incone replacement 
by UI over the spell of unemployment is lower and thus make
1/ See Holen, A./Horowitz, S.A. (1974) and the description of their 
study in Chapter 5. In this analysis cross-section data over 
all US states were used.
2/ On the other side, the strictness with which UI eligible standards 
are enforced can depend also significantly on the level of 
unemployment. See Wacker, A./Paul, G. (1975) and the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 6.2
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unemployment no re costly. The higher the cost of job search, the 
shorter the durati.cn of spells of unemployment will be.
4.3 Non-Clearing Markets and Involuntary Unemployment
The existing amount and types of unemployment in the current 
economic crisis cannot be sufficiently explained by neo-classical 
theories. They are theoretical paradigms that have evolved as 
explanations of voluntary unemployment. The search paradigm
provides a coherent account for large flows into and out of unemploy­
ment, but it is inconsistent with repeated str,A long-term spells of 
joblessness. • Only a small part of «n unemployment is experienced
by persons who find employment after a brief spell. In the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1979, for example, only about 37 percent of 
total unemployment was attributable to persons finding a job within 
three months.
For a more complex explanation of unemployment, we have to 
refer to different approaches of labour market theories. A model 
closer to reality has to contain some kind of involuntary unemployment 
as the Keynesian type that is due to deficient demand in the product 
market.
A simplified model of the labour market which takes reaction
to UI into consideration, will be outlines. It starts from the
Keynesian theory and its interpretation by D. Patinkin, in which the
framework of market equilibrium is rejected and which explains a
2/system of markets which are not always cleared. — This model
1/ See Clarke, K.B./Summers, L.H. (1979). Akerlof, G.A. (1979) argues 
that according to empirical evidence, most unemployment belongs to 
spells of sufficient length that it cannot plausibly be accounted 
for by misinformation regarding prices.
2/ For a more detailed description of the disequilibrium model 
presented here, see Barro, R.J./Grossman, H.I. (1971) and the 
interpretations of Keynesian theory on unemployment by Patinkin,
D. (1965). For a discussion of this approach in connection with 
DI see also Spindler, Z.A./Maki, D. (1979).
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represents as attempt to formulate a theoretical approach for empirical 
testing r
The norm of referesce to be used is defining involustary usem- 
ploymest is the supply curve of labour. This curve shows the amount 
of employment which the workers is as economy want to obtain, when 
confronted with certain wages, price levels asd budget restraists.
As long as they succeed is selling all the labour they offer at pre­
vailing wage rates, the economy will be is a state of full employment.
By definition, the extest of voluntary unemployment is identical to 
the excess supply of labour at prevailing prices.
Is general, the demand function of labour describes the behaviour 
of firms maximizing profits within the framework of perfect competition 
based, however os the assumption that they will be able to sell all 
output at market prices. Is a situatios where commodities are is 
excess supply, profit-maximizing firms will select the mini m m  quantity 
of labour necessary to produce the quantity demanded os the commodity 
market.
The theory developed by Patinkin demonstrates that unemploy- 
mest may occur is the absesce of constraints on the level or movement 
of real wage. The inability of firms to sell the output quantity 
according to their supply schedule asd the resulting excess supply is 
the market for current .output causes them to demand a smaller quantity 
of labour. According to Patinkin, cyclical (involustary) unemployment 
could be due to excess supply is the product market, rather thas to 
real wages being too high. Failure of the price level to adjust to 
clear the commodity market leads to deficient demand and excess 
supply is the labour market, which is usually referred to as involuntary 
unemployment
_1/ Malinvaud labels this type of involuntary unemployment as Keynesian 
unemployment which arises because firms are rationed is the goods 
market and households are rationed in the labour market. See 
Malinvaud, E. (1977) p.31
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Let us now assume a labour market where labour demand (L^ ) a 
decreasing function and labour supply (LS) an increasing function of 
the real wage rate. If the labour market is competitive with free 
perfect information and mobility, the equilibrium real wage rate and 
employment will be given by — and L as is shown in figure 7. The 
level of employment in equilibrium is jointly determined by the 
decision of households and firms, both of whose decisions are influ­
enced by the wage rate. Point E can be denoted as full employment 
general equilibrium. — Any kind of unemployment that may exist at 
this point can only be voluntary in the sense that members of the 
working age population prefer leisure to employment and income. 
(Imperfections and frictions do not exist at this stage of the model.)
We assume that there is excess supply in the product market 
and that the effective labour demand curve (L^ ) becomes vertical due 
to the disequilibrium in the output market. In a short-term analysis 
in a situation of disequilibrium, this shift will result in unemploy- 
sent. At the real wage rate — in figure 7, the employment level is 
L^ and unemployment is Anything that will shift the labour supply
curve to the right increases unemployment, and anything that shifts the 
labour demand curve to the right decreases unemployment.
The effective labour demand curve would shift to the right 
through an increase of aggregate demand on the commodity market. If 
the labour supply curve, is independent of aggregate demand, 'then 
unemployment would decrease. If the labour supply curve shifts to 
the right due to social or demographic changes, unemployment increases 
along the given labour demand curve.
w1A decline of real wages to — would lead to equilibrium B of 
supply ar|^  effective demand for labour and involuntary tin employment 
would disappear.
1/ The commodity market is in equilibrium and it is assumed that 
effective supply and demand for labour coincide with the 
apparent supply and demand.
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FIGURE: 7 NON-CLEARING MARKETS AND INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT
However, a decrease in wages can be expected to affect the 
demand for commodities. Lower demand for goods subsequently could also 
reduce the demand for labour. Thus, the equilibrium point B will not 
necessarily be reached.
In situation B, however, the labour force is reduced by EA, and 
labour resources are idle. Involuntary unemployment due to an excess 
supply of labour has been replaced by voluntary idelness and withdrawal
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from the labour market.  ^ In this case too high wages were not the
cause of unemployment and their reduction would be a superficial remedy. 
Only an increase of commodity demand can restore full employment.
wf w2If real wages were above — , in — , the classical case ofP Punemployment would exist where only a reduction of real wages could 
bring back full employment equilibrium. This classical type of involun­
tary unemployment could not be remedied by stimulation of commodity 
demand. It would appear in a situation where firms would not find it 
profitable to recruit the whole labour force even though they would be 
faced with an excess demand for their output.
Let the supply of labour
L* = f <J , b),
wwhere —  is the real wage rate and b contains social and demographic 
variables.
The demand for labour by the firm depends on 
Tt= p> Q - w L, and 
Q * f (L),
where the profit Tl is simply assumed to be the difference between the 
product of output and prices and the cost of labour. We disregard 
capital costs. The level of output for its part is a function of
employment L. Under these conditions the demand for labour by the firm
will be increased according to criteria of profitability. The demand 
for labour will be expanded up to the point where the marginal productivity 
of labour equals the wage rate»
Ld = g (—), until — “ f'^ (L).
In t-hi« neo-classical context production and thus the demand for labour 
is not restrained by the demand for output. Unemployment will occur if
1/ See Barro, R.J./Grossman, E.I. (1971) pp. 86
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Ld <  LS .
In the second case of demand for labour we have
TC = P Q - w L,
Q = f (L), and
Q = D.
the output is determined by the demand for products D and the demand for 
labour depends on D, L+ « g (D), if j- ^  f (L+),
Demand for labour will increase if the demand on the commodity market
augments, as long as the real wage rate is lower than marginal productivity
(otherwise production would be unprofitable for the firm).
The demand for labour will equal if Q (L^ ) ^  D, 
the demand for labour is equal to L+ if D ^  f (L).
The actual level of employment is determined by
L * min (Ls , L^, L+)
and unemployment
U * l s - l or
U - f (2 , b ) - L
where
L * g (”“) » if L * Ld or
L * g .(D) , if L = L+ .
gIf L is the smallest of the three numbers, there is an excess 
demand for labour because firms would like to produce at full capacity 
limits or equal demand in the product market.
If L+ <  L^< LS or L+ <  LS <  there is an excess
supply of labour and we are in a situation where the Keynesian type 
of unemployment prevails. An extension of demand in the commodity 
market would reduce - or in the second case - remove unemployment.
If is the smallest, there is an excess demand for goods 
but also an excess supply of labour. Unemployment is due to a lack
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of profitable productive capacities. The level of capacity depends
above all on the real labour cost and is a decreasing function of the
wage rate. If L <  L <  L unemployment ran be over cone by a
reduction of the real wage rate. A situation of full employment
will be reached without constraints in the demand for labour determined
2/by the product market.—
If the wage rate is above equilibrium level, the nH for
labour will not be sufficiently high to employ the whole labour supply.
Rigid non-clearing market wages bring about the ri*gg-ir*1 type of 
3/unemployment.—
In our analysis ve are interested in the two cases where unemploy­
ment appears. Theoretically we can expect different situations of 
unemployment to appear in different sectors of the economy. Some sectors 
will find themselves in the Keynesian situation where the lack of demand 
results in unemployment. In other sectors, production is limited by 
the lack of capacity, due to a wage rate that is too high for profitable 
investment.
The state of employment in the overall economy depends on the
1/ On the distinction between Keynesian and classical unemployment see 
Malixrvaud, E. (1977) and Fitoussi, J.F. (1979). 
d ^ s2/ If L L L a  reduction of the real wage rate will reduce unem­
ployment only until L+ is reached. At this point we will have the 
Keynesian type of unemployment, where only an expansion of demand 
on the commodity market can remedy unemployment.
3/ At this point we do not go into the discussion of why wages are rigid 
downwards. There exist different explanations why the real wage 
rate will not afljust to equilibrium level. The stickiness of wages 
can be attributed to institutional factors or to workers who suffer 
from money illusion. At least in short-run analysis it can be shown 
that sticky wages are consistent with rational behaviour by employers 
and workers. See Varian, H.R. (1976). Social customs and standard 
business practice, while paying some attention to labour market con­
ditions, do not allow the payment of the market clearing wage at all 
times and in all circumstances. See Akerlof, G.A. (1980) p.232
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proportion of the two sectors with different types of unemployment. — 
The aggregate unemployment rate is. determined by the supply side in 
the labour market and by the demand for labour which for its part is 
determined by the level of real wages and by the demand for output.
How in the context of this simple model can the introduction 
of Cl be assumed to affect the labour market ?
Firstly, the effects, which can be expected at the supply level 
will be described. For this purpose, we recall the discussion in the 
preceding chapter. As reaction to the introduction of Cl (or an 
increase in'Cl benefits) more people would prefer to work during shorter 
periods of prolong job search and live on unemployment compensation.
The effective labour supply would decrease, although the apparent 
supply would not change. Frictional unemployment reduces the number 
of workers actually available for employment. An increase in UI 
benefits would lead to voluntary unemployment appearing as the 
difference between effective labour supply (people immediately available 
for the type of labour offered) and apparent labour supply (the total 
number of people registered in the labour force). In Figure 7 this 
difference is given by U^. Total labour supply can also increase as 
a reaction to the introduction of Cl. Unemployment benefits make 
labour force attachment preferable to withdrawal from the labour market 
and may result in a higher participation rate.
At the same time, an introduction of Cl benefits will tend to 
increase the wage rate by setting up the individual reservation wages.
In general, a worker will not accept a wage that is not somewhat higher 
than the unemployment compensation which he could receive when out of 
work. Since the unemployed have an alternative source of income they 
might be less constrained by existing unemployment in asking for higher 
wages. The aggregate wage will thus be higher when UI exists.
Classical unemployment would increase because, at a higher real wage 
rate, it becomes less profitable for firms to extend capacity.
1/ See Malivaud, E. (1978)
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UI benefits also have as employment increasing effect in the 
context of stabilizing policies. UI as a built-in stabilizer helps 
to maintain demand for output during cyclical downswings.
4.4 From Theoretical to Econometric Model
The econometric testing of disequilibrium models is only in 
its beginnings and involves complicated econometric methods. — 
Discontinuous functions would have to be tested as in the simple 
model on classical and Keynesian unemployment» which hafi been outlined 
in the preceding paragraph. In my own empirical research, I will 
move away from the theoretical framework presented before in order to 
obtain a form which is more easily testable in regression analysis.
For the model on rationing in the labour market, we assume that the 
two different types of unemployment exist in different sectors of the 
economy. But in the aggregate model, we do not distinguish between
sectors. The variables which determine the labour demand, the real
wage rate and the coamodity demand, will be included in one function 
describing the demand for labour.
In this section, I outline the theoretical model on which I can 
base my empirical analysis. I want to establish those factors which 
can be as sinned to affect unemployment and at the same time, I will 
account for the impact of UI. The model for empirical testing will 
comprise elements from different theories. It describes disequili­
brium in the labour market and is based upon microeconomic foundations 
by which the supply of labour can be explained by the individuals 
choice between income, leisure and job-search process.
Most of t-Tv* analyses on the effects of the level of UI benefits 
on unemployment have the same basic structure: a simple equation relat­
ing the unemployment rate to the ratio of UI benefits to income, to 
a variable representing demand deficiency (the deviation from the trend 
in output or its arm««! growth rates) and some other variables which 
can be expected to affect unemployment. It is assumed that the
1/ See Hauser, M.M./Burrows; P. (1969) pp. 123 
2/ See Bowden, &.J. (1978)
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partial derivation of aggregate unemployment with, respect to the 
replacement ratio is positive. This prediction appears to be justi­
fied from the model of the supply side in the labour market, where 
unemployment is a voluntary choice of utility maximizing workers 
as in neo-classical theory, or a result of lower job search costs due 
to the availability of UI benefits. —
Most studies on the impact of UI are concentrated on the 
supply of labour and although including demand variables in the 
equation, they are not explicitly considering the demand increasing 
effect of UI on the goods and labour markets. The demand for labour 
and the impact of UI on this side of the labour market are assumed 
to be captured in the level of output, which for its part, represents 
the demand on the connodity market.
In connection with insurance-induced tin employment, the supply 
of labour is based on two types of decisions by the household. The 
worker decides whether to become a member of the labour force,'as is 
reflected in the participation rate, and whether to become or remain 
unemployed.
An analysis of the overall impact of UI on unemployment requires 
an entire model of the labour market. The approach presented here is 
based on the concept of non-clearing markets as described in the 
preceding paragraph. From there we want to derive a basic testable 
equation in which unemployment is explained by different variables, 
each of them representing some aspects of labour market theories in 
connection with UI.
In equilibrium models, the current wage is assumed to equate
quantity demanded and quantity supplied and unemployment is due to job 
2/search.—  Here we assume a disequilibrium in the labour market.
1/ See Spindler, Z.A./Maki,D. (1979)
2/ See Lucas, K.E./Sapping, L.A. (1970)
Approaches for an econometric testing of markets in disequilibrium 
will be adopted and adjusted taking into account the effects of UI 
on the supply and demand for labour. —^
(a) Demand for Labour
The demand side of the labour market is important in the 
context of our research because UI schemes are partially 
(in some cases even completely) financed by employers' 
contributions. In most European countries these con­
tributions represent variable costs in the sense that 
they are wage-related up to a given income ceiling; 
above this ceiling they are fixed costs and independent 
of the hours worked. For reasons of simplicity it 
will be assumed that the contributions are fixed costs.
The typical firm is assumed tc minimize the total labour 
bill subject to the production function restraints.
A necessary condition for profit maximization requires 
that £he marginal product of labour equals the real wage
wt = *L L^t* Kt* ^
where f^ is the partial derivative of the production 
function
Qt ~ f Œ'fc» t)
where L^ is the man-hours of labour, is the flow of 
services of capital, t is a time trend representing the 
state of technical progress in period t and is output.
1/ Econometric estimations for markets in disequilibrium have first 
been carried out by Fair, R.C./Jaffee, D.M. (1972) and for the 
special case of labour markets by Rosen, H.S./Quandt, R.E. (1978)
1} See Rosen, H.S./Quandt, R.E. (1978) p. 372
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The wage that is relevant for the firm is assumed to 
include contributions to social security schemes, cfc 
(of interest here: UI),
i , i 
”t • Bt +iCt
The total wage costs for the firm are the stase of the 
wage rate multiplied by the number of workers and the 
fixed contributions to UI for all workers. A rise is 
ct, i.e. higher labour costs will, ceteris paribus, 
lead to a decrease in the demand for labour.
The income creating effect of UI that brings about an 
increase in aggregate demand in the commodity market is 
assumed to be included in the output variable.
The demand for labour, eliminating is given by
If we distinguish between the different sectors of the 
economy would be a discontinuous function, which is « 
depending on the cost of labour if no constraints appear in 
the product market ( f ( L ) >  (^ ), or it is depending 
on the demand for output if is lower than f (L^ ,). The 
aggregate econometric model for the entire economy includes 
both types of rationing in the labour market in one equation, 
one represented by w£, the other by Q ,^ without dif f rentiation 
by sectors.
With the equation above we have a structural relationship 
but not a reduced form equation, because the endogenous 
variable appears on the right hand side. But for 
reasons of tract ability it will be assumed that output 
is exogenous. —  For purposes of estimation a log linear
1/ Ideally output should be treated econometrically as an endogenous 
variable in a multi-market model. But estimating multiple markets 
is disequilibrium is beyond the scope of the current study and 
involves considerable econometric problems.
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transformation Is deployed 
D
111 Lt “ a0 + “l1“ wt + h 1® Qt + a3ln ct + a4t + etl*
(b) Supply of Labour
The simplest formulation of the supply of labour draws 
upon the theory of leisure-income choice, based on the 
utility function
V - V < wnt, ant, bt )
where w is the net wage, a^ _ the net non-earned income and nt « , tn
b the real UI benefit. —
It is assumed that the atemporal choice of the household 
depends on income variables of period t. This is a 
simplification of a more elegant formulation in a model of 
labour supply which also includes variables of future con­
sumption and future labour supply in addition to the current 
2/ones. —  The simplification appears acceptable because
in analysing the effects of UI on the supply of labour
we are dealing with relatively short-termed reactions.
Furthermore, we assume that non-labour income istn
- ' endogenous. When hours of work are high, workers
accumulate assets and thereby increase their non-labour 
income, on which they can fall back when employment is 
low. —
Thus labour supply can be formulated according to the 
function
V C "nf V
where P is a population parameter, capturing changes over
1/ See Rosen, E.S./Quandt, R.E. (1978) p.373 and Harrison, A./Hart, B, (1981) 
2/ See Lucas, R.E./Rapping, L.A. (1970)
2/ See Romer, D. (1980)
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time in the size of the potential labour force.
The log linear transformation gives an equation that ran 
be estimated
** Lt = Po + P1 1J1 wnt + h  bt + V *  Pt + et2 *
A difference could exist between the nominal and the 
effective supply of labour. If not all the desired 
consumption can be realized the actual offer of labour 
will be lower. The potential income from more work and 
thus a higher supply of labour would not find satisfactory 
consumption possibilities in the commodity, market.
In general, the UI benefits are irrelevant in an equation 
on the supply of hours of work. — The individual's 
optimal number of hours worked will be independent of a 
change in UI benefits. Be can receive UI compensation 
only when he is completely unemployed, but not if employ­
ment is reduced by a few hours. Thus UI benefits will 
influence the number of days per time period, but not the 
number of hours. Income then is the variable as the 
outcome of a labour supply decision and the wage rate.
Income and. UI benefits do not necessarily have to enter the 
equation as a ratio, like the replacement ratio. It has 
been done in most approaches that analyse the impact of 
UI on unemployment. But one may assume that an individual 
is likely to change his behaviour if both wage w and benefit 
double but the replacement ratio of benefits to income 
itself remains constant.
(c) The Complete Model
We have now outlined the equations specifying demand and 
supply of labour. Disequilibrium models often assume that
1/ See however the argumentation on the impact of UI on the demand for 
labour in Baily, M.N. (1977) and in Chapter 4.5.
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the quantity observed is the minimum of quantity supplied 
and quantity demanded at the current wage,
In Lt = min ( In L® , In ).
If aggregation is over submarkets, some of which are 
characterized by excess demand and sense by excess supply, 
the observed quantity of labour might be some combination
of L and , as reasonable approximation to how the
1/observed is determined.—
In our model, the level of unemployment is given by the
amount by which the supply of labour exceeds the demand
for labour. The difference between the employment level
that is realized on the labour market, L , and the apparent 
Slabour supply, L^ , indicates the level of unemployment,
U = LS - L . t t t
The dependent variable in our model is unemployment which is 
determined by demand and supply in the labour market. Un­
employment can thus be described by a set of variables 
derived from the structural form of and L^. The reduce 
form of the equation for unemployment can be formulated by
ut * Q ( vt, wnc, Qt, c*, t, bt, Pt ).
2/If we disregard the difference between net and gross wages,—  
and have c^ included in the real wage, the log linear trans­
formation yields
In Ut = afl + a^ln wfc + a 21n bt + a 3ln ‘
+ rt + *t2 •
The coefficients of this single linear equation will be 
estimated in the empirical part.
1/ See Kosen, H.S./Quandt, R.E. (1978) p.373
2/ We have, however, to be aware of the fact that the gap between gross 
»nd net wages may fluctuate over time.
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(d) Participation Rates
In the model of non-clearing markets we pointed to the 
fact that UI may induce individuals to join the 
registered labour force. Haw the participation rate 
is affected by the existence of UI will be analysed.
For the following equations the total labour force LF 
is subdivided into primary (PLF) and non-primary labour 
force (NLF). —^
LF * PLF + NLF
The first group consists mainly of male workers between 
25 and 60 years of age and their labour market attachment 
will merely vary with cyclical fluctuations in employment. 
Workers of this labour market segment will be either 
employed or registered as unemployed. The registra­
tion of the non-primary labour force - above all women,
young and old worker and migrant workers - can be expected
2/to respond to variations in the level of employment. —
The two segments of the labour market will be affected 
differently by the variables wages and benefits. An 
increase in UI benefits may lead to a higher participation 
rate as a consequence of an increase in the participation 
on non-primary labour force. Married women and older 
workers above 50 years of age may join the labour force 
or register as unemployed, while they would withdraw from 
the labour market if- UIdid not exist. The non-primary 
sector of the labour force, contrary to what may be expected 
from the primary labour force, will show variations in the 
participation rates.
1/ See Tarantelli, E. (1974), pp. 155 and Mincer, J. (1966)
2/ See Clark, K.B/Summers, L.H. (1980). Over the period under consideration 
views about primary and secondary labour force have changed, the 
attachment of men aged 60 to 65 years has probably declined while that 
of women may have increased. Including these fluctuations in the 
analysis will, however, lead too faraway from the topic of this analysis.
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The labour market participation of both groups can be 
expressed as proportions of the total population groups 
and depending on the level of UI benefits:
PLF = ( ax + b ) TPP and
NLF « ( a2 + a4 b ) TNP,
where TPP and TNP represent the total primary and non-primary
population, respectively.
The activity rate of both groups is a non-homogenous 
function of the employment level L.
Let
* 1 = ax + pxL.
*2 =
*3 " 03 + p3L and
ii a4 + p4L.
Thus,
PLF = + 3xl
NFL = [< 0 3 + P3I
Dividing the two components of the labour force by the 
total population P, we obtain
LF 5ai + Pjp+fcj + ÎÿOb] TPP +[(Oj + P^D+'Ol* + P4L)bJlKP 
“ P
Let us now assume that UI benefits have no effect on the 
participation rate of the primary labour force, and that 
its supply of labour is relatively inflexible in relation 
to cyclical variations in employment. This is quite 
plausible as in industrialised countries the participation 
rates of th*« population group are generally close to a 
hundred percent.
The hypothesis is:
Eo : a2 * h  = °*
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thus
= C^TPP + [(03 + PgD+C a 4 + -^4L)b] TNPLF ____________________________________________
P P
By adding and subtracting ^TNP in the preceding equation 
we obtain
LF a , TPP + TNP [^3 ~a i  + $3L)+>to4 + P4L)]  ^
P * P P
- a . + (a- -a .) TOT + (LL rap + a . b tnp + &Lb tnp. 
j p j p p P
The activity rate is thus a function of the relation non­
primary population to total population, the level of employ­
ment, and the UI benefits (or the replacement ratio),
LF   A / * « x
Pt * ( p t, Lt’ bt
TUPDividing equation of above by —p— and including an error 
term yields
TNP ” (Ct3 “ ai * + “l TNP + ^3 L + a 4b
+ |34 L b + e ^  .
Specifications of this structural relation shall be tested in 
the empirical analysis.
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4.5 Appendix: Contract Theories
Implicit Contract Theory surfaced only a few years ago and has 
contributed an explanation of the working together of employment fluctuations 
and UI. -
Contract theory in itself cannot claim to explain why unemployment
exists. But it can help to understand the phenomenon that a decline in
aggregate demand falls on the quantity of labour (layoffs and reduced
hours of those currently employed) and has little effect on wages. In
the context of my research, the theory of contracts is not a central one,
since its principal aim is to explain wage stickiness. Unemployment is
understood as an optimal response to economic conditions, rather
as involuntary idleness. Like job search models, Implicit Contract
Theory can account only for short-term unemployment. The type of unem-
2/ployment described by contract theories is entirely voluntary. —
The theory of implicit contracts offeisan explanation for the 
fact that people rationally choose to be unemployed some of the time.
It can explain why workers may be interested in signing contracts that 
ensure stable wages but allow for fluctuations in employment. These 
implicit or explicit contracts between workers and employers include 
a form of risk shifting from the workers towards the firm. The notion 
of risk-shifting means that the firm carries the risk stemming from a 
tWl in» la demand in the product market, while the workers get the 
security of stable income. Wage bargains allow workers to buy insurance 
in the form of real wage stability.
Wage stability is a means by which relatively risk-neutral firms 
provide income insurance for risk-averse workers, presumably in exchange
_1/The basic texts on Implicit Contract Theory are by Baily, M.N. (1974),
—  Gordon, D.F. (1974) and Azariadis, C. (1975). The impact of implicit 
contracts together with UI on fluctuation in employment has been 
analysed by Baily, M.N. (1977) and Grossman, E.I. (1980c). f-:
2/See Varian, H.B.. (1976).
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for a lower average wage.—
One can assume, however, that the Implicit Contract Theory only
works well when workers have income possibilities also when they are
unemployed. If they are assumed to be risk-averse they presumably
want to exclude as well the risk of being out of work and without income.
Only the compensation of income losses through UI makes the employment
2/insecurity acceptable for workers. —  "The risk-shifting hypothesis
plays a critical part in the present anslysis, but by itself does not
provide a full account within a market-clearing framework of the diverse
phenomena associated with layoffs. An adequate analysis of layoffs
seems to require, in addition, explicit allowance for the consequences
3/of tax-financed unemployment insurance." —
M.N. Baily explains implicit contracts and stability in incomes
by the costs of adjustment and layoffs for both employers and workers,
4/for which UI benefits are an important determinant. — H.I. Grossman 
argues that workers who are risk-averse, and firms which are risk- 
neutral, agree on.contracts that stabilize incomes. — Baily assumes 
that firms and workers are risk-neutral and he shows how the cost to the 
worker who was laid off, actually influences the number of layoffs the 
firm makes. Both theories c.lain to explain why firms do not lower 
wages in the presence of declining demand or falling prices in the 
goods market. In certain states of the economy, employers are assumed 
to lay off workers and workers prefer income from UI to too low wages 
or to short a working time.
In the context of theories on unemployment and UI, the analytical 
framework of H.I. Grossman will be presented in more detail in the 
following section.
1/ The idea of risk-shifting is especially presented in Grossman, H.I. 
(1980b).
2/ See Solow, R. M. (1979) pp.350 
3/ Grossman, H. I. (1980c) p.3 
4/ See Baily, M.N. (1977)
5/ See Grossman, H.I. (1980c)
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(a) The Model Without Risk Shifting and UI
Two groups of individuals who differ in their attitudes 
to risk are observed. The crucial assumption is that 
those who are risk-neutral will become entrepreneurs, 
while the risk-averse individuals are workers. In the 
model, all workers face the some utility function 
these utility functions in respect to income and working 
time are additive. Furthermore, labour services are 
considered as being homogenous. In the absence of risk 
shifting and UI, workers receive the value of their 
marginal contributions to total product.
The variable wages w is stochastic and determined by 
w^ with the probability
w2 with the probability a 2 »
where 0 <  w^ <  
and + a 2 * 1 *
w^ characterises a bad year (or state of nature, as formulated 
by Grossman) and a good one. They arrive with certain 
probabilities Ct^  anda2 - i.e., the probabilities for good 
and bad years are known.
In the following,
1 - measures the units of employed time and can be {o, lj , 
i.e. the worker will be employed ( 1 « 1 ) or unemployed 
( 1 - 0).
£2 - measures the wage income, given by the- product of 
wages and the units of employed time.
c - measures the worker’s consumption which is assumed to 
be equal to the wage income.
In the following equations u stands for utility and v for 
disutility. E(u-v) gives the expected utility of a worker 
who is choosing between employment and wage income:
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E(u-v) u(c ) ” v^i^] + a 2 CU C^2^  ~ V^2^] *
Workers obtain positive and decreasing marginal utility 
from their consumption, and negative and increasing 
marginal utility (positive disutility) from the number of 
hours and days worked per time period.
Workers select between three possibilities, employment in 
both states, in only one, or in no state of nature.
The expected utilities are:
E1 (u-v) = CLjU (w1) + a2u (w2) - v(l)
e2 (u-v) « a^u (0) + a2u (w2) - a^viO) - a2v(i)
E^ (u-v) = u(0) - v(0)
The worker desires employment in a particular state of 
nature where his possible income is high enough so that 
the utility of being employed and consume income is at 
least equal to the utility of not working. So far the 
wage rates are changed according to the state of nature. 
Adjustments in employment reflect only wage-induced move­
ments along the supply schedule of labour.
(b) The Model With Risk-shifting
Introducing now risk-shifting into the employer-worker 
relation, one has to include the constraint:
p cti ( - w ^ )  = a 2(w2l2 - & 2),
where ( - w^l^) gives the additional income of a worker
in state 1 , in exchange for a reduction of income in state
2 ( W2^2 ” ^ 2^'  ^ tbe rat'io tbe exPecte<* vfilue
the reduction to the expected value of an addition. We 
assume that p is equal to unity, i.e. a 'fair' price for 
risk-shifting. Then a worker would set equal to & 2 
and Cj = c2> which means also that his consumption is stable 
over the different years.
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This Implies as constraint
ft = ?.ai W1 * 1 +CX2 W2 hl 2 P a x + a 2
Again the worker can choose between the three combinations 
employment in both states, only in the good state or no 
employment at all. The expected utilities are:
Esl(u-v)- axu -ai, t u ■ ^  +a2z 2 - v (1)
w w
Es2(u-v)-aiu + a2 u -a, v (0) -a, y (1)
Es3(u-v)= u(0) - V  (0).
In the risk-shifting contracts workers accept a constant 
wage low enough that the under-employed in bad years can be 
paid up to the local wage sum available to the firm.
This way of risk-shifting allows the worker to use the 
revenues of his marginal contribution to output in the good 
year to supplement his income and consumption in the bad year. 
Therefore, the value of working in the good year is larger, 
and the higher w^ is in the good year, the higher w^ has to be 
in order that the worker also desires to work in the bad year.
Risk-shifting gives all workers less variable wage income 
and its consequence is that a worker's contractual income does 
not equal the value of his marginal contribution to total 
product in each period.
(c) The Model with UI
We now look at the effects of the introduction of a UI.
It is assumed to be financed out of taxes. The amount of 
benefits that an unemployed worker can receive depends on
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his previous earnings. If the system of ÜI is 'fair* 
i.e., organized according to an insurance principle, the 
expected value of taxes paid to the UI fund by each 
worker has to equal the expected value of UI benefits 
he receives when unemployed. Actual UI, however, does 
not satisfy these conditions, but includes a redistri­
bution from all employed tax payers to certain workers 
who are facing unemployment and are receiving UI benefits.
In the labour market with UI, the worker faces the additional 
constraints:
c1 * ( 1 - T) 1 + b,
c.^ “ (1 - T ) £2 2 and
f 2^ * 1 311(1 H ®b = <
o, otherwise 
j g, if b = 0
h, otherwise,
where t is the worker's contribution to the UI fund and b 
is the amount of UI benefit, if the individual works only 
in the good state, b equals x equals h. Other­
wise b equals zero and T equals g. Fair UI would have 
equal to zero (i.e., workers who never receive benefits 
would not pay contributions to UI) and h equal Pa^/ a 2*
The replacement ratio is equal to {3/(l-h). The expected 
values again for the three combinations are:
Eii(u-v) »djU [(I-.).,] + a2u rU-g)w2] “ v(l)
e1 2 (u-v)~= ctiu( w2) + a 2u ^d-tOwJ - a^vio) - a2v(i)
Ei3(u-v) = u(0) - v(0)
After the introduction of a fair UI, there would be less 
workers who would not want to be employed in any year, but 
more workers to be employed in the good one.
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(d) The Model with Risk-shifting and UI
With risk-shifting combined with UI the worker faces all 
constraints together:
The worker who chooses employment in the good year and 
unemployment in the bad year can receive income in the bad 
year either from rish-shifting arrangements with the 
employer or, alternatively, UI benefits. If he chooses 
risk-shifting, his income is (1 -g) a ^ / C p a  j+ a^) in the 
bad year and the same in the good year. If the worker 
chooses UI, his income will be w^^  in the bad year and 
(l-h)w2 in the good one. If bad years mean deep 
recessions or they appear for a long period, the wages 
that would be possible according to Implicit Contract 
Theory might be actually lower than UI replacement. At 
this point, for both employers and workers, layoffs will 
be convenient. In a 'fair' system, however, the worker 
would have to consider that he is paying contributions to 
UI according to the duration and frequency of his unemploy­
ment. One could also assume that workers who decide to 
be employed only in the good state prefer UI to risk- 
shifting. However, risk-shifting will remain attractive 
in reducing income variability for other workers who choose 
to be employed in both states. These facts give the 
explanation for rigid wages and relative flexible 
employment.
h  - { 0, 1} , i 2 = jO, 1]
cx = ( 1 - T ) + b, c2 = ( 1 - x ) Q 2
pa x - w ^ )  = a2(w2l2 - fi2)
0, otherwise
h, otherwise
g, if b = 0
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The worker now chooses the employment situation with the 
highest value of E(u-v):
E^Cu-v) = o^u (1 -g)Palwl + a 2w2pc^ + a 2 + a 2 u
POiwi ■^2w2
P® 1  + a 2 - v (l)
i
EA2 (u_v) = a 1 u(Pw2) + a2u ^(i-h)w2J -a^v (0) - a2v(i)
EA3(u"v) = u(0) ■ ^ 0)
The range of values for which the worker chooses employment 
in neither good nor bad state is the same in all cases, with 
and without risk-shifting and UI. The range of combinations 
of w^ and w2, for which a worker chooses employment in both 
states of nature is larger with UI and risk-shifting together. 
According to Gorssman's findings, the actual effect of 
risk-shifting in economies which have UI is probably to 
make employment less variable. With the existence of risk- 
shifting, the availability of UI does not make unemploy­
ment any more tolerable, but it makes stable employment 
more attractive.
Unemployment generated by this mechanism is, in a sense 
voluntary. Workers reveal a preference for steady wages 
over steady employment. Such implicit or explicit 
contracts certainly do not themselves account for unemploy­
ment, they rather seem to have an effect on the fluctuations 
in employment.
The 'rational' theory of layoffs by Baily focuses on the 
layoff policy of firms which is that workers know at the time 
they are hired, that they may be laid off later.—  ^ When 
workers decide upon joining a firm they will look at the 
expected wage-employment package being offered. Those 
firms that offer unstable employment will have to compen­
sate for this instability in the form of higher wages.
1/ See Baily, M.N. (1977)
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The worker evaluates the expected two—period income 
offer the firm is making. When prices vary (due to demand 
variation on the product markets) firms will first try to 
vary hours of work - overtime during peaks and short- 
time during slumps.
There exists a critical price P lower than the initialc
price P. ( 0 <  P <  P ) so that for P <  P. <  P 1  c o c ^  1 o
employment will remain constant ( = Lq ) and reductions
appear in hours of work ( H, <  H ) . There are no1 o
layoffs but hours are reduced. If P, <  P there are1 c
no further deductions in hours of work but layoffs will 
become more profitable ( <  Lq ). as well as
decrease with lower values of P^ .
The existence of unemployment compensation (in general 
the UI benefits minus the costs for job search) will 
provide a floor on wage income. Workers will not accept 
a cut in income due to less hours of work, when they 
would rather collect UI benefits or look for another job.
Implicit Contract Theories should be seen in the context 
of the theory of dual labour markets. We can observe 
two different types of labour markets; one can be regarded 
as a kind of ’spot market’, the other as a labour market 
for stable employment. The risk aversion and the pre­
ference for stability of income and employment can be 
assumed to differ in these two markets. Implicit 
Contract Theory may be valid in the non-primary segment 
of the labour market.
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5. A Critical Examination of Studies on UI
5.1 Unemployment in Great Britain in the Inter-wax Period
The persistently high level of unemployment in Britain in the 
period between the two world wars was the principle concern in British 
economies at that time. Unemployment rates between 1921 and 1938 
never fell below 10 percent, and in the years 1931 to 1933 they remained 
above 20 percent. Table 13 shows unemployment figures and income 
replacement by UI for the years 1922 to 1976.
At about the same time as J.M. Keynes formulated his theory on 
involuntary unemployment and deficiency of demand,another approach, 
pioneered by Jacques Bueff, argued that the problem of high permanent 
unemployment was caused only by the high unemployment benefits. —
Rueff's position was based on the high positive correlation he had found 
between the time series of unemployment and the level of real wages in 
the 1920s and 1930s in Britain. He postulated that unemployment benefits 
encouraged labour unions to resist any reduction of nominal wages, no matter 
what the level of »inemployment amoung their members. Unemployment 
benefits were representing the floor for nominal wages and prevented 
them from falling. Even when prices were falling from 1925 onwards, 
the fixed unemployment conpensation prevented a fall in wages which 
would otherwise have been provoked by the excess supply in the labour 
market.
According to Reuff, there was a generous subsidy for the unem­
ployed workers, which was paid for by the nation, and which contributed 
considerably to the strength of the British trade unions. The bargain­
ing power of the trade unions would not have been sufficient to maintain 
the resistence of the unemployed workers without the financial security 
of UI. Increases in wages were brought about and they caused higher
1/ See Reuff, J. (1931), Garraty, J.A.(1978) describes Reuff's 
reasoning as more typical of the thinking of 1831 than of 1931, 
p. 198
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TABLE 13: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND REPLACEMENT RATIOS 1922-1976
Year
Total
Unemployment
Male
Unemployment
Replacement Rate 
Imputed for a Married 
Man with 2 Children
Replacement Rate 
(Based on actual 
benefits paid)
1922 14.3 _ 0.37 0.28
1923 11.7 12.5 0.40 0.25
1924 10.3 1 1 . 1 0.42 0.24
1925 11.3 12.3 0.48 0.26
1926 12.5 13.5 0.48 0.23
L927 9.7 10.9 0.48 0.27
1928 10 .8 11.4 0.50 0.22
1929 10.4 1 1 . 6 0.50 0.29
1930 16.1 16.5 0.53 0.17
L931 21.3 2 1 .0 0.54 0.26
L932 2 2 . 1 25.4 0.50 0.30
L933 19.9 23.2 0.51 0.32
L934 16.7 19.3 0.53 0.32
L935 15.5 17.7 0.55 0.32
L936 13.1 14.8 0.57 0.37
L937 10 .8 1 2 . 1 0.56 0.36
L938 12.9 0.56 
U;B’. S.B.
0.29
.951 1 . 2 1 .2 0.36 0.36 0 .2 1
.952 2.0 1.5 0.42 0.42 0.24
.953 1 .6 1.5 0.39 0.39 0.23
.954 1.3 1.3 0.37 0.47 0.22
.955 1 . 1 1 .0 0.39 0.46 0.24
.956 1 . 2 1 . 1 0.37 0.47 0.22
.957 1.4 1.4 0.36 0.45 0.22
.958 2 . 1 2 . 1 0.44 0.51 0.28
.959 2 .2 2.3 0.42 0.54 0.27
.960 1 .6 1.7 0.40 0.51 0.26
.961 1.5 1 .6 0.44 0.53 0.28
.962 2.0 2.2 0.43 0.54 0.28
.963 2.5 2.7 0.47 0.53 0.31
.964 1 .6 1.9 0.45 0.56 0.29
.965 1.4 1 .6 0.49 0.59 0.33
.966 1.5 i.7 0.53 0.61 0.36
.967 2 .2 2.9 0.57 0.63 0.40
.968 2.4 3.2 0.54 0.63 0.39
969 2.4 3.2 0.54 0.62 0.36
970 2.5 3.5 0.58 0.61 0.37
.971 3.4 4.6 0.56 0.62 0.39
,972 3.8 5.0 0.56 0.60 0.38
.973 2 .6 3.6 0.56 0.59 0.38
.974 2.6 3.6 0.54 0.61 0.37
.975 4.2 5.4 0.54 0.61 0.35
.976 5.8 7.0 0.54 0.60 0.35
Source: Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980)
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unemployment, but the unions' wage policy was not violated by the 
masses of unemployed as the system of unemployment compensation enabled 
them to stay out of work, almost indefinitely.
"Ainsi, la 'dole' a surtout pour effet d’assurer indéfiniment 
le maintien de la discipline syndicale. C’est elle qui est l'instrument 
essentiel de la stabilisation des salaires' à un niveau entièrement in­
dépendant du niveau des prix, c'est elle qui est, par là, la cause du 
chômage permanent.” —
As another example for induced unemployment, Rueff mentioned 
Germany where the system of Ul was assumed to ensure a very low flex­
ibility of wages. In those countries where no ÜI existed - France
and the United States - he hypothesised that unemployment would dis-
2 / appear very soon through an adaptation of wages to falling prices.—
For his theory, Rueff had such important supporters as
3/W. H. Beveridge, E, Cannan, and A. C. Pigou. — But he stated that 
the general public, as well as the great majority of specialists who 
were researching and recommending remedies for unemployment, ignored 
or did not accept his explanation.
E. Cannan explained how UI operated to increase unemployment by in­
creasing the amount of job search and the incidence of layoffs.
"Especially in the occupations in which the superiority of employment 
over unemployment is least, the insurance scheme has reduced the economic
4/pressure which used to make persons grab at every chance of employment." — 
1/ Rueff, J. (1931) p.222
2/ See Rueff, J. (1931) p. 229. In Germany where UI was introduced in 
1927, the numerous fluctuations in the unemployment curve did not 
seem to have any discernible connection with the very regular rise 
of the wage-price index, see Murette, F. (1931)
3/ Beveridge explained the considerable rise of female unemployment in 
1930 and 1931, rather than by economic conditions, by changes in the 
insurance system, see Beveridge, V.E. (1936) and Chapter 3.3.1. Pigou 
estimated that UI benefits had added five percentage points to British 
unemployment figures, see Pigou, A.C. (1927), pp. 356 and Pigou, A.C. 
(1933) p. 254.
4/ Çannan, E..(1930) p.49 . .
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Immediately after the publication by Rueff his article was 
contested by contemporary economists. Several points of critique 
were put forward. Doubts were expressed on the correlation between 
real wages and unemployment. — The regional and sectoral differences 
in the rates of unemployment have to be explained by reasons other than 
unemployment compensation. In historical perspective, the introduction 
would, according to Rueff's hypothesis, have been expected to induce 
additional unemployment, but in fact, the rate of unemployment declined 
until 1919. Afterwards, in spite of the fall in real wages, unemploy­
ment went up.
Furthermore, the fact that a high percentage of the unemployed
had no claims on UI benefits, which in any case were not really high
enough to allow a comfortable way of life (in 1930 UI benefits were
17 shillings for a single man, while the lowest wage for a manual
2/worker was 40 shillings per week) cannot be neglected. —
If unions had been the key, wages should have declined less in
1921, when wages stayed nearly constant but the power of trade unions
had declined. Moreover, if unemployment was being caused by the
unions’ obstinacy, one would expect the levels of unemployment in
defferent industries to have been correlated positively with the
relative rise in wages in those industries, since the most obstinate
unions would have caused more unemployment. The correlation was,
3/however, in the reverse direction. —
The enormous regional differences in the rates of unemployment 
of inter-war Britain can hardly be-explained by variations in the wage 
levels or the benefit-income ratios. The standard explanation for 
the distinct regional pattern to unemployment by economic historians is 
simply that some industries were more depressed than others. When the 
narrow industrial base in areas of high specialization stagnated,
1/ See Picard, R. (1931) and Maurette, F. (1931) 
2/ See Picard, R. (1931)
3/ See Benjamin, D.K,/Kochin, L.A. (1979) p.470
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declined or collapsed, the communities were particularly vulnerable 
both in economic and in social terms. Wages and employment levels were 
not high enough in the prosperous areas to attract large numbers of 
workers from the depressed areas. —^
Recently, the debate on the effects of the 'dole' in inter-war
Britain has been taken up again. In spite of the miserable situation
of unemployed workers during the 1920s and the 1930s which has become
known by description of contemporary writers, it has been argued again
2/that most of the observed unemployment was of a voluntary nature. —
Recently, two economists Benjamin and Kochin, attempted to
3/explain why high unemployment was persisting in inter-war Britain.—
They tested the hypothesis that UI benefits had an important impact on 
the rate of unmeployment and adduced both cross-section and time series 
evidence in support of their claim. The weight of their case, how­
ever, rests on the' performance of time series estimates of a single 
equation over the years 1920 to 1938:
u = a 0 + a x ( B/W ) - ( log Q - log Q+ ) ,
in which unemployment is explained by the ratio of unemployment benefits 
to wages and the deviations of the logarithm of national product 
( log Q ) from its trend value ( Q ). This single equation produced 
the following estimates ( t-values in parenthesis) :
U = 5.19 + 18.3 ( B/W ) - 90.0 ( log Q - log Q+ }
(2.64) (4.46) (-8.30)
R2 * 0.84 DW - 2.18
See Booth, A. E./Glynn, S. (1975) P.623
2/ On a description of the lives of unemployed people and the economic 
conditions in England in the inter-war period, see for example 
Orwell, G. (1962).
3/ See Benjamin, D.K./Kochin, L.A. (1979).
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They were considered as "clearly consistent with the hypothesis 
that UI had an important effect on the rate of unemployment in inter- 
war Britain." —
Benjamin and Kochin concluded: "The persistently high rate of
unemployment in inter-war Britain was due in large part not to deficient
aggregate demand but to high unemployment insurance benefits relative 
2/to wages." — They found that over the period during the late twenties
and thirties the insurance system raised the average unemployment rate
3/by about five to eight percentage points. — The levels of UI benefits 
acted directly on the unemployed by making unemployment preferable to 
employment at wages little higher than unemployment benefits.
A more careful analysis of the unemployment data and the respective
benefit levels for the single years does not support the hypothesis of
benefit-induced unemployment. The events of 1918 to 1924 were inconsistent
with the high replacement ratio - high unemployment argument. In 1921
as a consequence of the high level of unemployment, benefits were raised
but unemployment fell continuously for the next three years followed
4/by falling nominal wages. — There is evidence that in the 1920s UI 
benefits were periodically adjusted upwards because unemployment rose. —
In spite of a relatively low employment and contribution require­
ment, less than half of the insured unemployed workers were entitled to 
benefits and many not even passed the much easier requirement for 
assistance. —^
Data available on unemployment of the time before World War II 
are rates amoung insured workers, representing about 60 percent of 
the total work force. The insurance figures tend to over-state the
1/ Benjamin, D.K./Kochin, L.A. (19?9). p. 453
2/ Benjamin D.K./Kochin, L.A. (1979). p.474
3/ See Table I in Benjamin, D.K./Kochin, L.A. (1979) p. 467
kj It is argued, however, that the puzzle about rises in real income but 
remaining high unemployment only started in 1924, See Benjamin, D.K./
Kochin, L.A. (1979) p.443
5/ See Alber, J. (1979)
6/ See Beveridge, W.H. (1936) p.363
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general unemployment as non-insured workers had a somewhat lower 
unemployment. —
The approach and findings of Benjamin and Kochin were recently
2/called into question in several articles published by British economists.—
A more detailed analysis of the inter-war period and a regression
approach based on a linear relation between the unemployment rate, the
benefits to income ratio and demand variables, provided absolutely no
clear-cut results about the impact of UI benefits on unemployment in 
3/this period. — In this study pre-war unemployment series were
adjusted, in order to make them comparable to post-war standards.
As alternative replacement ratio was calculated as a weighted average
across different family types. Married men with two children, for
whom replacement ratios were calculated in most of the studies, are
rather rare among the unemployed. Furthermore, half of UI recipients
were subject to the means-test and the actual scale of benefits was
4/lower for many unemployed. — A more relevant benefit measure has to 
reflect compositional changes of different groups of unemployed. 
Metcalf/Nichell/Floros, by applying the same equation as Benjamin snd «
Kochin but defining variables differently, received very divergent 
coefficients for different specifications of the regression equation.
They conclude that the thesis of Benjamin and Kochin is simply incorrect. —
The pre-war system is in no respect unique, as has been argued 
by Benjamin and Kochin. In fact, the post-war system shares most of 
its features (no experience rating, benefits that are not earnings-
i/ See Booth, E./Glynn, S. (1975) p.614
2/ See Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980), Sawyer, M.C. (1981 
and Hatton, T.J. (1980.
3/ See Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980)
4/ See Sawyer, M.C. (1981) and Hatton, T.J. (1980), who calculated that 
actual benefit payment per unemployed was only half the amount of the 
benefit calculated by Benjamin and Kochin.
5J At the time of writing, I have no notice of a reply by Benjamin and 
Kochin to the critique that followed their article.
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related, the possibility of * linking—up' three days of unemployment 
during a week to continuous unemployment in order to avoid the waiting 
period). ■—  ^ As Table 11 shows, post-war UI benefits are more generous, 
both absolutely and relatively in respect to income replacement, and 
in terms of coverage, than those of the inter-war period. Thus it 
appears that the same characteristics of the UI scheme explain high 
as well as low levels of unemployment.
"If unemployment was high in the inter-war years due to the
generosity of benefits, then in the 1960s and 1970s it should have been
truly gigantic. On the contrary, however, it is amazingly low by pre- 
2/war standards." —
5.2 Research in the United States
Analyses and empirical research on the impact of UI on the 
labour market, especially on unemployment, have mainly been conducted 
in the United States. Application of results from US studies to 
Western European countries are limited because the UI system in the
3/United States has different features from those of European countries. — 
A basic difference lies in the American system of experience rating 
which has an impact on employment policies of enterprises. Further­
more, major changes in the UI system in the 1970s have involved the 
maximum potential duration of benefits. Extended Benefits, that is the 
general extension of the potential UI benefit period, are automatically 
provided if the unemployment rate of total covered unemployment is at
1/ See also Chapter 3.3
2/ Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980) p. 15
3/ The federal tax on UI is 3.4 percent of wages up to a certain base 
(in 1979 $6,000 of each covered worker's wage) payable entirely by 
the employer. Great inter-state variation is in the determination 
of the tax rate paid by the firm, since the federal law allows states 
to void up to 0.5 percent of the federal tax. The states are free 
to construct sets of schedules that vary the tax rates charged to 
individual plants so long as overall financial solvency is maintained. 
Almost all states use some type of experience rating of employers to 
fix the rate paid on the taxable earnings of their employees. The 
tax rate varies depending on the employer's past experience. If a 
firm has a high layoff rate and a large fraction of its former em­
ployees receive UI benefits after separation from the plant> its tax rate will be higher. See Hamermesh, U.S. (1977).
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or above four percent and above 120 percent of the average of its level 
in the same three months in the past two years. — There is no single 
system of UI in the United States; each state has its own system.
In general, among American economists involved in research 
on UI, there is little dispute about the soundness of the argument 
that, on balance, UI creates incentives to greater unemployment. How­
ever, the quantitative importance of this phenomenon is still under 
question.
A number of studies on UI have analysed its effect on the 
duration of spells of unemployment. They were generally based on 
cross-section data on micro-economic level, dealing with the roughly 
50 percent of the unemployed who are covered by UI. Some of these 
studies will be presented here, in order to give a picture of calculation 
methods and empirical evidence from analyses of the impact of UI in 
the US. Recently, the effect of UI on the number of spells of short­
term unemployment have been analysed. However, due to labour market 
pecularities, this phenomenon'appears to be relevant mainly for the US. 
Two studies have been published, in which the total impact of UI on 
unemployment rates is examined. They will be described more in detail 
since their proceedings have been adopted also for studies in countries 
other than the US.
5.2.1 Studies on Individual Data
Especially since 1973 the effect of UI on the duration of 
unemployment has been analysed more extensively. In his study for 
the Joint Economic Committee, M. Feldstein, one of the main represen­
tatives among economists arguing UI as being an important factor for
changes in the unemployment rate, gave some raw estimates on the impact
2/of UI on the duration of unemployment. — He calculated that the total
1/ See Hanennesh, D.S. (1977) p. 6
2/ See Feldstein, M. (1973). In his Nobel Lecture Milton Friedman 
argues that the natural rate of unemployment has risen among other 
reasons because of unemployment compensation. The UI benefits are 
considered as often being attractive enough to induce individuals 
to search longer for the ’right’ job. See Friedman, M. (1977).
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impact of the UX system increased the overall permanent unemployment 
rate by at least 1.25 percent as a result of prolonged duration.
"A restructuring of the unemployment compensation system could reduce 
the unemployment resulting from cyclical and seasonal instability and 
from unnecessary long durations by an additional 1.25 percent or 
more." —
Taking data for 20,000 individuals from the National
Longitudinal Survey for the period 1966 to 1969, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
2/based their model on assumptions from Job Search Theory. — They
investigated the relationship among the individual's average duration
of unemployment, the ratio of an individual's weekly UI benefit to his
pre-unemployment weekly wage, and other variables thought to influence
the duration of unemployment. The basic regression equation is:
k
In (D) = a q + a 1R + I CLj x.
J-2
where R is the replacement ratio and x^  are variables which serve 
as proxies for certain variables with an impact on re-employment 
success, such as race, number of dependents, education, non-labour 
related income, family income, former spells of unemployment, etc.
They estimated the impact of UI benefits relative to the absence of 
such benefits to be small, but statistically significant. For males the 
estimated change in the duration of unemployment through an increase 
of the replacement ratio of 0.1 was 1.5 weeks, as the highest figure 
found among the different groups. For females this effect was found 
to amount to only 0.3 weeks, for males between 14 and 24 years it was 
0.2 and for younger females 0.5 weeks. According to Ehrenberg and 
Oaxaca, the question remains as to whether the cost to society of an 
increased duration of unemployment by higher UI benefits is more than 
offset by the increases in expected post-unemployment wages.
JL/ Feldstein, M. (1973) p.54 
2/ See Ehrenberg, R.G./Oaxaca, R. L. (1977)
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K. Classen presented empirical estimates of the effects of the 
level of weekly benefit payments on the duration of unemployment and on 
the monetary returns of the accepted job. — The sample consists of 
UI recipients from only two US states in the late 1960s. The regression 
equation applied is similar to the one is Ehrenberg and Oaxaca,
k
d = a + a , wba + I  a . x . ,
1  i-2 1  1
where WBA is the weekly benefit amount and the x^ variables are 
proxies of a worker’s skill level, the cost of search and the distri­
bution of job offers. Results indicate that as increase of $10.00 in
the weekly UI benefit amount leads to about a one-week increase in the
average duration of unemployment. The use of compensated weeks of 
unemployment as the duration measure has two disadvantages. Firstly, 
estimates of the effects of benefits will be biased upwards because 
short spells of unemployment may be missed in the sampling procedure. 
Secondly, unemployed individuals who have exhausted the potential 
period of UI benefits are excluded. This implies that the longest 
duration of unemployment found in the sample is identical to the 
maximum period of UI benefits. If duration of benefits is extended, 
registered unemployment will increase automatically.
R. M. Feinberg examined the effect of a worker’s risk
aversion on the expected duration of job search, by relating the duration
of unemployment to the cost of job search, an index of risk aversion
and the mean and standard deviation of the wage offer distribution
2/facing the individual. — The duration of unemployment was examined 
by multiple regression analysis of cross-sectional data for 1969,
1970 and 1971 from a panel study. The unemployment benefit in the 
search cost was seen to have the predicted positive effect on the 
duration of unemployment. Coefficients of this variable are, however, 
quite different in each of the years analysed. For 1970, which pro­
duced the ’best' fit for the regression specification, a $10 .00 increase
1/ See Classen, K.P. (1977)
2/ See Feinberg, R.M. (1977)
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in the amount of UI compensation per weeks of unemployment would lead 
to a one-week increase in duration.
The study by A. Holen examined how variations in the level of 
unemployment benefits, the maxi mum weeks of eligibility, and the work 
test enforcement affect the duration of compensated unemployment. —^
The 20,000 observations used in the study were collected during an 
experimental programme providing special counselling to unemployed 
workers in five cities. Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis 
was used to estimate the model:
k
d - a g + wba + a 2 pd + I ai xi,
where PD is the potential duration of UI benefits and the x^s stand for 
demographic variables, city dummies, previous earnings levels, etc.
A $10.00 increase in the weekly benefit level is generally associated 
with an increase of about one week in compensated duration. In 
recent recessions special extensions have been made in potential duration 
of UI benefits. Longer entitlement was found to lead to increased 
unemployment and to very large increases in UI benefits. Based on her 
findings, Holen concluded that more stringent work test enforcement 
would reduce compensated unemployment duration and benefit exhaustion. 
These findings are in agreement with the outcome of other studies. 
However, the choice of the duration of compensated unemployment as 
dependent variable casts some doubts on the reliability of the 
general conclusions. Registered duration of unemployment coincides 
with duration of UI compensation because after exhaustion of benefits 
the registration ceases. Thus it is obvious that longer potential 
duration of UI benefits increases unemployment; not necessarily because 
of prolonged spells of actual unemployment, but because the unemployed 
remain in the register for a longer period. Analysing effects of 
longer entitlement requires a dependent variable that takes into 
account the entire actual duration of unemployment.
1/ See Holen, A. (1977)
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In a recent study, M. Feldstein also analysed the effect of 
UI on temporary layoff unemployment. —  ^ He used a sample from the
Current Population Survey in order to measure the effect of UI benefits. 
The estimated regression equations related each individual's temporary 
layoff unemployment status to three kinds of variables:
(i) his potential UI benefit as a percentage of lost net 
wages;
(ii) his basic demographic characteristics such as age, sex 
and race; and
(iii) the basic characteristics of his employment according to 
industry groups and occupation categories.
✓
Most temporary layoffs were found to be induced by short random or 
cyclical fluctuations in demand. Feldstein concludes that the ex­
istence of the insurance has a powerful effect on temporary layoff 
unemployment. According to his findings, 50 percent of this unemploy­
ment can be attributed to the average UI benefit replacement ratio 
(the ratio of benefits to income) as set down in the current US laws^ 
This has to be seen, however, in connection with the fact that temporary 
layoffs account for about 50 percent of all unemployment spells in 
the US, and many of those who are laid off return to their original 
employers. The special features of the US labour market lead to 
Feldstein's conclusion that the current UI programme imposes an 
efficiency loss by distorting the behaviour of firms to lay off 
too many workers when demand falls.
Burgess and Kingston analysed the impact of UI benefits on
the re-employment success in the framework of Job Search Theory, using
2/data on UI claimants from three urban labour markets. —  Their 
results may be biased because these claimants were interviewed as a 
part of a special project. The study showed that re-employment 
success was positively related to higher weekly UI payments and longer
1/ See Feldstein, M. (1978b)
2/ See Burgess, P,L./Kingston, J. L. (1976) and Kingston, J.L./Burgess 
P.L. (1977)
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potential periods of unemployment compensation. On the other hand, 
post-unemployment earnings were negatively related to these workers 
actual duration of job search. Burgess and Kingston stated, however, 
that a number of other labour market characteristics of the unemployed, 
such as sex, age, education attainment and the labour market area .in 
which search occurred, also significantly affected the level of re­
employment earnings. However, these charteristics to some extent 
also determine eligibility for UI benefits and their absolute level.
The available empirical evidence indicated that the reservation wage 
is inversely related to the duration of job search and unemployment.
D. S. Haaermesh gives an overview of 12 available studies of 
the effect of UI benefits on the duration of unemployment in the US.
He summarizes these studies by posing the question: How much
greater would the average duration of claims have been in the sample 
period and place if benefits had been higher but nothing else had 
been altered ? —^
The results of these studies range from less than zero 
(a greater benefit amount decreases average duration of unemployment !) 
to 1 .6  (indicating that a rise of 10 percent in weekly benefits increases 
duration of unemployment by 1.6 weeks). Analysing the studies more 
in depth under the aspect of sample size, representativeness and the 
phase in an economic cycle, he considers the best estimate of a single 
figure to be an increase of 10 percent in the gross replacement rate 
(a worker's total benefits to the pre-tax earnings when fully employed) 
leads to an increase in the duration of insured unemployment of about 
half a week when labour markets are tight.
Hamermesh concludes that the measured effect of an extension 
of benefits and coverage of UI is certainly small but not zero, and 
that UI is inducing an extra 0.51 percent of unemployment through 
its effects on the duration. The most likely impact of the entire 
system of benefits on the unemployment rate which is induced by the 
workers’ behaviour (including the entrance or the remaining unemployed 
workers who without UI benefits would have left the labour market) is
1/ See Hamermesh, D.S. (1977) pp.36
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0.61 percentage points at low unemployment. —
But "UI's possible impact on unemployment is diminished by four
sets of factors: incomplete coverage, the availability of means of
financing job search other than UI benefits for many workers, the
negative Impact of an intermittent employment record on potential
employers, and competition with non-recipients for scarce jobs.
For all these reasons, it seems reasonable to conclude that the American
system of unemployment insurance does not appear to be a major cause of 2/unemployment." —
5.2.2 Studies on the Impact of PI on the Overall Unemployment Rate
Aggregate time series data on cross-section data on different
US states have been used in research on the impact of UI on the overall
unemployment. The theoretical and empirical approach presented by
3/Grubel and Maki is representative of several other studies on UI. —
It is based on a theoretical model of marginal utility and the income-47leisure trade-off. —  The econometric estimates are founded on the 
following equation which is assumed to describe aggregate unemployment:
URr - f ( SU, CU, TU, IU ),
where UR^ is the officially reported unemployment rate, SU is the 
structural or frictional, CU the cyclical, TU the seasonal and IU is 
the induced unemployment. IU is considered to be due to the increased 
consumption of leisure by workers who otherwise would have been employed. 
Unemployment is assumed to be an increasing function, of the benefit- 
income ratio and a decreasing function of the cost of job search.
\l See Hamermesh, D.S. (1977) pp. 32 
2/ Fields, G.S. (1977) p.12
3/ See Grubel, H.G./Maki, 0. (1976). The basic model presented in 
this article has been applied to a number of countries: for
Canada by Grubel,H.G./Maki, D./Sax, S. (1975), for Great Britain 
by Spindler, Z- A. /Maki, D. (1975), and with some modifications for 
New Zealand, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, published in the proceedings of an international 
conference, see Grubel, H.G./Walker, M.A. (ed) (1978).
4J  See Chapter 4.2.1.
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In the cross-section analysis for the whole US in 1971, the 
following proxies were used for estimating induced unemployment :
in D R- Po + P 1 r -|32e - p 3g - p4 S + £
where UR is the unemployment rate among workers insured against unemploy­
ment. The replacement ratio R is the average unemployment compensation 
benefit per week received by unemployed workers, in relation to the 
average weekly wages of workers in covered employment. E is a proxy 
for the strength of enforcement of eligibility rules, constructed from 
data on denials. The recent rate of growth in employment is given by 
G and the percentage of the civilian labour force covered by UI by 
variable S in the equation.
The cross-section analysis of the 48 United States of America
in 1971 produced a significant coefficient for the replacement ratio
and an elasticity of the insured unemployment rate with respect to the
variable R of 0.9 All variables except the percentage of the covered
2labour force are significant. The relatively low R =0.52 indicates 
that unemployment is affected probably by other important conditions 
and social policies in the different states. Differences in the un­
employment rates can, for the most part, be attributed to interstate 
differences in respect to economic performance and growth, and to 
political orientation of local governments and administration.
The time series analysis consisted of two equations that were 
estimated simultaneously using the two—ptage least square technique:
la DEt - ao + “ ! *t - a 2 *t - a 3 Dt " a 4 V l  • a 5 St + e t
R_ » a + a, dr + a, time + e, ,t O l  i t
where D^ and D^.  ^are the current and lagged percentage changes in the 
gross national product. The equation on R£ is included in the model 
in order to eliminate simultaneous equation bias resulting from the 
fact that the benefit-tincome ratio is itself a function of the unem­
ployment rate, because both wages and benefits tend to rise pro- and 
contra—cyclically, respectively, around a trend. The hypothesis is
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that during periods of high unemployment the average skill level of the 
unemployed rises, and thus eamings-related-average benefits increase.
The time series for E, the ineligibility for UI benefits, is strongly 
contra-cyclical and, in addition, varies as a result of changes in 
administrative procedures. In order to obtain a variable reflecting 
the cyclically unrelated changes in the strength of enforcement of UI,
INEL was defined as the residual from an equation with the denial 
rate as dependent variable and the current and lagged changes in 
GNP as independent variables.
The estimated coefficients in the time series for 1951-1972 
are all significant ( t-values are given in parenthesis ) :
In UR * -1.271 + 17.622 R - 0.39 INEL - 0.35 D 
(1.67) (9.92) (4.21) (5.26)
- 0.27 D . - 0.52 S 
(4.04) (4.27)
R2 - 0.93 DW = 1.74
R = 0.302 + 0.0054 UR + 0.0017 TIME
(60.63) (5.06) (9.49)
R2 * 0.84 DW * 1.66
According to these estimates, in 1972 unemployment among the insured would
have been 2.5 percent instead of 3.5 percent, if the variables R, INEL
and S had been at their 1955 levels.
The Grubel/Maki findings are neither very convincing in their 
theoretical approach nor in their practical proceedings. The neo­
classical model on marginal utility, as discussed in a preceding 
Chapter (see paragraph 4.2) is insufficient for explaining unemployment 
In particular, neo-classical theory does not account for involuntary 
unemployment, which Grubel and Maki, however, include in their calculations 
by the variables representing output (the growth rates of national 
product). Their basic theoretical model of the income-leisure trade­
off is extended to the decision process of workers who have been laid 
off as a result of cyclical or structural changes in the demand for 
labour. But the neo-classical concept does not_provide a theoretical
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basis for all four types of unemployment as distinguished by Grubel and 
Maki. Furthermore, the theoretical model in their approach is one of 
individual choice on a micro-economic level, while estimates are done 
for aggregate data on macro-level. The theoretical model describes 
the decision process of an individual who is voluntarily choosing 
leisure, but does not explain the causes and duration of unemployment.
It does not provide the foundations for the equation that is used in 
empirical testing.
Time series analysis on the impact of UI on unemployment 
generally creates problems because the variations of the replacement 
ratio over time are relatively small. The lack of substantial 
variations in the US replacement ratio since 1945 causes any observed 
change in unemployment to be attributed to very small changes in the 
replacement rate. —
Holen and Horowitz sought to ascertain to what extent provisions
of the UI laws and payment practices account for inter-state differences
21in unemployment rates. — Using a similar approach, a multi-equation 
model, and similar data to those of Grobel and Maki, they related each 
state's employment and unemployment rates to various characteristics 
of that state's labour force (race, age, and educational composition), 
its industrial composition, and the characteristics of the UI system, 
including benefit levels.
Two equations of their model estimate the interaction of UI3/benefit liberality and the unemployment rate* .
U - f1 ( UI, W, X, L )
UI = f2 ( U, PI, X ),
where U = state unemployment rate,
UI * benefit liberality,
W * wages,
1/ See Hamermesh, D.S. (1978)
2/ See Holen, A./Horowitz, S.A. (1974) and Horowitz, S. A. (1977) 
3/ See Holen, A./Horowitz, S.A. (1977) p.408
- 136 -
X - a vector of industrial mix variables,
L = a vector of labour force characteristics, and
PI - a political index, computed as a simple average of the
state's congressional votes.
The two stage least squares procedure is assumed to eliminate 
bias resulting from association between the independent variable and the 
error term,.including any association arising from causal mechanisms 
running from the dependent variable to the independent variable.
Holen and Horowitz found that unemployment is positively and 
strongly affected by benefit liberality measured with denial . rates.
The elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to benefit liberality 
was estimated to be 0.7. At an unemployment rate of 5.9 percent in 1971 
this implied an increase of 0.4 percent in the rate of unemployment for 
each 10 percent increase in benefits.
The liberality of UI benefits appears to be significantly 
explained by the state's political position relative to that of organized 
labour, not simply by the level of unemployment. The effect of UI on 
employment and labour force participation was also tested:
E » f3 ( UI, W, X, P )
LF - f4 ( UI, W, X, P ), 
where P is a vector of population characteristics.
Finally, benefit liberality was decomposed into the components 
coverage by UI, the fraction of initial claimants eligible for UI, 
denial rates, the weekly UI benefit and the ratio of exhaustions of UI.
Of the five determinants of benefit liberality only the denial rate had 
a significant estimated impact on the unemployment rate. Contrary to 
the findings by Grubel and Maki, Holen and Horowitz indicated that 
variations between states in average weekly benefits paid had no direct 
bearing on the unemployment rate, while doubling the denial rate would 
imply a reduction of 1.4 percent in the unemployment rate.
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It is strange that for the set of four equations the benefit 
liberality and the denial rate are statistically significant determinants 
of the unemployment rate, but not significant for employment and labour 
force participation. This fact sheds some doubts on the reliability 
of the results, because an increase in unemployment should be reflected 
either in a decrease of employment or in higher participation rates. 
Furthermore, the denial rate in the different states are related to the 
level of unemployment for another reason. —  ^ The administrative costs
of operating the UI system are funded by the federal government through 
grants from the federal UI tax. The amount of a state's administrative 
grant depends mainly on the level of unemployment. The number of work- 
tests and thus of denials of UI benefits is determined by the amount of 
money and administrative staff at disposal. This inter-dependency of 
unemployment and work test could be a source of considerable difficulty 
in untangling causal relationship.
5.3 The Debate on ERS in Great Britain
Many British economists assumed a causal link between the 
substantial and apparently permanent increase in Great Britain's 
measured unemployment rate starting at the end of 1966, and the intro­
duction into Britain's unemployment compensation scheme of an 'Earnings
2/Related Supplement' (ERS) which was first paid in October 1966. — 
Estimates of the order of magnitude of unemployment induced by UI 
benefits since the introduction of ERS have varied widely.
Mackay and Reid presented results from a multi-variate analysis
based on the unemployment experiences of 658 male employees in the
3/West Midlands during 1966-1968. — The regression results confirmed 
the findings of previous analyses that age is the most important 
personal attribute influencing the length of unemployment. Their 
evidence showed that higher unemployment benefits do have some, though 
rather weak, disincentive effect. An increase in UI benefits of £1.00
2J See Ashenfelter, 0. (1977)
2/ The ERS is paid in addition to the normal flat rate benefit,
see Chapter 3.3.2
3/ See Mackay, D.I./Reid, G.L. (1972)
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per week tended to increase the length of unemployment by almost one 
half of a week. They also found that the amounts of redundancy 
payments for workers who are dismissed did not appear to be linked 
very markedly with the length of time out of work.
Gujarati suggested that the introduction of ERS along with the
introduction of the Redundancy Payment Act in 1965 were responsible
for the change in the behaviour of the relationship between unemployment
and vacancies. —  ^ In an article Taylor challenged this assumption and
put forward that the 'shake-out* of hoarded labour was a more significant 
2/explanation. —
A further discussion was started by an article by Maki and 
Spindler. This article was based mainly on the evidence of a simul­
taneous increase in unemployment benefits and in the unemployment rate
3/from 1966 onwards. — They presented an aggregate time-series 
regression analysis, applying the theoretical and empirical work of 
Grubel and Maki for the United States. For the econometric estimation 
the total unemployment rate UR was regarded as a function of the benefit- 
income ratio ( Ben/Inc ) and variables determining cyclical (CycVar ), 
structural ( StruVar ), and seasonal ( SeasVar ) unemployment:
UR * f ( Ben/Inc, CycVar, StrucVar, SeasVar ).
If there exists a substantial reverse causation between the 
benefit-income ratio and the unemployment rate, then empirical estimations
1/ See Gujarati, D, (1972)
2/ See Taylor, J. (1972)
3/ See Maki, D./Spindler, Z.A. (1975). However, the change-over to 
ERS took place at a time of already rapidly increasing unemployment 
due to a severely restrictive government policy. The rise in 
unemployment may therefore have simply been a continuation of the 
underlying trend already apparent before the changes in UI.
See Hauser, M.M./Burrows, P. (1969) p.104.
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with ordinary least square techniques will yield biased coefficients. 
By including the equation:
Ben/Inc = g ( UR, ChangVar, RPI, O/PE ) 
with variables for changes in social preferences (ChangVar), the 
retail price index ( RPI ) and output per person employed ( O/PE ) . 
Two stage least squares estimation will reduce one source of simul­
taneous equation bias.
Proxy variables are assumed to represent the different types 
of unemployment. Thus the regression equations were:
In UR = a0 + a-1 Rt - a 2 In Dt - a 3 In Dt _1
+ (X4 St + £t
and
Rt " Po + Pi ^  ~ h  SHIFT + 03 TIME + et »
where UR is the unemployment rate, R the replacement ratio and and 
represent the cyclical variables as the current and lagged ratio 
to trend of the index of gross national product. The proxy for
StrucVar is S^., a labour force index multiplied by output per person. 
Since annual data is used no seasonal variable is necessary. Changes 
in social preferences (ChangVar) were represented by a consecutive 
integer time variable (TIME) and a shift dummy (SHIFT) starting in 1966.
The equation yielded the following results (t-values are
given in parenthesis):
In UR * -I.129 .+ I.197 Rt - II.615 Dfc - 4.557 D
(-5.59) (2.558) (-5.607) (-2.224)
+0.00009067 S 
(2.458) C
R2 = 0.907 DW - 1.258
R = 0.3135 + 0.02617 UR + 0.2231 SHIFT + 0.00575 TIME
Z (14.738) (I.841) (10.919) (3.267)
R2 - 0.975 DW *= 1.988.
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Ordinary least squares results were virtually identical to two stage 
least squares. —^
According to these estimates the effects of#ERS on unemployment
are quite substantial; on average the overall and male unemployment
rates were 30 percent and 33 percent higher respectively, as a result
2/of ERS during the first six years of its functioning. —
Though debate and speculation has continued over a number of
years, a definite answer to the question of what caused the changed
relationship between registered unemployment and notified vacancies
had not been agreed. In April 1974 the Department of Employment set
up a working party to " appraise the evidence of a change in the
relation between unemployment and vacancies from about 1966, and to
3/study possible explanations for such a change." —
The Department of Employment Working Party on the Changed 
Relationship between Unemployment and Vacancies made estimates on the 
likely magnitude of an effect of ERS, without using econometric 
methods. The shift in the unemployment-vacancy relationship in 
1966-1974 was about 300,000 measured in terms of unemployment. In the 
years 1966 to 1970 ERS was being received by an average of about 
100,000 unemployed men. The Working Party reckoned that it would be 
very much an over-estimate to regard these 100,000 as the upper limit 
of additions to the register because due to ERS as many of these men 
would have been unemployed in any case, also without any UI. Even if 
ERS had doubled unemployment duration, this would indicate induced 
unemployment of only 50,000. Another way of calculating a maximum 
effect was to take the number of men unemployed for 2-26 weeks (the 
period of receipt of ERS, if eligible) plus those unemployed for less 
than two weeks who would go on to receive ERS, and then to compare 
this sum with the equivalent situation in the previous cycle. The 
estimate arrived at for the ERS effect was thus 80,000. For these
1/ See Maki, D./Spindler, Z.A. (1975) p.446 
2J See Maki, D./Spindler, Z.A. (1975) p.449 
3/ Department of Employment (1976) p.l
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reasons the effect of the introduction of ERS could explain no more than
a small part of the shift of 300,000.
The fact that only a small proportion of the stock of unemployed 
actually receive the Earnings Related Supplement (only about 22 per­
cent of all registered unemployed in 1975 —  ^) leads one to suspect that 
Maki and Spindler*s statement about an effect of ERS of over 30 percent 
on unemployment is seriously mistaken. M. Sawyer criticized their
approach because of testing, at the aggregate level, a theory that is
2 /based on an individual decision-making process. — In addition 
their study was criticized because of using benefit payments that are 
not representative of the level of benefits actually being received by 
the unemployed. Maki and Spindler referred to benefits which would 
be received by an unemployed worker who had previously been earning the 
average industrial wage, while the previous earnings of unemployed 
are generally below the average earnings. Thus, these comparisons 
overstated the effect through the Introduction of ERS.
Calculations carried out by Sawyer were based on different
time series as well as on different regression variables to represent 
the cyclical and UI factors. For a slightly shorter period from 
1956 to 1972 (Maki and Spindler used data from 1952 to 1972) a re­
gression with the same variables yielded coefficients on the benefit- 
income ratio that were not statistically significant:
In UR — 1.911 + 0.166 Rt - 13.378 Dt - 4.513
(7.64) (0.398) (-7.415) (-2.874)
+ 0.000211 St 
(5.242)
R2 « 0.967 DW = 1.980
1/ See Holden, K./Peel, D.A. (1979) and Table 12 in Chapter 3.3.2 
Furthermore, a considerable percentage of the unemployed (about 
50 percent in 1975) fall through the net of the UI scheme, they 
either are not entitled to any benefits at all or can only claim 
Supplementary Allowance. See also George, V. (1973) p.103.
2/ See Sawyer, M.C. (1979) p. 136
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R = 0.247 + 0*0179 OR + 0.205 SHIFT + 0.00933 TIME
C (8.831) (1.238) (9.205) (3.492)
R2 = 0.982 DW - 2.415
The introduction of ERS to unemployment benefits were unelikely to have 
been a relevant contributory factor to the higher level of unemploy­
ment. Furthermore, between 1968 and 1972, with the exception of 1970 
the numbers receiving ERS were found to be about three quarters of the 
induced unemployment calculated by Maki and Spindler. —^
Cubbin and Foley estimated the duration of unemployment and the
logarithm of unemployment as linear functions of the benefit-income
ratio, permanent income and vacancies, where the latter variable was
2/a proxy for the probability of finding the right job. — They found 
that when both the benefit-income ratio and permanent income variables 
are included in the same estimation equation, permanent income is sig­
nificant while the benefit-income ratio is not. They concluded that 
the income effect of changes in permanent income, played the main role 
in explaining the apparent shift,in unemployment. But since both 
the replacement ratio and unemployment have risen over most of the 
years under examination, the inclusion of any variable that moves 
monotonuously over time will always tend to reduce the impact of the 
replacement.ratio.
In a recent article Junankar has re-examined the theory of un-
3/employment that is induced by UI benefits. — He tested the equation
from Maki and Spindler, separating the benefit-income ratio and taking 
logarithms for the variables. Ordinary least squares yielded the 
following results for the period 1952 to 1970:
In UR = -7.587 + 0.008 In (B/P) - 3#172 in Y/P)
(-3.194) (0.041) (-3.875)
If See Sawyer, M.C. (1979) p.144 
2/ See Cubbin, J.S./Foley, K. (1977) 
3/ See Junankar, P.N. (1980)
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-9.967 In D - 6.669 In D + 0.0003 S.
(-6.00) c (-4.377) t"A (4.197) Z
R2 = 0.92 DW = 2.08
where B is the benefit, Y the net income and P the price level. The 
benefit variable was not significant in any sub—period and even negative 
for 1952 to 1966. It was significant and positive for the whole 
period of 1952 to 1975. The vector of the coefficient for real UI 
benefits showed structural instability over the time periods under 
examination. Results from further calculations that made some allowance 
for other causes of unemployment suggest that the level and composition 
of aggregate demand is an important explanation of increasing unemployment.
In a reply to the critique of their article, Spindler and 
Maki argued that their model may not be complete, and the exogenous 
variables, as measured, may not correspond exactly with the theoretically 
relevant variables. The model may also be highly collinear. But 
the same criticisms might be made about the empirical models developed 
by Cubbin and Foley and Sawyer. — Since a time-series analysis 
of unemployment and benefit-income ratio will always be biased by 
multicollinearity, they see the only valid approach which is one that 
involves cross-section or micro data. This, however, makes it difficult 
to take demand effects into account.
S. Nickell recently conducted an interesting empirical analysis
of the impact of increased benefits on the duration of unemployment 
2/spells. -* It is based on cross-section data from the unemployed males 
interviewed in the General Household Survey of 1972. Nickell adds 
variables to the relationship between unemployment duration and the 
replacement ratio. These variables, which are liable to affect the 
probability of an individual leaving unemployment, are personal 
characteristics, family composition, local labour demand, and income 
variables that may be relevant for the duration of unemployment of an 
individual.
1/ See Spindler, Z.A./Maki, D. (1979) p. 156
I! See Nickell, S.J. (1979/a) and Nickell,S.J. (1979/b ).
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The conditional probability of a man leaving unemployment in 
a particular week (still being out of work at the beginning of that 
week) is given by:
P (s) = 1  + e~Z
where s gives the number of weeks that have passed since the beginning 
of the .unemployment spell. The logit transform is used to ensure that 
the function is bounded by zero and one. Functions of x(s) are part 
of specifications of z(s):
2x(s) = x± + aQs + a^s ,
where x^ are different variables like age, marital status, ill-health 
dummy, etc. The simplest specifications are:
sQ : z (s) = £ o + x(s)
: z(s) = (Bo + x(s) + R(s)
y-j(s)
with R(s) y^s)
as the replacement ratio, in which y^ is the real potential income while 
the individual is out of work and y^ the real potential family income 
were the individual to work.
Nickell cannot, however, reject the hypothesis that benefit 
and income effects on duration arise only through the ratio of these 
variables. He found an elasticity of duration with respect to the 
replacement ratio of between 0.6 and 1.0, but the effect of UI benefits 
on the probability of leaving unemployment seems to be negligible for 
the long term unemployed. He concludes that the introduction of ERS 
increased unemployment by about 10 percent. —
5.4. Calculations on the Effects of UI in the FRG
The discussion about UI as an element inducing voluntary unemployment 
is not new in the FRG. Especially employers organizations frequently 
put forward the argument that 'shirkers' are voluntarily out of work
1/ See Nickell, S.J. (1979/a) p.47
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because unemployment benefits are avilable. — Cuts in UI benefits
are being seriously considered as a way of lowering the unemployment
rate, as the deficits of the Federal Labour Office are rising.
Unlike in the UK and the United States, little empirical research has
been done in this field for the West German labour market« Only a
few general estimates have been provided and only one study has tried
to establish the effects of UI on unemployment in an econometric
framework. This approach by König and Franz followed methodologically
the lines of Grubel and Maki and was based upon yearly and quarterly
2/observations for the period 1950 to 1975. — The regression analysis
- based on the same equation system as applied by Grubel and Maki for
the United States - did not yield satisfactory results. The Two
Stage Least Square version for all registered unemployed for the
3/whole time period yields: —
In UR * 20.45 - 0.082 UCB/AWWCE + 0.456 INEL
(0.6) (3.1)
- 0.097 PCGNP - 0.057 PCGNP . - 0.213 PCOV
(1.6) (0.8) (1.7)
R2 = 0.532 DW = 0.594 ,
where UCB/AWWCE is the replacement ratio, INEL is defined as residual 
from an equation with the denial rate as dependent variable and the 
current and lagged percentage change in gross national product as 
independent variable. PCGNP and PCGNP_^ are the current and lagged 
percentage changes in gross national product, reflecting the cyclical 
variations in demand. PCOV is the percentage of civilian labour force 
covered by UI.
The replacement ratio and PCOV have been replaced by their 
estimates according to the following equations:
UCB/AWWCE ■ b + b.UR + b0TIME and 0 1 i
PCOV - c + c, MFG/TOT + C-AG/TOT, o l  i
1/ See for example Der Spiegel(1978), Süddeutsche Zeitung (1981)
2/ See König, H./Franz» W. (1978)
3/ Figures in brackets are t- values.
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in which MFG/TOT and AG/TOT are the share of manufacturing and agricul­
tural in total employment.
Results do not improve with Ordinary Least Squares or the 
autoregressive version. Results for the sub-period 1960-1975 are 
better from the statistical point of view, but the magnitude of the 
parameters appears to be completely implausible indicating that a 
seven percentage point decrease in the benefit ratio would have been 
sufficient for the re-employment of the one million unemployed 
persons in 1975. The authors state that the statistical material is 
inadequate for this type of analysis. Because of some particular 
aspects of the West German labour market it is better in any case to 
limit the analysis to the period after 1960. —^
Konig and Franz suggest modifying the dependent variable, 
the officially published rate of unemployment. It is considered to be 
biased because it neither includes the 'export of unemployment’ of 
foreign workers, nor the discouraged workers nor short-time working.
These are certainly good points in criticizing the unemployment rate as 
an economic indicator for the state of the tbour market or in international 
comparisons. But why these corrections might improve the analysis of 
the effects of UI is not explained. If the replacement ratio is 
assumed to affect unemployment, the impact should be expected on those 
workers who in the case of unemployment will profit from UI benefits.
UI will hardly induce or prolong the duration of unregistered 'hidden 
unemployment'.
In the calculation of participation rates and the potential 
labour supply, Konig and Franz exclude the foreign..members of the labour 
force. This seems to be a somewhat arbitrary decision because a sub­
stantial number of the migrant workers are registered as unemployed and 
thus form part of the labour supply. The argument that the income- 
leisure approach cannot be applied to them because they consider leisure 
as an inferior good and they should thus be excluded from analysis
1/ Especially the inflow of refugees and the exclusion of West Berlin 
and the Saarland from official statistics until 1960 explain the 
data deficiency before this period, see Chapter 2.1.
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does not hold for those foreign unemployed who are eligible for UI 
benefits. —  ^ A number of German unemployed, such as workers who are 
head of a family, might as well regard leisure as an inferior good.
With several transformations and a labour demand function 
based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, Konig and Franz compute 
a variable for unemployment that is defined as the difference between 
potential and actual labour demand, both measured in hours *. The 
unemployment rate, calculated only for the German labour force, is 
given by:
jrp i .  (EP+ . H+ ) -  ( ET . H ), ,
EP ’ H
where EP+ is the labour force, ET the number of employed persons, and 
H the weekly working hours. The potential hours per worker, H+, are 
defined as:
' .  - M L .
ET - V
where N+ is the demand for labour that has been calculated from the 
labour demand function, divided by the sum of employed persons and 
vacancies. The demand for labour is assumed to be determined by wages 
W, user costs of capital UC, capacity utilization CD, the demand for 
labour of the previous period  ^and seasonal dummies S.
In the approach of Konig and Franz the two equations on the 
demand for male and female labour result from the same optimization 
procedure.
In Njt * a0 + ai^-n Wjt + a2 ^  UCt + a3
+ a4 In (Nj) t _1 + a5 Sx + a6 S2 + S3 ,
j « M, F
The underlying assumption is an equilibrium model for the firm, where 
the level of output is fixed and thus the problem is one of minimizing
1/ In May 1979, 66,552 unemployed foreign workers, about 10 percent
of all unemployed recipients, claimed unemployment compensation.
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costs. The demand for labour - according to the model - is determined 
by the capacity utilization rate» which, however, in itself reflects 
the level of demand for labour and its lagged value. An equation 
designed to explain the demand for labour which includes a measure of 
capacity utilization is misspecified and will not yield reliable 
estimates. The level of capacity utilization and, at the same time, 
the user costs of capital (which are particularly determined by the 
level of capacity utilization) stand in the same equation. This may 
bring about problems of multicollinearity. To a certain extent the 
costs of capital depend upon the level of capacity utilization, because 
a different utilization factor of the productive facilities implies a 
different cost structure.
Furthermore, the implicit assumption that the costs of one man 
working 40 hours is equal to those of 40 men each working one hour is 
not realistic. Neither the way of calculating nor the reasons for 
the preference of the measure of unemployment in hours are convincing.
It is not evident why the computation of potential and actual working 
hours rather than the rate of employment should provide a better measure 
for analysing the effects of UI, especially as compensation for short- 
time working is not Included in the UI benefits. The potential labour 
force participation rate has been computed for an unemployment rate of 
zero, any type of frictional, structural or search unemployment has 
been disregarded. No kind of structural unemployment has been 
Included in the model. These proceedings are certainly not realistic, 
but they are convenient because of the lack of precise indication of 
the normal level of these types of unemployment.
Two of the regression results obtained by Konig and Franz are 
presented here:
InUR’ « 14.47 + 0.089 UCB/AWU - 0.492 V/ET 
(6.0) (8.7)
+ 0.493 W/P - 0.181 UC - 0.013 INEL
(1.9) (3.6) (0.7)
- 0.238 PCOV + 0.298 S. + 0.321 S
(2.3) (4.0) 1  (4.1) 1
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+ 0.277 S,
(3.6) 3
R2 * 0.734 DW « 0.549
and
UR' - 302.683 + 0.495 UCB/AWU - 0.971 CU + 9.104 W/P
(2.6) (5.5) (2.7)
- 2.828 UC + 0.031 INEL - 3.507 PCOV
(3.9) (0.1) (2.6)
+ 0.514 S - 0.557 S, - 0.745 S
(0.6) 1 (0.6) L (0.9) J
R2 - 0.614 DW - 0.444
where UCB is the average unemployment compensation, AWU the average
weekly net wage which unemployed persons earned before unemployment,
V/ET is the vacaney-employment ratio, W/P the real wage rate, UC the 
user costs of capital, S the seasonal dummies and CU the capital 
utilization rate. In the second equation, one may doubt the theoreti­
cal validity of using any measures of capacity utilization in an 
equation that is supposed to explain the rate of unemployment. One 
cannot postulate a change in the unemployment rate in response to 
a modification of UI benefits while controlling for the level of 
capacity utilization (which itself is a measure of under-employment of 
production factors).
With regard to statistical properties the distinction by sex 
yielded no advantage. This could have been expected because most of the 
variables (and especially the replacement ratio) are not available for 
the sex status.
From the statistical point of view the last results are more 
significant than those of the original model. But because of several 
deficiencies in the approach as well as in the data, they cannot be 
considered as supporting the hypothesis that UI is inducing unemployment. 
One effect of UI that has not been mentioned by K5nig and Franz, however,
- 150 -
may be deduced from the analysis. The replacement ratio does not seem 
to affect registered unemployment, but shows a significant positive 
coefficient when the unemployment rate is constructed from potential 
labour supply and thus taking into account 'hidden unemployment' and 
the discouraged workers effect. For this reason, one may hypothesize 
that UI rather than affecting the level of unemployment has an impact 
on labour market participation and on the registering of the unemployed. 
When the unemployment rate UR' goes up as a result of a rise in the 
replacement ratio, this might not only be the result of higher unem­
ployment, but also of an increase in EP+, the registered labour fource. 
However, this assumption requires further analysis.
In their conclusions Konig and Franz admit that they are 
sceptical about their results.
Recently two studies on the unemployment prolonging effect of 
UI were published. In an analysis based on data on the duration of 
unemployment compiled by the German Federal Labour Office since 1966,
H. KSnlg calculated transition probabilities from unemployment to 
employment. — He distinguished between unemployed workers who are 
ineligible and those who are receiving unemployment compensation. The 
completed duration of unemployment for the two groups was estimated with 
a Markov model based on monthly data for the period 1970-1976. Konig 
found that the duration of unemployment is on average nearly one month 
longer for recipients of UI benefits compared to the average duration of 
all unemployed. He concluded that there exists some voluntary un­
employment , as explained by job search models and the income-leisure 
approach, that Is Induced by UI.
Konig's findings were criticised in an article of the research
2/institute of the Federal Labour Office. —  F. Egle and V. Karr considered 
the Markov model and the assumptions in the calculations of unemployment 
duration as unrealistic. A different method of calculating the duration
1/ See KSnlg, H. (1978)
2/ See Egle, F./Karr, W. (1980)
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of completed spells of unemployment leads to an opposite result,
i.e., the unemployment duration of UI recipients is found to be lover 
than the average duration. A more careful analysis of the data 
published on UI shows that the number of UI recipients in König's 
approach was systematically underestimated. — The most important 
argument against this type of analysis is that the two groups of 
unemployed persons do not only differ in respect to the receipt of 
UI benefits, but also have very different employment perspectives. 
Unemployed workers who are eligible for UI benefits are not compara­
ble to those without claims for compensation; they show different 
characteristics in respect to the labour market. The hypothesis that 
UI is prolonging unemployment cannot be examined by comparing two
groups for which differences other than the receipt of UI benefits
2/cannot be held constant. —
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that the duration 
of the receipt of UI benefits is not identical to the duration of un­
employment. Some unemployed persons stay in the register after the 
exhaustion of the maximum benefit period, others then end registered 
unemployment by withdrawing from the labour merket. Figures on the 
duration of unemployment from official statistics may be misleading 
for an analysis of the impact of UI. Quite a profound understanding 
of data collection and of the functioning of the labour market and 
UI is required to make reliable statements about the effects of un­
employment benefits.
In a reply H. König insisted on the soundness of his calcula-
3/tions, but he could not refute the basic critiques.—
1/ The percentage of unemployed persons who are receiving UI benefits
— is not identical to the percentage of persons eligible for UI
because part of the applicants for UI have to wait until they receive
unemployment compensation. They are counted as non-recipients until 
they receive their first payment of UI.
2/ On this point see also Chapter 6.3.2
3/ See König, H. (1980)
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Only one study on the effects of 171 exists for the FRG based 
on individual data. F. Wlndolf and E. Heirich published an analysis 
on the answers obtained from interviews of 103 unemployed persons in 
eight cities of West Germany. — '^ However, this sample can neither
claim to be representative (blue collar workers were excluded) nor 
is it large enough to allow any generalization of the findings. The 
results indicate that about 8 , to 10 percent of the unemployed can 
be classified as 'voluntary*, in the sense that they either quit their 
last employment without good cause or they refused job offers. A 
reduction of UI benefits has only a marginal Impact on the behaviour 
of the unemployed. But the system of social security was found to 
be stabilizing voting behaviour and political attitudes of the un­
employed. Based on figures of UI benefit' denials because of voluntary 
quitting and refusals of job offers, F. Egle calculated a voluntary
and insurance induced unemployment ('unechte' Arbeitslosigkeit) of
2/3 percent of all registered unemployed. — In 1977 voluntary 
unemployment after quitting was calculated to be 18,000 and because 
of refusal of a job offer, 8,600.
The German Labour Unions' Federation (DGB) has turned against
the defamation of the unemployed because of individual cases of unem-
3/ployed 'shirkers'. — It has argued that a number of points explain 
high 'real' unemployment such as the high level of hidden unemploy­
ment, the relation of unemployed to vacancies which was 1 : 4 in
1978, a low level of denials of UI benefits, and a significant part 
of unemployed persons ineligible for benefits.
The discussion on the unemployment inducing effects of UI has 
never died down during the last years. Unemployment compensation can
If See Wlndolf, P./Weirich, H. (1980)
2/ See Egle, F. (1979)
If See DGB (1978)
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be assumed to have seme impact on the incidence and duration of 
unemployment in certain cases. But the problem is to provide reliable 
estimates of the magnitude of this phenomenon.
5.5 Conclusions
It is hard to refuse the hypothesis that variations in the 
amount of UI benefits have an impact on the initiation or duration of 
unemployment among some persons who are covered by a UI scheme. A 
popular topic of conversation in pubs or at cocktail parties is the 
story about an unemployed person who is living on UI benefits, enjoy­
ing leisure and avoiding the possibility of re-employment. There 
is little doubt that some individuals prefer leisure and a low income 
to regular work and that some unemployed persons might indeed be 
better off by living on UI than by working. It is, however, not 
obvious that this is a widespread phenomenon among unemployed people 
and whether it can contribute to a higher overall level of unemployment.
On an individual level, UI can be seen in the context of a moral 
hazard and the work-leisure trade-off. The concept of a moral hazard 
is a well-known concept in the private insurance industry. The 
incidence of a certain risk is greater when its victims are insured 
against losses than when they are not. —  ^ UI in concept reduces the
1costs associated with a spell of unemployment in the same way that 
insurance against fire is meant to reduce the cost associated with 
this event. In economic terms, the Increased incidence of unemploy­
ment can be simply viewed as a rational response to reduced costs. 
However, the assumptions that are implicit in this concept are unlikely 
to be true for all unemployed persons. In spite of potential compen­
sation from an insurance scheme, many workers would, for a number of 
reasons, not wish to become unemployed. Except for unemployed workers 
in some marginal categories, for most men and women the experience of 
unemployment Is sufficiently unpleasant not to prolong it voluntarily 
and they are quite anxious to find another job. In any case, while
1/ See Grubel, H.G./Walker, M.A. (1978) p.2. However, Topel, R./Welch, F. 
(1980) argue that UI has such features that traditionally limit the 
insurability of risk, above all the high covariance in the occurence 
of the adverse contingency, p.356.
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the hypothesis of 'profitting' from the insurance system may be true 
for certain individuals, it does not necessarily provide a general 
explanation of the increasing level of duration of unemployment.
The number of unemployed at any time depends on the size of 
the labour force, the number of spells of unemployment experienced by 
labour force participants and the average duration of spells of un­
employment. The impact of UI on unemployment and the unemployment 
rate may therefore occur through three effects:
(1) It may increase the registering of unemployment 
and thus the labour force participation.
(2) UI may induce the initiation of a spell of unemploy­
ment by voluntary quitting of the workers or layoffs 
by the employers.
(3) And it may increase the duration of a spell of 
unemployment.
With regard to (1), there is little doubt that the type of extended 
UI programmes that exists in the US induces some of the unemployed who 
have exhausted their regular benefits to remain in the labour force 
rather than drop out. In the UK and in the FRG no such extensions
of UI benefits are provided in periods of high unemployment. When 
employment levels are low, labour market participation generally de­
creases . The availability of unemployment compensation may cancel 
or mitigate this effect because people will not withdraw from the labour 
market as long as they receive UI benefits. Unemp loyment rates can
rise because of higher participation rates. However, when unemployment
is high it is tin likely that persons who otherwise would not be seeking 
work are induced by the existence of UI benefits to enter the labour 
force. In the absence of any unemployment compensation many unemployed 
workers (especially members of the secondary labour force) would not 
register at the employment offices but withdraw from the labour market.—^
— This argument Is, above all, valid for the group of married women 
and elderly people who are nearing retirement.
- 155 -
Much of this effect on unemployment will depend on how unemployment is 
measured. In this respect, UI does not increase the overall unemploy­
ment but rather lowers the level of 'hidden' unemployment. UI 
benefits can simply turn'discouraged' workers into unemployed workers 
until benefits run out. But in these cases, unemployment benefits 
have not caused any substantial change in employment. Workers were 
just shifted from one status to another in the labour force. Most 
studies on the impact of UI never clearly determine whether it is this 
type of unemployment that is created by increased UI benefits or whether 
registered unemployment is prolonged.
With regard to (2), in the US the effect of UI on layoff 
practices of employers has been studied. It has been found that 
imperfect experience rating in the UI contributions is inducing a higher 
level of fluctuations in employment. These findings cannot be applied 
to Western European countries. In the FRG, Italy and the UK, employers 
have to pay contributions to UI schemes independently from their 
experiences in unemployment. But labour market administration and 
laws on dismissals also determine a different type of industrial 
relations where temporary layoffs are either impossible or an exception. 
The existence of UI mitigates the social consequences of unemployment 
and we may hypothesize that it takes off responsibility from employers 
in cases of dismissals. It thus makes it, under moral aspects,easier 
for firms to dismiss workers. However, it is impossible to estimate 
these effects for the UK or the FRC.
One may postulate that it is quite unlikely, that 01 benefits 
induce workers to quit their jobs because UI regulations require a 
waiting period before becoming eligible in cases of voluntary quitting.
With regard to (3) the main impact of UI can be seen on the 
duration of unemployment. A doubling of the average duration of spells 
of unemployment would lead to a doubling of the unemployment rate 
assuming there are no changes in the numbers of persons being made 
redundant. If UI affects the duration of completed spells of unemploy-
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meat we may conclude that unemployment varies in proportion to the 
change in duration induced by UI.
Studies in the US and the UK on the effects of UI on the 
duration of unemployment vary widely in the magnitude of their estimates. 
The duration of unemployment can be affected by UI either through 
changes In the benefit amount or the potential duration of these 
benefits. In US studies, it was found that an increase in the potential 
duration of benefits prolongs unemployment, especially when the level 
of unemployment is high. But it is a result of longer registering 
rather than a preference for leisure. In the UK and the FRG estimates 
on prolonged duration of unemployment have been limited to the effects 
of changes in the level of benefits because no modifications in the 
potential duration of benefit receipt have occured. The available 
studies on the effects of UI postulate an increase of the unemploy­
ment rate through longer durations of unemployment when UI benefits 
increase. But estimates differ considerably from one study to another. 
We may conclude that some unemployment is induced by UI, but the 
present studies on the Importance of this effect are inconclusive.
The measuring of the impact of UI is a difficult process, and it is 
not certain which type of unemployment is created, search employment 
or simply that 'discouraged' workers turn into unemployed workers.
The likely effects that can be estimated appear to be small. — ^
Effects of changed UI benefits depend upon the situation of 
the labour market. High unemployment rates are normally correlated 
with long duration of spells of unemployment because the lack of 
available job offers forces workers to search longer. In this situation 
additional UI benefits will have little Influence on the duration of 
unemployment. When employment perspectives are bad, individuals are 
more likely to spend unemployment compensation on intensified job 
search. Any prolonging effect of Increased UI benefits on the 
duration of unemployment will be less than In good times. Under
1/ See OECD (1978) p.23
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adverse conditions OT benefits may not be expected to Induce recipients 
to prolong the duration of the period for receiving UI unduly, or 
therefore cause general unemployment levels to rise. —^
Studies on individual cross-section data in the US and the
UK indicate that any impact of UI on the duration of unemployment is
not the same for different population groups and for different income
levels. The disincentive effects will differ among demographic
groups. Primary workers are less likely to be affected by work dis-
2/incentives because of social pressures existing in this group. —
For long-term unemployed workers, independently of the state of the 
economy, the effect of UI on the duration of joblessness can be 
assumed to be negligible. For them personal characteristics such 
as age, health and skill level are particularly decisive for the 
duration of employment.
In the context of moral hazards, and the unemployment inducing 
effects of UI benefits, we also have to consider that there are limits 
set on the prolonging of unemployment and abuses of the UI system. 
According to prevailing legislation, jobs offered by the employment 
agencies have to be accepted. A refusal of a suitable job offer 
will, in most cases, result either In a denial of UI benefits for a 
certain time or in a complete cut of benefit payments. When this 
component of UI legislation was included in the analysis it was, in 
fact, found that it has a significant impact on the registering of 
unemployment.
In most cases, the effect of UI on the supply of labour has 
been studied without regard to the stabilizing effect of UI. In the 
US some studies have, independently from the effects of UI on the 
workers' behaviour, analysed the function of UI as an automatic 
stabilizer. The evidence suggests that as an aggregate measure UI
1/ For the US Cooke, W.N. (1981) found that the negative effect of 
increased unemployment on job search duration offsets the effect 
of increased UI benefits.
2/ See Munts, R./Garfinkel, I. (1974)
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benefits function quickly and effectively to prevent even greater 
drops in employment during recession. —^
We may conclude that a possible impact of HI on the duration 
of unemployment can be expected to be small and, in addition» is 
diminished on aggregate level because of the effects of UI as an in­
strument of fiscal policy.
6. Can We Measure the Impact of UI Empirically ?
6.1 The Replacement Ratio as Variable Representing UI
6.1.1 Definition and Calculation
In the analysis on the impact of UI we can basically expect 
two different factors affecting unemployment. The main effect 
presumably arises from the amount of UI benefits paid to the unemployed 
(in relation to income in employment). Furthermore, the strictness 
with which eligibility rules are enforced may affect the decision to 
initiate a spell of unemployment and its duration. A pre-condition 
for the second effect, however, is that UI benefits of a substantial 
amount are available.
In order to understand the relation between unemployment 
and UI benefits and the way in which they influence each other, 
definitions and calculations of replacement ratios need to be under­
stood.
The replacement rate is the most relevant variable in the 
analysis of the Impact of UI on unemployment. It describes the 
relation of benefits from UI schemes to some kind of average Income in 
case of employment. There are fundamentally two ways of calculating 
the replacement ratio. One is a ratio of UI benefits which a repre­
sentative individual can claim and the post-tax earnings he had before
1/ See Hamermesh, D.S. (1977) p.64. But it is also possible that in 
the absence of UI individuals would save more during high employ­
ment periods to maintain their consumption when they experience 
unemployment. UI may only displace some private saving during 
booms and private spending during recession.
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becoming unemployed. Another possibility is a ratio of average UI 
benefits as a fraction of average net income. The first type is based 
on data from individual cases of unemployment,
■4* -
V i , i  ,
where is the replacement ratio in the period of unemployment t of 
individual i, Is his UI benefit and w^  ^his post—tax wage previous 
to unemployment.
In most countries this ratio is determined by law according
to previous income, family size, and employment records. The Employment
Promotion Act of the FRG states that unemployment benefits are 68 percent
(and unemployment aid 58 percent) of net income up to a yearly changing
celling.—  ^ Thus according to. legal provisions the replacement rate
for all workers eligible for UI benefits amounts to 0.68, and it is
correspondingly lower for those unemployed persons who previously had
an income above the ceiling. The calculation of British replacement
ratios is different because the benefit is not simply a percentage of
previous income but is computed from fixed amounts for different income
ranges. It can be calculated from the yearly information provided by
the Department of Health and Social Security where potential benefit
2/amounts for different incomes are published. —
In the FRG the percentage of income replacement by UI for
individual cases did not undergo any significant modifications during the 
3/last decades. — A fixed replacement ratio does not serve the purpose 
of analysing the effects of changing UI benefits on unemployment, whereas 
the replacement ratio calculated as an average overall registered unemployed 
has variated over time. The second replacement ratio is composed of some
1/ See Chapter 3.1.2 for the exact way of calculating benefits and aid 
and the requirements for eligibility.
2J See Chapter 3.3.2
3/ Until 1972 the amount of regular unemployment compensation was 62.5 
percent (and 52.5 for UI aid), but family allowances were paid in 
addition, which now are included in the 68 percent.
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average percentage of UI compensation for all unemployed and the average 
income of all employed people» both of the same period t,
.* J k  I bti I . ( i * - . )  ,
* 1 " 1 - 1  ^  I \ * ¿ 1  /
where is the percentage of income compensation by UI, w^ is the net 
wage, n the number of registered unemployed and m the number of wage earners.
In practice, the average UI benefit is a combination of different 
types of Income compensation through UI (in the FRG, benefits and aid; 
in the UK flat-rate benefits, Earnings Related Supplements, and Supplementary 
Benefits), but, at the same time, the case of being ineligible for UI is 
taken into consideration. In the FRG there are three different possibilitie 
for the unemployed worker, b^ = 0.68, b2 * 0.58, and b^ = 0. We can 
calculate a weighted average that accounts for the percentage in each 
category of b. The average replacement ratio can now be formulated as
A  * ( £  v  bti) •(: £  "«)■
with a ^  as percentage of the registered unemployed i who receives b ^  
percent as unemployment compensation.
However, not all recipients of UI aid receive the full amount 
of 58 percent of previous net income, because income of their relatives 
is taken into account.
For the UK a^ can be assumed to be the precentage of ERS
recipients, a2 is the percentage of unemployed persons who are eligible
only for flat-rate benefits, and a. stands for persons claiming supple-
3mentary benefits. The computation of Rfc is complicated by the fact that 
combinations of the three different types of UI benefits are possible and 
again because benefits are not fixed percentages of previous incomes.
In this case a way of calculating the replacement ratio is forming 
weighted averages for typical cases of UI recipients. The standard flat- 
rate benefit is the same for all unemployed persons who are eligible for UI.
1/ In the studies on UI In the UK, a replacement ratio for an individual 
considered as being representative has commonly been calculated. Maki 
and Spindler considered benefits of a married man with two children 
who are eligible for ERS as typical.
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Having the percentages of the unemployed who recieve EES, an average UI
benefit can be calculated. Taking into account supplementary benefits
as veil as family allowances and child benefits (which all are fixed amounts
independent of income) the amount of benefits for different family types
(single, married and with dependents) can be calculated. An average of
these potential benefits, weighted by the percentages of the different
family types, provides an average replacement ratio for all unemployed 
1/persons. —
It is also possible and easier in practice to calculate an
average UI benefit by dividing the monthly expenditure on income compensation
from the UI scheme by the number of registered unemployed. The total of
unemployment benefits paid results from the budget of the UI scheme. The
amount calculated per month is divided by the average number of unemployed
on the register. This proceeding should yield approximately the same
figures as the calculations presented above.
B.
RÎ
t
n
A  Wtj
with Bj. as monthly expenditures on income compensation by UI. The re­
placement ratio is obviously different if B is divided by the number of
2/ÏÏI recipients instead of nfc as all registered unemployed.— Since at each 
time a certain part of the unemployed persons is ineligible for benefits, 
the replacement ratio is higher if the total UI payments are. calculated for 
benefit recipients.
Another way of calculating the replacement ratio is setting average 
income before unemployment, i.e., the previous average income of all 
registered unemployed in the denominator.
If Metcalf, D./Nickell, S./Floros, N. (1980) take the approximate propor­
tions of family types among the unemployed in 1972.
2/ This type of replacement rate has been calculated in Metcalf, D./ 
Hickell, S./Floros, N. (1980).
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The two denominators can bring about quite different results. The outcome 
depends on how much the income distribution of the whole working population 
deviates from the one of the unemployed.
If unemployed persons are calculated, the denominator should 
theoretically also account for the financial situation of those unemployed - 
especially young people - who did not have any income before registering.
A ratio calculated from average income of the working population 
may be more relevant for the question of whether UI induces spells of 
unemployment because it relates the general financial situation of unem­
ployed persons to the one with normal income from work. The other 
refers more to the question of how much the living standard falls in 
unemployment and whether it can be regarded as profitable to prolong 
unemployment. It is, however, difficult to decide which ratio is more 
appropriate for the analysis.
Different types of replacement ratios have been calculated 
for the FRG. Table 14 and the following graph show their developments 
from 1955 to 1979,
4REP LI has been calculated according to the formula of R ,5 tREPL2 according to R^ . REPL7 gives the average UI benefit of all 
recipients in relation of their previous income. REPL9 shows the3calculation of the replacement ratio according to the formula of R^ .
It has similar but much smaller variations than REPL1 and it has higher 
values. This may be expected because not all UI recipients receive 
the full 68 or 58 percent of previous income. In addition, income 
before unemployment can be calculated only approximately due to the 
lack of exact data. — ^
1/ In Appendix A calculations of replacement ratios are described in 
more detail.
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In the FRG UI schemes are paying contributions to health 
insurance for the registered unemployed. These expenditures are 
included in the figures on total benefit payments published in the 
budget of the Employment Office* If net income is the measure in 
the denominator, the total amount of UI benefits should be reduced 
by at least half of the expenditures on health insurance that are 
paid by the UI scheme. — BEPL4 in Table 14 shows a replacement 
ratio calculated in this way.
However, payment of social security contributions by the UI 
is one reason for unemployed persons to register even when they are 
ineligible for benefits. The relevant ratio for the analysis of UI 
and unemployment should include the payments to health insurance in 
average UI benefits.
6.1.2 The Relation Between Replacement Ratio and Unemployment
Which factors can cause variations in the average replacement 
ratio ? First of all, changes will occur when net average income
varies. At a high level of unemployment, real wages can be assumed to
fall or at least to have lower growth rates. Real income varies with 
the economic cycle. Income distribution and thus average income 
changes over time, determined to some extent by the level of employment.
More important in the context of the research on UI is the 
numerator of the replacement ratio. Absolute changes in benefit 
amounts come about through inflation and the continuous adjustment of 
benefits to income through the calculation formula. In the FRG the 
absolute figures change automatically because unemployment compensation 
is a percentage of income; in the UK the absolute amount of UI benefit 
is established annually.
The replacement ratio changes if by law or decree the percentage
of compensation for income loss in unemployment is modified. Recently,
in most countries there have been no or only minor changes in the ratio
2/of income compensation. —
1/ In the FRG contributions to social security are equally divided 
by employers and workers
2J In the UK there is now generally a downward pressure on the replacement ratio.
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Significant variations in the aggregate replacement rate are 
above all due to changes in the share of UI recipients among the unemployed 
and to changes in their socio-economic structure. The percentage of 
unemployed persons ineligible for unemployment benefits and the level 
of unemployment are positively correlated. Average duration of unemploy­
ment is growing and employment perspectives are worsening. The correla­
tion between the average duration and the rate of unemployment is high.
With longer duration of unemployment, more unemployed workers reach the 
maximum period of UI benefits. In the case of West Germany they either 
obtain the lower unemployment aid or they do not qualify anymore for UI.
In the UK ERS and flat-rate benefits are substituted by supplementary 
benefits after some time. Statistics for the FRG show also that denials 
of UI benefits go up with growing unemployment. — Relatively more 
people are ruled ineligible for UI because the concept of suitable jobs 
is handled more strictly than in periods of low unemployment. In formula3Rt a^ decreases while snd a3 grow.
Increases in youth unemployment as currently observed in most 
Western European countries result in a higher percentage of unemployed 
people ineligible for UI benefits; increases since UI can be 
claimed only after a certain period of employment with contributions paid 
to UI.
Older unemployed workers have, on average, less chances of 
finding new jobs. They will more often exhaust the maximum period of 
UI benefits. An increase in this group of unemployed will affect the 
distribution of a^ .
During a longer recession unemployment may also rise among high 
Income earners. This may lead to higher average UI benefits and thus 
to a rise in the average replacement ratio. However, the celling for 
income compensation - which is automatically raised every year - will 
come into effect. Better qualified workers, who may be laid off more 
frequently when unemployment Is high will reach the ceiling and thus 
receive an income compensation lower than 68 percent. In the UK the 
absolute amount of UI benefits produces an inverse relationship between
1/ See the discussion on denial rates in Chapter 6*2
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replacement ratio and income. The higher the income, the lover is the 
compensation for income loss.
The relation of male to female unemployment affects the average 
UI benefit because of differences between male and female incomes. In 
the UK UI benefits for married women are absolutely lower. The 
extra amounts paid for dependants under UI schemes are received by 
husbands but usually not by the wife, if unemployed. In general, the 
percentage among unemployed women who are ruled ineligible is higher 
than among men. Furthermore, according to social security laws the 
income of family members is taken into account when calculating UI aid. 
Relatively more unemployed women do not receive UI payment because their 
spouses' incomes are too high.
The effects described above are mitigated by the fact that 
unemployed persons who are ineligible for UI benefits will be the first 
to withdraw from the labour market. There is little incentive for 
unemployed workers to register if they cannot profit from social security.
Increasing unemployment duration and diminishing probabilities 
of finding employment will reinforce the 'discouraged workers effect'.
A number of unemployed persons who are ineligible for UI will not register. 
Consequently, the replacement ratio appears higher, as the average UI 
benefit is calculated for all registered unemployed, excluding the hidden 
unemployment.
In the FRG the individual replacement rate is a constant, 
determined by law. Variations in the aggregate level have occured 
because of changes in the social structure of the unemployed and because 
of changes in the duration of unemployment. These variations, after 
all, result from changes in the total level of .unemployment. However, 
movements in the time series of unemployment and replacement ratio are 
not parallel, because the single effects of unemployment on UI benefits 
described above are working in different directions.
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6.1.3 Can the Impact of UI be Described by the Replacement Ratio ?
As indicated In the examination of previous studies on the
impact of UI on unemployment, little attention has been paid to the
question of to what extent the replacement ratio can be considered as
an independent variable. In the case of Great Britain, the substantial
change in social security laws in 1966 was of particular Interest.
However, a research into the effects of UI on unemployment in the UK
in later years finds similar problems as those for the FRG. In time
series analysis the lack, of substantial variations in the replacement
ratio since World War II causes us to attribute any observed change
in unemployment to very small changes in replacement rates. —  In
most countries the relative amount of UI benefits has not undergone any
significant modifications through legal provisions. Yearly observations
of the replacement ratio themselves depend on the variable unemployment.
Different levels of unemployment will produce different structures of
unemployed persons in respect to receiving UI benefits. Furthermore,
country comparisions over longer periods show that modifications in
UI legislation appeared as reaction to the actual situation of labour
markets. In the past improvements in the compensation of Income
losses in unemployment have been introduced as response to growing
numbers of unemployed and the worsening of the material position of
2 /the working class. —
Recently, as expenditures and the deficits of social security 
schemes are gowing, labour market authorities have begun to curtail UI 
benefits - so far not by an absolute cut In UI benefits, but by certain
1/ Hamermesh, D.S. (1978) criticises this point also for studies in 
the United States lit his comment on the analysis by Grubel, E.G./ 
Maki, D. (1974).
2/ Research on UI legislation in Western European countries of the last 
50 years showed that most of the laws, that aimed at improving the 
material situation of the unemployed, were introduced in periods of 
high unemployment and as reaction to the current state of the labour 
market. See Alber, J. (1978).
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administrative measures. In the UK ESS bebefits are being phased out 
and discussion is on-going on including unemployment compensation in 
income taxation, whereas, German labour market offices more frequently 
deny UI benefits and UI aid. — Average replacement rates are affected 
by more restrictive administrative procedures.
In time series regression analysis variations in the total 
level of unemployment cannot directly be attributed to variations of the 
replacement ratio. The same argument holds true for an analysis based 
on individual cross-section data. In the FRG, the replacement ratio 
as determined by law, has not only remained relatively unchanged over 
time. But it is also equal for all those people out of work who are 
eligible for the same type of unemployment conpensation. This problem 
will be discussed more broadly in the following chapter on approaches 
with cross-section data. Under these aspects, the average replacement 
ratio appears as an endogenous variable, that is explained by the level 
and structure of unemployment. There is, however, a somewhat different 
way to deal with the replacement ratio, which may justify its application 
as explaining variable. In the approaches based on time series, we 
look at aggregate data. Variations of the aggregate replacement rate 
may affect the number of spells and the duration of unemployment as well 
as labour market participation rates. A higher average replacement 
ratio can be traced back to a higher proportion of recipients of UI 
benefits or to higher numbers of unemployed persons eligible for any 
type of UI. Relatively more unemployed workers can then be expected 
to prolong unemployment since our working hypothesis (as for instance 
according to Job Search Theory) is that UI benefits influence unemploy­
ment duration.
When more registered unemployed qualify for UI benefits, a 
potentially higher portion can be induced to prolong unemployment. As 
the number of unemployed ineligible for UI benefits grows (e.g., increasing 
youth unemployment), the replacement ratio falls, ceteris paribus. The 
'average' unemployed worker receives lower income compensation. Average
1/ This is especially a result of a more extended interpretation of
suitable jobs unemployed persons are assumed to accept. See Chapter
3.1.
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duration and the Incentive to prolong unemployment can be assumed to 
fall because relatively less people out of work will profit from UI.
On average, unemployed individuals who face high costs of unemployment 
in the absence of UI benefits will end unemployment faster than UI 
recipients. Likewise, the incentive to initiate a spell of unemploy­
ment is lower. People in employment realize that a high share of the 
unemployed remains without compensation. They have to fear that UI 
benefits are denied to them - especially because of stricter application 
of the work test. —^
However, we have to take into consideration that some of the 
unemployed workers who are ineligible for benefits will end registering 
and withdraw from the labour market. This reaction mitigates the 
effects described above.
The theoretical model of UI in labour market pointed to the 
aspect of labour market participation as being influenced by unemploy­
ment compensation. Mainly for non-primary workers UI benefits may 
provide an incentive to join the labour force. A member of the non­
primary labour market segment is more likely to register as unemployed 
when he realizes the chance of receiving UI payments. As he notices 
the bulk of registered unemployed is eligible for UI he will expect 
benefit payments also for himself. A high average replacement ratio 
resulting from a low share of ineligible unemployed workers may thus 
induce a higher participation rate, which consequently augments 
registered unemployment. Above all, female participation rates may 
be influenced by the availability of UI benefits. On the other hand, 
a low replacement ratio, deriving from a high share of unemployed who 
are ineligible for UI benefits, signals to a potential member of the 
labour force that it is not worthwhile jaiMag "the unemployment register 
He has to assume that probably he too will not receive any benefits.
These considerations point to the fact that not the replacement 
rate itself but rather the ratio of recipients to non-recipients has an 
impact on unemployment. What can be analysed in our regression
1/ Moreover, in the case of voluntary quittings, UI benefits are 
not paid during the first weeks of unemployment.
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approach is the duration of unemployment and the labour market partici­
pation when less unemployed workers are eligible for UI benefits (I.e. 
the average replacement rate is lower). When fewer unemployed persons 
receive UI benefits, less people will see an incentive to become 
unemployed. We can hypothesize that the average duration of unemployment 
decreases when the percentage of UI recipients and thus the average 
replacement ratio falls, ceteris paribus.
The main problem in this type of analysis lies in the inter­
dependency of replacement ratio and unemployment. The replacement 
rate in a time series but also the variation of the rate over different 
states (for the case of the US) corresponds to certain levels of un­
employment. When unemployment is high, more unemployed persons 
exhaust the marl mum period of UI benefit payments. The replacement 
ratio can be expected to be low. If there is no significant change 
in the ratio of income compensation for the unemployed as laid down by 
law, it is difficult to establish empirically in what way changes in 
the level of UI benefits should affect unemployment.
6.2 The Denial Rate and Waiting Periods
The second variable representing the system of UI which can 
be assumed to have an impact on unemployment, is the denial rate.
People who leave their employment voluntarily 'without just cause' 
are disqualified from receiving UI benefits in the FBG as well as in 
the UK. UI benefits are also denied to people registered as unemployed 
who fail to accept suitable employment. The operational definition of 
suitable employment differs among countries but also varies through time 
as a result of changes in administrative directives. These in turn 
are influenced by public opinion as well as by the financial situation 
of UI schemes. The denial rate is considered as a proxy for the 
strength of enforcement of eligibility rules. In the context of 
Job Search Theories, this variable represents a part of the costs 
of unemployment because it lowers the benefits from UI.
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In the FRG unemployment benefits are paid after a waiting 
period of four weeks if unemployment results from voluntary quitting 
of a job. In the UK, the waiting period is up to six weeks for 
voluntary quitting as well as for a refused job offer. In the FRG 
the first refusal of suitable employment will lead to a denial of UI 
benefits for four weeks, and when a second job is refused UI benefits 
can be completely stopped. In 1979 UI benefits were denied to
283,000 workers which is almost ten percent of the 2.84 million 
unemployed persons who entered the register. Twenty percent of 
these denials were effected because of a refusal of jobs offered by 
an employment office. The other 80 percent resulted from workers 
quitting their jobs voluntarily. (See Table 15).
The denial rate can be expected to decrease when unemployment 
is growing. When it becomes more difficult to find jobs, less people 
will quit employment voluntarily and unemployed workers will refuse job 
offers less frequently. Empirical studies in the United States found 
a cyclical behaviour of time series for denials. They are high during 
periods of low unemployment and low when jobs are less readily available. 
In the FRG, the ratio of denials to the flow into unemployment has been 
growing during the last years. Compared with the movements of denials 
in the US it shows an opposite cyclical pattern. There exists a high 
positive correlation between the denial rates and unemployment.
(For the rate of unemployment r = 0.94 for all denials, and r * 0.93 
for denials because of voluntary quitting, for the duration of completed 
spells of unemployment r » 0.93 for all denials, and r ■ 0.96 for 
refusals of job offers.)
Regression analysis for the FRG shows that variations in the 
denial rate can be explained mainly by the level of unemployment.
DENI - 0.970 + 1.171 UNR + 0.626 UNR .
(2.76) (3.89) (2.01)
R2 - 0.9079 DW * 0.999
Denials of UI benefits show a reaction of labour market administration 
to high and persisting levels of unemployment. In fact, in the FRG 
the interpretation of what has to be regarded as suitable employment
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TA R T .* IS; DENIAL RATES FOR THE FRG
DENI DENIR DENIQ UNR
1960 0. oooooo o. oooooo o. oooooo 1. 32015
1961 2. 22000 0. 450000 1. 77000 0. 865573
1962 1. 82000 0. 280000 1. 54000 0. 731581
1963 1. S5000 0. 220000 1. 63000 0. 867254
1964 2. 04000 0. 260000 1. 78000 0. 780492
1965 1.76000 0. 240000 1. 52000 0. 671110
1966 2.31000 0. 240000 2. 07000 0. 734288
1967 5. 90000 0. 690001 5. 21000 2. 13359
1968 4. 58000 0. 930000 3. 65000 1. 50191
1969 2. 75000 0. 510000 2. 24000 0. 816196
1970 1 . soooo 0.280000 1. 52000 0. 665327
1971 2. 44000 0. 340000 2. 10000 0. 818620
1972 3. 29000 0. 530000 2. 76000 1. 08461
1973 3. 14000 0. 500000 2. 64000 1. 19543
1974 5. 20000 0. 790001 4.41000 2. 56004
1975 6. 95000 1.29000 5. 66000 4. 78183
1976 8. 04000 1.90000 6. 14000 4. 74315
1977 8. 79000 2. 15000 6. 64000 4. 60294
1978 9. 93000 2. 21000 7. 72000 4. 39419
1979 9. 96000 1. 93000 8. 03000 3. 83303
1 2 3 4
Source: ANBA, own. calculations
Notes to Table 15:
DENI -  Denial rate
DENIR - Denial rate for refusals of job offers
DENIQ - Denial rate for voluntary quitting
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has been extended recently. Consequently the number of registered 
unemployed disqualified from receiving UI benefits has been growing.
On the other hand, when employment perspectives are deteriorating 
more voluntary job quitters will not immediately find new employment.
They have to undergo a waiting period, while in better situations of the 
labour market new employment might have followed without Intermediate 
unemployment. Figure 9 shows the development over time of the denial 
rates.
In the analysis on UI for West Germany the denial rate was not 
found to contribute significantly to variations in unemployment.
Findings for the United States showed that the denial of UI
benefits to certain applicants had a clear Influence on the rate of
unemployment. — More stringent administrative procedures could lower
unemployment and more liberal benefits may lead to higher levels of
unemployment. The more costly job search becomes, the shorter the
duration of unemployment can be expected to be. If a significant
part of the unemployed persons is 'scrounging' the system of social
security, then unemployment should decrease, ceteris paribus, when
UI benefits are more often denied to applicants. Evidence in the
2/FRG, however, does not support this reasoning. —
In the Grubel/Maki model the variable denial rate, DENI, was 
substituted by the variable INEL in order to exclude the cyclical 
pattern in the denial ratio. INEL is assumed to reflect cyclically 
unrelated changes in the strength with which eligibility rules for 
benefit recipients are enforced by the administrators of the UI program. 
It is constructed as the residual from a regression with the denial ratio 
as dependent variable and the current and lagged percentage of changes 
as Independent variables.
1/ See Holen, A./Horowitz, S. A. (1974) and Chapter 5.2.1. 
2/ See Chapter 7.2.
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B • 3o +V t  + P2Xt-l 
i ’ B - < 3C + V t - 1  >
This regression for the FRG yielded:
DENI * 7.655 - 0.272 PCGNP - 0.518 PCGNP .
(5.69) (1.08) (2.27)
R2 - 0.3238 DW = 0.3851
If the variable INEL is calculated from an equation with the precentage 
change in GNP, which again appears in the regression equation on 
unemployment, the following inter-dependency of the variables will be 
obtained:
+ V t +C13Xt-l 
n -  cco +a x { d - g#- &jXt-  ) + a2xt + a 3xt. 1
u - ( a o- a iP0) +« ! » + ( a 2- - A )  xt + V l
Knowing the denial rate one can also calculate the coefficients of the 
growth rates of GNP and its lagged value.
In some of the following regressions for the FRG INEL was included 
as the residuals from the equation with PCGNP. Coefficients for the 
variable however, were positive and thus contrary to the hypothesized 
impact of benefit denial. INEL as residual from a regression of the 
current and lagged unemployment rate was found to give more satisfactory 
results. —
The problem with the denial rate as variable is that it is not 
obvious at all whether it has to be treated as dependent or independent 
variable. The original variable never shows the expected sign in 
regression with the rate of unemployment as dependent variable. It 
is highly correlated with unemployment. The variable denial rates can
1/ See the regression analysis for the FRG in Chapter 7.2
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6.3 Different Quantitative Approaches
6.3.1. Individual Cross-section Data
The aggregate approaches which are applied in most studies on
the relation of Cl and unemployment are inadequate for analysing the
behaviour of individual agents. When a phenomenon of voluntary 
decisions of unemployed persons is analysed according to the neo­
classical Job Search Theory, studies should be based on individual data. 
Most statistical analyses have aggregate dimensions although they are 
based on a theory of individual decision making. The underlying theory 
does not account for unemployment resulting from demand deficiency, 
whereas the estimated equations include variables for aggregate demand. 
When arguing along the lines of Job Search Theory what is interesting
to note is whether the availability of UI payments has an impact on the
behaviour of unemployed Individuals, holding constant other factors 
that may influence the duration of unemployment and the initiation of a 
spell of unemployment. This can be done best by applying cross-section 
data taken from interviews with unemployed people. Ideally, one would
have to analyse different replacement ratios (the UI benefits in re­
lation. to previous income) and whether they determine a different 
duration of unemployment.
For Western European countries the only relevant and more 
sophisticated approach that has followed these lines Is the one by 
S. Nickell on British data from the General Household Survey 1972. —
This kind of data analysis, in general, brings about problems because 
of the secrecy of Individual data. (Nickell had access to the unpublished 
statistical material because he was asked to give a report to the 
Department of Employment !)
Statistics on individual cases may indicate the impact of 
certain personal characteristics and the individual financial situation 
on the duration of unemployment. But they are not yet adequate for 
an analysis of the effects of UI benefits. In some countries like 
in the FRG the level of Income replacement by UI benefits does not differ
1/ See Hickell, S.J. (1979) and Chapter 5.3
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significantly among individuals. As described before the replacement 
ratio is identical for those unemployed persons who are eligible for 
U1 benefits. In practice it is impossible to observe different 
reactions to different levels of unemployment compensation because 
either the replacement ratios are identical or differences are deter­
mined by characteristics which themselves affect the duration of unem­
ployment. This inter-dependence of UI benefits, personal characteristics 
and duration of unemployment exist in the UK. One can tell exactly 
«hat type and how much UI benefits an unemployed person receives if the 
income previous to unemployment, the employment record and certain 
personal characteristics are known. These facts determine the 
replacement ratio (whether EES, flat-rate benefit, supplementary 
benefit and/or family allowances can be claimed by the unemployed 
worker). But at the same time, these factors also influence the 
re-employment success and the individual’s duration of unemployment. 
Unemployed workers with previously high income will receive high UI 
benefits (in the UK the replacement ratio will be above average because 
EES can be claimed) but they can also be expected to be among the 
unemployed with the shortest duration of unemployment.
Individual cross-section data may allow to calculate effects 
of UI on the duration of single spells of unemployment. But they 
are inappropriate to estimate the overall impact of UI benefits on 
unemployment. In the context of neo-classical models the effect of 
UI on individual cases of unemployment can be analysed. These models 
do not explain the emergence of high and persistent levels of unem­
ployment and whether In such a situation UI benefits would have any 
effect on the aggregate rate of unemployment. If unemployment Is 
high and above some kind of 'natural' rate of unemployment (where 
demand for labour equals supply of labour) at individual level, 
unemployment can be considered involuntary. Hence UI benefits which 
are operating via the supply side cannot have an effect.
The theory of search unemployment is a theory of individual 
decision whereas, the alternative theory of unemployment
resulting from demand deficiency is a macro-theory. If unemployment 
is assumed to be at least partially determined by quantity restraints
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cross-section studies reveal little since aggregate demand is ignored. 
In order to analyse changes over time and the impact of DI on different 
levels of unemployment, time series studies are required. Aggregate 
demand is excluded from individual cross-section analysis.
The relative duration of unemployment is assumed to depend on 
personal attributes rather than on the general situation of the labour 
market. Some elements of the demand side may be included in the 
analysis. For example, skilled workers are unemployed for a shorter 
period than unskilled labourers - in part because of higher demand.
But aggregate demand does not enter in this type of analysis.
Individual cross-section studies on UI are often based on 
sample surveys originally meant for other purposes. Data and findings 
from these studies may be biased if the factors that are determining 
the composition of restrictive samples are not taken into consideration. 
In general, any kind of 'hidden* unemployment is left out but in many 
cases also workers who are ineligible for unemployment compensation are 
excluded. For economical reasons, sample surveys will hardly be 
conducted for the sole purpose of analysing the effects of UI on 
unemployment. But in any case, such a primary survey would have to 
take into account the lack of reliability of the answers given by the 
interviewed. It is likely that persons asked about their financial 
situation in and before unemployment will not tell the truth, either 
because of ignorance or, more probably, because they suspect cuts in 
their UI benefits.
In the FRG no comprehensive study on the effect of UI has been 
conducted with individual data. As there is little variation among 
individuals in respect to the replacement ratio such a study would 
not provide reliable empirical evidence.
6.3.2 Comparison of Identical Groups
Another theoretically promising approach is an analysis of 
two different groups of unemployed persons, one of which receives UI 
benefits (or relatively, high benefits) and another with unemployed
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workers ineligible for UI compensation (or very low benefits). If 
groups could be found which show practically no differences that 
were relevant for re-employment possibilities apart from the availability 
of UI benefits, a simple comparison of the average (completed) 
duration of unemployment could yield sufficient evidence. However, 
things are not that easy in reality. In each country the labour market 
group with members receiving UI benefits is fundamentally different 
in its social structure from the one of registered unemployed without 
unemployment compensation, i.e. those unemployed workers who either 
never had any claims on UI benefits or whose duration of UI payments 
has been exhausted. Regardless of the existence of UI benefits, both 
groups are faced with very different re-employment possibilities.
"The difficulty with any hypothesis about the impact of earnings- 
related supplement is, therefore, the absence of a comparable group 
getting nothing who can be compared with those receiving the supplement. 
The supposition must be that, at most, the impact of earnings-related 
supplement will amount to no more than an increase in the selective­
ness of men who are in any case able to get more work fairly easily." —
Consulting the respective laws and looking into labour market 
administration, it seems obvious that comparable and adequate groups 
of unemployed eligible and ineligible for UI benefits do not exist.
The duration of unemployment in social groups of unemployed who cannot 
claim UI will depend on labour market attributes other than UI benefits. 
In the FRG H. Konig compared the duration of completed spells of un-
21employment of UI recipients with the one of all registered unemployed. —
By doing this he assumed implicitly that UI recipients show basically
the same characteristics in respect to employment perspectives as the
average unemployed worker. This Is contradictory to empirical evidence
3/from West German labour markets. —
1/ Hill, M. J. (1976) p. 173
2/ See KSnig, H. (1978) and Chapter 5.4
3/ See Egle, F./Karr, W. (1980)
- 181 -
Furthermore, many non-recipients may leave official unemployment 
statistics by ending registration with the labour offices, and withdraw 
from the labour market. Registered unemployment is not necessarily 
ended by the initiation of new employment. In a considerable number 
of cases, it ends with withdrawal from the labour market. —  Officially 
registered unemployment is transformed into hidden unemployment. Persons 
ineligible for UI benefits see less incentive to register with the labour 
office, generally. In official statistics their duration may appear 
shorter when they turn into 'discouraged workers' because employment 
perspectives are bad.
■ Two groups of unemployed workers in different regions or countries 
could be compared if identical or at least if similar population and 
social structures existed. Differences should be limited to the amount 
and/or duration of UI payments. These conditions can be found to some 
degree in the United States, with similar economic situations and population 
groups all over the country, but certain differences in respect to UI 
laws and administration in the single states. In the US some studies 
were based on cross-section regression analysis with different states 
as units. However, for the different states,one can expect a high cor­
relation between potential weeks of benefit payments and average income 
and rate of unemployment.
In Western European countries, conditions as in the US do not 
exist. A direct comparison between countries such as the FRG, Italy and 
the UK is not practicable. Regional comparisons in one country are dif­
ficult because normally differences in respect to UI do not exist, and 
statistics on gross domestic product, production, UI benefits or vacancies 
are generally not sufficiently disaggregated at the regional level.
Maki and Spindler tried a regression analysis for 16 countries
all over the world, in which they intended to estimate the impact of UI 
2/on unemployment. — This approach appears by far, too ambitious. In
1/ Clark, K.B./Sumners,L.H. (1979) found for the US that almost half of 
all unemployment spells end by persons leaving the labour force.
If See Maki, D./Spindler, Z. (1978).
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this kind of study the Influence of UI cannot be accurately isolated.
Too many factors which are specific to the single countries affect the 
rate of .unemployment, but cannot be held constant. It is still more 
difficult to distinguish causal relationships between UI and the level 
of unemployment in country comparisons, because higher unemployment may 
as well induce higher UI benefits. In time series studies one can at 
least expect a time-lag in governments' reactions to growing unemployment.
6.3.3 Aggregate Time Series
I have to limit my analysis to data from time series as the 
only data officially provided. But I am quite aware of many critiques 
to this approach. An important point of critique that can be made for 
most studies on the effects of UI is the discrepancy between theory and 
empirical testing. The theoretical explanation for the impact of UI 
on unemployment is drawn from micro-economic models like the concept of 
utility maximization and job search theory, whereas empirical analysis 
is based on aggregate data. This is the case in practically all studies 
working with the Maki/Spindler model.
The causal relationship between unemployment and UI is not all 
that clear In time series analysis. Difficulties arise because of a 
high interdependency of unemployment and the system of UI. The ratio 
of income replacement by UI, the extension of coverage among the labour 
force and the strictness of enforcement of eligibility rules are related 
to the level of unemployment. UI can be assumed to induce unemployment 
but it is also quite probable that different levels of unemployment 
Influence the decisions of authorities on conditions and the duration of 
UI payments.
In time series studies, one has to be aware of the existence 
of multlcollinearity of the variables because many of them are following 
a similar trend In time. The effects of the single exogenous variables 
on the dependent variable unemployment cannot always be accurately 
isolated and the standard errors of the coefficients will be large. —^
1/ On the problem of multlcollinearity see Schneewelss, E.(1971), pp. 134 
and Dutta , M. (1975), pp. 142.
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Time series regression analysis requires significant modifications 
in the observations of the variables. If the explanatory variable 
(for example Income replacement according to UI laws) shows little varia­
tion over the observed time period, it is difficult to assess its contribution 
to the variation of the dependent variable unemployment. In the FRG there 
have been few and very small changes in benefit payments and the replace­
ment ratio. In the UK only at one point of time in 1966 the UI regulations 
have been modified significantly. Changes occur la the composition of 
unemployed persons In respect to recipients and non-recipients and the 
proportion of different types of UI compensation paid to the unemployed. 
Aggregate replacement ratios therefore show changes over time, as described 
above.
For some variables it is difficult and sometimes impossible to 
find time series long enough to give good estimates. Series are often 
not consistent over time because changes in the definition and in the 
territory of analysis occurred. Some statistics have only been collected 
recently, such as statistics on the duration of unemployment in the FRG 
which are recorded from 1966 onwards.
In time series studies it is still more difficult than in cross- 
section analyses to determine the way in which UI influences unemployment.
The socio-economic structure of the registered unemployed changes over 
time, and UI can induce unemployment through higher and longer unemploy­
ment, but also through higher propensity to register. Demographic 
factors would have to be held constant over time if the direct impact of 
UI on unemployment has to be examined.
Ideal conditions for a reliable test on the impact of UI on unem­
ployment over time would be given If significant modifications had occurred 
in UI regulations in respect to income replacement, coverage and eligibility 
enforcement, while other factors such as the propensity to register had 
remained constant. In none of the countries under consideration has this 
been the case. We have to be aware of these shortcomings In time series 
analysis on the impact of UI.
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7. Empirical Analysis for the FRG
7.1 Variables and Data
7.1.1 Unemployment Rates and the Duration of Unemployment
The dependent variables that are relevant in the empirical 
testing of the effects of UI on employment are the rate of unemployment, 
the flow into unemployment and the average duration of spells of unemploy­
ment. There are several reasons why the number of officially registered 
unemployed does not reflect precisely the state of the labour market.
'Real' unemployment is over-estimated by the figures in official statistics 
because a certain part of the registered unemployed is not willing to 
take up a job that is offered. This kind of voluntary unemployment 
may exist in cases where registering is connected with the collection 
of UI benefits. Contributions by UI schemes to other social security 
schemes provide sufficient incentive for inscribing at the labour offices. 
However, this type of unemployment cannot be excluded from analysis 
because the extent of the phenomenon of voluntary idleness is an important 
factor in empirical analysis.
Another shortcoming of official labour market statistics is 
the omission of ’hidden’ unemployment. Discouraged workers who have 
withdrawn from the labour market or who did not register but are searching 
for employment are not counted as unemployed. —
It is difficult to estimate the extent of 'voluntary' and 
'hidden' unemployment. Therefore, the analysis is limited to the 
Impact of UI on registered unemployment. We can also assume that UI has, 
above all, a direct effect on variations of this measure of unemployment.
In a steady-state, the total number of unemployed persons equals 
the number of spells of unemployment beginning per month multiplied by 
the mean duration in months of completed spells of unemployment.
Changes in the rate of unemployment are essentially a product of the 
change In the number of spells and the duration of unemployment. The 
impact of UI can be decomposed into effects on the initiation and on the
1 / For a more detailed discussion of the extent of voluntary and hidden 
unemployment in the FRG see e.g., Egle, F. (1979) pp. 21-47 and LAB 
(1977), see also Chapter 2.1.1.
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duration of unemployment.
An alternative variable to the aggregate rate of unemployment 
In empirical analysis is the number of flows Into unemployment in 
relation to total employment (UNRF). The initiation of a spell of 
unemployment can result either from entry into the labour force or from 
the loss of employment. Since voluntary quitting brings about the 
denial of UI benefits for up to four weeks, it can be assumed that the 
effect of modifications In the level of UI benefits on the flow of un­
employment Is much smaller than on the duration of spells of unemployment. 
According to Job Search Theory lower costs of idleness and higher UI 
benefits will prolong unemployment.
Average duration of unemployment is calculated by the Federal 
Labour Office since 1966. Official publications only give percentages 
of unemployed persons who are out of work up to certain time periods 
(up to one month, three months, half year, one year, two years and over 
two years). These statistics provide information on the situation of 
one single day counting. They show the duration of unemployment as the 
time registered until the day of counting. It is not the duration of 
completed spells of unemployment but the duration so far. Statistics 
on the average duration so far of unemployment are misleading. They 
underestimate the length of completed spells because they relate to 
incompleted spells. On the other hand, they over-estimate the length 
because long-term unemployed workers will be over-represented. Persons 
with long duration of unemployment have higher probabilities to be counted 
on the key day of data collection as the following graph shows.
Data on completed spells of unemployment, calculated from 
additional information on the duration are more appropriate for an 
analysis of unemployment. In the calculation of the research institute 
of the Federal Labour Office, the duration of completed spells of unem­
ployment equals the total unemployment suffered since the beginning of 
unemployment by those ceasing to be unemployed during a period, divided 
by their number (i.e. the number of people unemployed at the beginning 
of the period plus the inflow during it, less the number of unemployed
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at the end). —
Figure 10 and Table 3 give an Idea of the differences In the
2 /two types of duration of unemployment. —
Empirical studies on the effects of UI on unemployment, In 
general choose the logarithm of the rate of unemployment as dependent 
variable. This Is justified by the assumption that the equation of the 
determining factors of unemployment is non-linear - the partial deriva­
tion of the unemployment rate with respect to the beneflt-income ratio 
depends on the existing level of unemployment. Host studies, however, 
do not discuss the decision for the logarithm as depent variable 
instead of simply the rate of unemployment. But "the economic and 
statistical Importance of taking account of appropriate funtional
1/ On the calculation of the duration of completed spells of unemployment 
See also Turvey, R. (1977), Egle, F. (1979) and Egle, F./Karr, W./ 
Leupoldt, R. (1980).
2 J The outcome of the different methods for calculating the average
duration of unemployment shows considerable structural differences in 
the FRG. The duration of completed spells of unemployment is higher 
for women than for men, while the average duration shows the contrary. 
See Egle, F. (1979) p.52.
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forms of relationships cannot be emphasized too strongly. —^
The Box-Cox analysis of transformation allows us to determine
2/the appropriate transformation of the dependent variable. —
In the basic equation of the Maki/Splndler type the logarithm
of the rate of unemployment (InUNR) was found to be the appropriate 
dependent variable. Coefficients were always found to be more significant 
when the logarithm was chosen as dependent variable. Thus further 
regressions were done on the logarithm of unemployment.
7.1.2 The Independent Variables
Host time series studies on the Impact of UI on unemployment 
have been produced using the general form
UNR *= f ( REPL; X ) ,
where REPL is the ratio of average UI benefit to average income and X 
is a vector of variables designed to account for differences in the 
unemployment rates not produced by the UI benefit. The X vector, in 
general, includes variables representing the state of the labour market, 
changes in the participation rates, and other characteristics of the 
system of UI. The basic approach followed in most of the studies that 
are based on aggregate time series is the regression of the rate of 
unemployment on proxies describing the supply of and demand for labour.
Some modifications have been introduced in the different country studies 
according to pecularities of the respective labour markets.
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UNR - + ..REPL + .DENI + ,PCOV + .PCGNP + ,PCGN? 0 1 ^ 2  j H D
income effect
severity 
of administration
Tsupply of labour demand for labour
1/ Zellner, A. (1971) p. 162
2/ See Zellner, A. (1971) pp. 162-169. The exact proceeding is presented 
in Appendix B.
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The rate of unemployment is symbolized by UNR, the replacement
ratio by REPL. In the analysis of the FRG, replacement ratios have been
calculated according to formulas presented in Chapter 6.1. DENI and
PCOV are two other variables which represent the system of UI. DENI
and Its substitution by INEL have been discussed in Chapter 6.2. PCOV
Is the percentage of the total labour force covered by UI. It shows
an upward trend because the proportion of employees - for whom social
security Is compulsory - has Increased during the last decades. PCGNP and PCGNP_^
are the current and lagged percentage changes in real gross national
product. These variables are assumed to represent factors determining
the demand for labour and are reflecting cyclical variations. The
deviation of GHP from its trend - which has been used in several studies
on UI - appears to be less appropriate as a measure of the Influence of
demand forces. The sign of the variable may remain positive in the
beginning of a recession because the curve of actual gross national
product is still above the trend line. Thus, when negative changes in
GNP appear, deviations from the trend do not reflect the severe point In
an economic downswing. Growth rates provide a more immediate indicator
of changes in the level of production. A demand variable constructed
as a measure for capacity utilization was not Introduced in the analysis
as has been done in the KSnig/Franz model for West Germany. It is not
appropriate for explaining unemployment, since the variable itself is
determined by the level of unemployment. In addition, the part of
unemployment that is caused by lower demand for labour In the administrative
sector cannot be derived from a capacity utilization ratio.
A variable reflecting the prevailing labour market conditions, 
a vacancy-employment ratio, may be more appropriate for the analysis.
Growth rates of national product explain only one component of unemployment 
but leave apart any structural component. The number of vacancies as 
a percentage of total employment ( VAC/EMP ) is a proxy for job possibilities, 
reacting very directly on changes of labour market conditions. —^
1/ We have, however, also to be aware of measurement problems in the 
variable 'vacancies',.see e.g. Rosewell, B./Robinson, D. (1980)
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With PCGNF defining the cyclical component of unemployment, a 
structural component should be included in the analysis. For the 
German labour market, the variable ILSET was constructed in the same 
way as done by Maki/Spindler for the analysis of British unemployment.
ILSET is a labour force index multiplied by the productivity per person 
employed.
Variables that are used in the theoretical and econometric 
model outlined in Chapter 4.4 are somewhat different. In the present 
empirical analysis, unemployment Is explained by the level of real 
wages and the growth rate of GNP (and its lagged value).
UNR - f ( MG SLR, BENR, PCGNP, PCGNP^, P )
MGSLR represents labour costs and is a proxy for the real wages. It 
is calculated as the monthly gross salary In real terms (gross salary 
multiplied by the price Index, MGSAL x Pi). It included social 
security schemes, such as UI. The average UI benefit BENR appears 
less appropriate for the analysis, because it is highly collinear with 
the variable wages. The replacement ratio as described before was chosen 
Instead. A population parameter P is assumed to capture changes in the 
potential labour force. It is calculated as the ratio of total 
labour force to total population.
Time series of all variables used In the analysis, as well as
their symbols and the statistical sources are shown in Appendix C.
Data for a few variables were not available or not collected for the 
entire time period 1955 to 1979. Due to the aforementioned data 
deficiencies , the empirical analysis was limited to the period 1960-1979, 
although it is relatively short and for most equations we have only 20 
observations. Quarterly figures could increase the number of observations. 
In the context of the present study, however, they would not be of any 
advantage because data of the key variables on the UI system are published 
on a yearly basis. —  A number of other variables, although published
1/ KSnig/Franz had quarterly data for their labour market variables, but the 
replacement ratio was from data recorded only on a yearly basis.
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quarterly» are simply interpolations of yearly data and thus would not 
improve calculations.
Because of fundamental changes in the West Gentian economy in the
1950s the time before 1960 was excluded from the analysis. Until 1960
West Berlin and the Saarland were not included in most official statistics. 
Furthermore» due to certain particular aspects of the German labour market, 
the inclusion of the reconstruction phase 1950 to 1960 would not increase 
the quality of the results but rather bias them. —^
Host of the presently available studies have been carried out
for the period up to the beginning of the 1970s when unenployment was still 
on low levels. It Is interesting to analyse how UI affects unemployment 
when-levels are Increasing. In the empirical analysis of the period 1960 
to 1979 both phases - high economic activity with high employment and 
recessions with high levels of unemployment - are covered.
A distinction of the variables by sex would not yield any
2 /advantage with regard to statistical properties. — Separate statistics 
of UI benefits for males and females do not exist. However» it cannot 
be assumed that the Income distribution in employment and unemployment 
is identical for males and females. Women may show a higher responsive­
ness to changes in the replacement ratio.. But no such time series 
are available that would allow to test the different impact of UI on 
males and females.
7.2 Discussion of the Regression Results
The analysis on the effects of UI in the FRG, In the first 
instance» has been carried out following the lines of the model suggested 
by Grubel and Main and by Maki and Spindler. The time series analysis 
is based upon yearly observations for the period 1960 to 1979. Table 16
1/ See the description of the German labour market in Chapter 2.1.2.
2/ This has also been stated by KSnig/Franz. They conducted separate 
analyses for males and females but found almost identical results 
for both groups.
- 192 -
summarizes some regression results. —  ^ Ordinary Least Square estimates
are characterized by (a) on top of the column and the two-stage version
by (b). Figures In brackets below the regression coefficients are
2t-value s. The F-statistics are given below the R s. DW represents
the Durbin-Watson statistic.
The Two-Stage-Least-Square version does not improve results. 
However, the replacement ratio is not well specified by the rate of 
unemployment and an integer variable TIME,
InUNR « -717 - 24.17 REPL + 0.262 INEL
(2.07) (1.83) (7.14)
+6.70 PCOV - 0.121 PGCNP -0.188 PCGNP n
(2.0) (7.0) (7.2)
REPL - 0.359 - 0.0015 ONR + 0.0043 TIME
(10.8) (0.14) (1.5)
R2 - 0.9679 DW « 1.299
When the variable vacancies per employed is chosen instead of the growth 
rate of GNP in the basic equation, results are found to improve. It 
must, however, be admitted that this is not very surprising, since the 
vacancy/employment ratio reflects the level of unemployment in its 
employment component.
As mentioned before, the denial rate is not significant as a
variable explaining unemployment, neither is the residual INEL. Signs
of its coefficients are always positive (i.e. stricter enforcement of
eligibility rules would increase unemployment I). When INEL is defined
as the residual from an equation with the denial, rate as the dependent
variable and the current and lagged rate of unemployment as the Independent
variables, it showed the right sign in some cases. The following OLS
version can be viewed to be more satisfactory:
InUNR - -0.172 + 1.806 REPL - 0.0184 INEL + 2.32 PCOV 
(0.47) (2.92) (0.70) (6.2)
-0'.590 VAC/EMP - 0.244 VAC/EMP - 
(12.3) (5.5)
R2 « 0.989 DW - 1.859
1/ Further regression results of the basic equation are presented 
in Appendix D, Table a.
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The coefficients of all variables, apart from INEL, are significant when 
logarithms of the Independent variables are used, the level of significance 
of all variables incresses, but INEL becomes positive.
InUNR « - 2.43 + 0.693 InREPL + 0.0149 INEL
(3.2) (4.4) (0.94)
+ 1.088 InPCOV - 1.258 InVAC/EMP - 0.428 InVAC/EMP
(6.6) (22.1) (7.6)
R2 - 0.9959 DW * 1.947 SE - 0.058
The regression coefficients of the logarithms are approximately the 
elasticities of the variables. The elasticity of the rate of unem­
ployment with respect to the replacement ratio is 0.693, i.e., an 
increase of 1 0 percent in the replacement ratio would raise unemployment 
by about 7 percent. In 1979 it implies that the rate of unemployment 
would have been by 0.26 percent higher or about 60,000 more people would 
have registered as unemployed. The magnitude of the parameter is 
plausible. The elasticity of unemployment with respect to the coverage 
by UI is 1.09, implying that if In 1979 10 percent more of the working 
population were covered by UI, unemployment would have Increased by 
somewhat less than 90,000 persons. In this equation, the coefficients 
of coverage by UI is higher than the one of the replacement ratio. A 
stronger effect of coverage on unemployment than of UI benefits suggests 
that an extension of UI to more marginal labour market groups will 
induce more unemployment than an increase of benefit payments for the 
registered unemployed. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that UI benefits tend to affect registering of unemployment more signifi­
cantly than the duration. The ratio vacancy to employment contributes 
most to explaining unemployment. The empirical findings suggest that 
there is a lagged effect of the vacancy-employment ratio on unemployment 
which is due to the fact that as demand for labour rises, the current 
variable VAC/EMP underestimates the effect of this variable.
The equation which Maki and Spindler applied to the British 
labour market does not provide satisfactory results for the FRG.
Regression results of an equation including an Index of labour supply in
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efficiency terms (ILSET) are shown in the last two columns of Table 16.
This specification does not appear to be adequate for our analysis. The 
variable ILSET captures most of the effect of PCQJP and the coefficient 
of the replacement ratio has a negative sign.
Omitting PCOV as explaining variable does not change significantly 
the coefficients In all specifications of the basic equation.
The regression was also carried out for the sub-period 1961 to 
1975, i.e., the time before the economic downswing. Some results are shown 
in Appendix D, Table b. Results differ somewhat. In the period until
1975 the growth rate of GNP had a stronger impact on unemployment than in 
the more recent period. This is consistait with the hypothesis of a 
'decoupling effect', which other authors have postulated for the FRG. —
The link between the rate of unemployment and the rate of growth seems to 
be Interrupted for the 1970s. After the beginning of the recession - 1974/75
- unemployment remained rather constant for the period under examination.
It did not show a sensitive response to variations in economic growth, 
whereas, the vacancy-employment relations appears to have become more 
relevant for unemployment In the later period.
The coefficient of the replacement ratio shows a higher level of 
significance in the period before 1975. The variable INEL (calculated 
from the rate of unemployment) shows the right sign or is closer to the 
level of significance in the period 1961-1975. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that any effect of UI on unemployment 
can above all be expected in periods of low unemployment.
Secondly, the effect of UI on the duration of unemployment is 
estimated. The dependent variable, duration of completed spells of 
unemployment, is calculated in months. Some results are shown in 
Appendix D, Table c.
1/ See Bolle, M. (1981)
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Only in one of the different specifications the coefficient of 
UI benefits was found to be significant. Also with logarithms of the 
variables the coefficient of the replacement ratio is not significant.
InCDUR - - 5.114 + 0.409 InREPL + 0.0375 INEL
(1.80) (0.52) (0.87)
+ 1.567 In CPOV - 0.0342 In VAC/EMP - 0.762 In VAC/EMP 
(2.04) (0.37) (8.43)
R2 - 0.9684 DW - 2.182 SE - 0.091
The variable which represents denials of UI benefit always has 
the wrong sign (an increase in denials would prolong the duration of 
unemployment). The coefficient of PC0V has a positive sign. This
indicates that a higher percentage of the working population covered by
UI may lead to some increase in the average duration of unemployment.
The elasticity of the average duration of completed spells of unemploy­
ment with respect to UI coverage is 1.57, implying that in 1979 an 
increase of 1 0 percent in coverage would have prolonged averge spells 
of unemployment by 0.6 months. The situation in the labour market in 
the previous year has a more important impact on the length of unemployment 
than the one of the current year. Only the coefficient of the lagged 
variable vacancies per employed is significant. This can be expected 
because the duration of spells of unemployment increases with a time- 
lag when there are less vacancies.
However» the time series available on the duration of unemployment 
are too short to provide reliable estimates. The inadequate number 
of observations may explain the quite unstable and diverging results of 
Table c. When the denial rate is omitted from the equation» results 
change completely and all but one variable become insignificant. (See 
the last column of Table c in Appendix D.) Further research and an 
analysis that can rely on longer time series (or individual data) are 
required to establish the effects of UI on the duration of unemployment 
in the FRG.
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In a next step the effect of income replacement by ÜI on the 
flows into unemployment was examined. The variable UNRT is calculated 
as the ratio of flows into unemployment to total employment. It has 
smaller fluctuation than the rate of unemployment as variations in unem­
ployment duration are excluded. The coefficient of REPL was in no 
case significant.
In UNRF - 3.521 + 0.115 InBEPL - 0.031 INEL
(8.7) (0.44) (1.20)
- 0.79 InPCOV - 0.788 InVAC/EMP
(2.06) (8.5)
- 0.0406 InVAC/EMP .
(0.44)
R2 - 0.9413 m  - 0.8496 SE = 0.0950
The denial rate has the right sign, it is, however, not significant. 
The parameter of the coverage by III has a negative sign. It is not 
evident whether PCOV should be expected to increase or decrease flows 
into unemployment. When ÏÏI is extended to new categories of the labour 
market layoffs may decrease because employment that is covered by ÏÏI is 
generally also characterized by higher stability. On the other hand, 
the availability of unemployment compensation for a higher percentage of 
workers may induce more voluntary quitting. A deterioration of job 
perspectives affects immediately the flow into unemployment, while the 
lagged variable yields an insignificant coefficient. Results are not 
very different with the growth rate of GNP Instead of the vacancy 
relation as independent variable. The lagged variable representing 
the demand for labour is under the critical value of significance in 
all specifications. This is consistent with empirical evidence. A 
decrease in demand for labour increases the number of spells of unemploy­
ment Immediately and, with some time lag, prolongs the duration of unem­
ployment.
Different replacement ratios were not found to change results 
significantly. Signs, and level of significance of the coefficients 
remain almost unchanged for REPLI to REPL6. However, hypothetical 
replacement ratios, such as REPL7, had negative signs. This fact may 
be Interpreted as underlining the inappropriateness of the variable
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replacement rate as it is determined by law. Once casual fluctuations 
and variations due to changes in the composition of UI recipients are 
excluded from the variable replacement ratio, there remains no support 
of the hypothesis that UI benefits affect the level of unemployment. 
However, variations over time of a hypothetically calculated replacement 
ratio - much smaller than variations of the actual average ratio - are 
too small to allow a regression approach.
In the regression equations based on the Grubel/Maki approach 
the coefficients of the replacement ratio have practically always a 
positive sign (however, not in the two-stage version). But in the 
majority of cases the t-values are below the critical value of the 
five percent significance level. There is little evidence that changes 
In the average unemployment compensation affect the rate of unemployment. 
The Grubel/Maki model, however, is not a good specification for an 
analysis of the West German labour market. INEL calculated from 
growth rates of GNP is not appropriate, neither is the equation including 
ILSET. Therefore, the impact of UI benefits on unemployment is 
analysed according to the model outlined In Chapter 4.4 . The 
dependent variable is again the logarithm of the rate of unemployment.
The explaining variables are the monthly gross salary in real terms, 
unemployment benefits, a variable representing the demand for labour 
(GNP)and the labour market participation rate. The variable represent­
ing UI benefits is the replacement ratio as described before. Real 
benefits and gross salaries are highly collinear, because UI benefits 
are calculated on the basis of salaries. An index of gross national 
product with 1960 as basis (IGMP) was chosen instead of percentage changes 
of GNP in order to allow for logarithms of the variable. For the 
period 1961 to 1979, the Ordinary Least Squares version yields: —
1/ The regression with BENE. (UI benefits in real tenns)_ yields:
InUNR » 26.75 + 0.0011 MGSALR + 0.00081 BEHR
(5.8) (3.3) (0.76)
- 0.0628 I GNP + 0.0151 IGNP - 27.4 P
(5.9) (1.4) (5.5)
R2 - 0.9750 DW * 1.9540
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InUNR - 23.79 + 0.00132 MGSALR + 1.828 REPL
(5.2) (13.2) (1.67)
- 0.0628 IGNP + 0.01745 IGNP . - 43.14 P
(6.9) (1.77) ■-1 (5.4)
R2 « 0.9786 D W - 1.9337
The coefficient of the replacement ratio is not significant at the five 
percent level. The participation rate has a negative sign and is 
significant. The parameter for real wages is significant in all 
versions of the basic regression equation. Only for the current 
value the variable for gross national product has the expected sign and 
is significant. When the logarithms of the variables are used, coef­
ficient and t-value of the replacement ratio are lower.
InUNR = 109.6 + 3.45 InMGSALR + 0.619 InREPL
(4.6) (12.2) (1.18)
- 9.602 lnlGNF - 1.616 lnlGNP - - 16.02 InP
(6.0) (0.87) (3.5)
R2 - 0.9726 D W - 1.409
It is not evident whether the parameter participation rate should be 
negative or positive. Higher labour market participation and thus a 
higher supply of labour may increase unemployment. Under this aspect 
a positive sign should be expected. However, higher unemployment 
(and a lower level of employment) may result in a lower activity rate, 
because of Increasing numbers of 'discouraged' workers. A negative 
coefficient for the participation rate was found in most versions of 
the equation. This fact speaks In favour of the latter hypothesis, but 
the causal link appears to be from unemployment to labour market parti­
cipation. The real gross salary and the index of gross national product 
have the expected signs and are significant in all specifications. These 
findings support the hypothesis of different types of unemployment, 
the Keynesian unemployment that is due to demand deficiency and the 
classical type of unemployment resulting from real wages too high to 
clear the labour market. There is little evidence that unemployment 
compensation induces unemployment. The level of unemployment can be 
explained by deficient demand as well as by too high real wages, but 
merely by preference for leisure or prolongled job search, because UI
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benefits are available.
In order to distinguish between the two types of unemployment, 
the analysis has to be carried out on sectorial level. Classical and
Keynesian unemployment are assumed to exist each In different sectors of 
the economy. Overall unemployment is then a combination of classical 
and Keynesian unemployment according to the proportions of the sectors 
where one or the other type of unemployment prevails. Such analysis, 
however, goes beyond the scope of this thesis. In this place it can 
be concluded that both, Keynesian and classical unemployment, exist in 
the West German labour market but estimates of the extent to which they 
exist would require further econometric analysis.
The analysis on the impact of UI benefits which has been described 
in this paragraph does not support the hypothesis of an unemployment 
inducing effect. In the FRG the rate of unemployment as well as the 
duration and the number of spells of unemployment are, above all, 
determined by the demand side of the labour market. Available vacancies, 
the growth rate of production and output and the level of real wages 
are the factors that are explaining unemployment. But there is little 
evidence of a significant amount of voluntary unemployment. Neither 
the rate of unemployment nor the duration , nor initiation of unemployment 
appear to be significantly affected by unemployment compensation.
Finally, the hypothesis that UI benefits have an impact on the 
rate of participation in the labour market will be analysed. The 
regression is based on the approach formulated in Chapter 4.4. The 
dependent variable is the activity rate defined as the ratio of the total 
labour force to the total population. The level of employment, the
replacement ratio and the percentage of the population contributable to
the non-primary labour force are the independent variables. For the 
period 1958 to 1979 the basic equation with logarithms of the variable 
yields:
InP « - 2.72 - 0.0474 InREPL + 0.258 InEMP
(3.6) (1.63) (3.2)
+ 3.31 in 2§g-
(8.3)
R2 - 0.8734 D W * 0.6349
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The coefficient of the replacement ratio has a negative sign. For the 
period under examination a higher level of employment increases labour 
market participation. The existence of UI benefits cannot be assumed 
to induce a significant part of the population to enter the labour market.
A regression equation according to the equation on labour market 
participation in paragraph 4.4 brings about similar results. —  ^ But it
is difficult to ascribe the single coefficients to a certain variable.
Most of the explanation to the level of the participation rate is con­
tributed by the variable population not contributable to the primary 
labour force in relation to the total population.
However, it has to be admitted that the available data are 
Insufficient for an analysis of the impact of UI benefits os labour market 
participation. Variations in the replacement ratio are too small to 
allow reliable estimates of their effects on activity rates. Potential 
benefit duration and periods of UI contributions necessary for claiming 
benefits have merely been changed in the FRG. On the basis of time 
series data it is not possible to examine the effect of UI on the entering 
and remaining in the labour market. A number of other important 
variables have brought about changes in labour market participation. 
Activity rates cannot be explained by the short-termed variations in 
certain variables of the labour market. An insignificant coefficient 
of the replacement ratio may be expected for this kind of analysis. It 
is quite likely that participation rates of males and females do not so 
much depend on economic factors but on other variables such as the long­
term growth of income, changes of consumption habits and certain 
cultural factors. Further analysis along the lines indicated here is
necessary. In the context of my thesis, however, it leads too far to
1 2 NPOP -5 NPOP1/ P - - 0.593 (10^) + 1.615 fgr + 0.857 (10 3)EMP. ■2|g§-
(1.86) (8.5) (3.9)
+ 0.594 (101 2)REPL* - 0.334 (10"5)EMP*REPL*(1.86) (1.78) ?XSP
R2 « 0.8908 D W - 0.7734
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analyse more profoundly the determinants of labour market participation.
The empirical evidence from an analysis limited to a short period of 
time does not support the hypothesis of a positive effect of UI 
benefits on labour market participation.
In conclusion, it can be said that UI benefits described by the 
replacement ratio cannot be assumed to increase overall unemployment 
significantly, neither by prolonged duration nor by a higher registering. 
However, results presented in this research are preliminary and need 
further elaboration in the context of a more comprehensive econometric 
model of the economy.
It is quite likely that variations in UI benefit amounts and in 
eligibility rules have some effect on the incidence or duration of 
unemployment in the population covered by the UI system. The problem 
is to measure these effects convincingly in a non-experimental environ­
ment so as to determine whether they are large enough that modifications 
in the system of UI might reasonably be expected to affect the rate of 
registered unemployment.
8. What Can We Learn from Empirical Studies on UI ?
8.1 The Validity of Time Series Data In Analysing UI
What is disputable in research on unemployment and UI is not the 
existence of voluntary unemployment, but its extent. A rise in the ratio
of UI benefits to Income from work would presumably lead to an Increase 
in some individuals' duration of unemployment, but the Impact on the overall 
unemployment rate Is much less certain, since other areas such as labour 
market participation, unemployment registering and aggregate demand for 
consumer goods may be affected.
Studies on the impact of UI on unemployment, which are based on 
similar approaches, have produced widely diverging results. Findings 
depend fundamentally on the period under examination and the type and 
definition of variables chosen for the analysis. Too often researchers 
in the field of unemployment and UI tend to accept those results that are 
favourable for their hypothesis while they rationalize away unfavourable ones.
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In several studies, regression is applied to equations with a vague theory 
behind, which may not correspond to the type of data and the level of 
aggregation of the estimations. It appears that frequently those speci­
fications which do not fit the hypothesis, are thrown out and the best 
fit is chosen for publication. Several estimations based on the Haki/ 
Spindler approach, selected the type of data and those specifications which 
found significant coefficients for UI benefits. But it is always possible 
to find at least one specification that verifies the working hypothesis. 
Therefore, all results should be published —  ^ I have preferred to show
several regression results for the FRG, although the evidence is not 
unambiguous. In most specifications, UI benefits do not appear to 
have a significant Impact on overall unemployment.
The question of whether an aggregate approach is appropriate for 
analysing the effect of UI on unemployment has been discussed In other 
parts of the thesis. The hypothesis that the duration of unemployment 
is prolonged when UI benefits are made available, requires tests which 
are based on individual data. But studies on a micro-economic level do 
not indicate the determinants of aggregate unemployment. In spite of 
several shortcomings, but also for reasons related to the availability 
of data, an analysis of aggregate time series was chosen for the research 
on UI and unemployment, and demand variables have been included. However, 
variations of the independent variables representing the UI schemes have 
been small. This may explain why empirical findings for the FRG as 
well as for several other countries are contradictory. In the UK the 
discussion of an unemployment Inducing effect of UI has focused on the 
Introduction of Earnings Related Supplements, when a significant change 
in the replacement ratio occurred. But over a longer time period only 
slight variations similar to those in the FRG for the period under 
examination, have been observed. Basically, both countries lack 
conditions for a convincing analysis of the effect of variations in the 
replacement ratio on aggregate unemployment.
1/Blaug, M. (1980) suggests that applied econometrics should seek to 
replicate previous results using a different data set and that authors 
should be required to present all the regressions they ran and not just 
the particular regression that happened to support their hypothesis.
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Ideal pre-conditions for an investigation into the impact of UI 
on the labour market do not exist. Disaggregation of data on registered 
unemployment and an examination of homogenous groups with similar 
behavioural patterns and social conditions could improve the analysis, 
as reactions to UI payments are not identical in the different segments 
of the labour market. A 'typical' man, who is covered by UI and can 
easily find re-employment is not so much of interest for the empirical 
analysis. He would not seek to prolong unemployment for a number of 
reasons, particularly because longer idleness would result in a depreciation 
of acquired skills. The non-primary labour force, having a loose 
attachment to the labour market, is assumed to be more inclined to live 
on welfare programmes. Jobs in the secondary segment of the labour 
market are characterized by lower stability. While unemployment may 
rarely be initiated because of waiting periods after voluntary quittings, 
intermediate periods between two employment records may be extended when 
UI benefits are available. But when jobs become scarce voluntary un­
employment frequently turns into involuntary, the store so as unemployment 
compensation decreases after some time. Furthermore, few members of the 
non-primary labour force have sufficient employment records to qualify 
for the maximum amount and duration of UI payments. Unfortunately, 
the data that is available on income replacement by UI and on re-employ- 
ment success in different labour market segments is limited and does not 
permit a more profound analysis of different socio-economic groups.
Ve can make an attempt to estimate the magnitude of voluntary 
unemployment by looking at disaggregated information from labour market 
statistics, such as denial rates. According to prevailing labour market 
legislation in the FRG an obvious abuse of UI programmes will result in 
the denial of benefits for four weeks. In 1979, in about 54,900 cases,
UI benefits were denied to claimants because job offers had been refused. 
Assuming a four-week duration of benefit denial (in exceptional cases the 
period can be reduced to two weeks) the number of unemployed persons who 
can be considered as unwilling to take up work amounts to an annual 
average of about 4,600 persons. Thus, it can be calculated that in
1979, voluntary unemployment induced by UI amounted to about 25,000 
persons on annual average, which is little more than 3.5 percent of 
total registered unemployment. However, an increase in the denial rate
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does not necessarily mean that more people misuse the UI scheme. It 
indicates rather that when unemployment is high, job seekers are more 
often requested to accept jobs below their skills level or which require 
high mobility.
In recent years, the denial rates for women have been lower than 
those for men. This contradicts the hypothesis that women, especially 
married women, tend more easily to prolong voluntary unemployment 
and are more inclined to live on UI benefits. However, women also have 
fewer chances to be affected by benefit denial because fewer jobs are 
offered to them.
Persons who had refused jobs a number of times above average 
were, In general, re-integrated into the labour market, while fewer of 
those who after a year were still unemployed or again out of work, had 
done so. This supports the hypothesis that 'voluntary' unemployment 
plays only a secondary role particularly among the long-term unemployed.
The analysis of Vest-German unemployment does not indicate any 
significant impact of UI benefits when recent years of high levels of 
unemployment are included. Overall unemployment has been growing in 
spite of decreases in the precentage of income replacement by UI. The 
rise in the rate of unemployment has to be explained by factors other 
than UI benefits. The most probable cause of increased unemployment is 
longer average duration because of a reduction in the probablity of being 
re-employed from the unemployment register. The empirical analysis for 
the FRG clearly shows that unemployment is mainly determined by the 
number of available vacancies and output growth.
A look at the socio-economic structure of the unemployed hardly 
supports the hypothesis that unemployment is significantly induced by UI 
benefits. Unemployment has risen over proportionately in those marginal 
groups of the labour market that have the lowest compensation or no 
compensation by UI. Youth unemployment has Increased, but persons in 
search of first employment cannot claim UI payments. During recessions 
employers diminish their labour force in response to declining demand.
The Increasing female unemployment in all countries reflects a significant
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growth in female labour force participation, but it also shows that women, 
especially married women, have been employed as a reserve army of labour. 
As the figures in Chapter 2 show, female unemployment has much greater 
cyclical fluctuation than male. Unemployment among unskilled workers 
has been particularly high. They form the bulk of unemployed In the 
recent recession. Their possibilities of re-employment have deteriorated 
and consequently the duration of unemployment Is higher than average.
People with low earnings previous to joblessness have been hit 
most severely by -unemployment. Pre-unemployment income of registered 
unemployed is, on average, substantially lower than the income of employed 
workers. This is the case for unskilled workers and young people, 
but also pre-unemployment income of the female unemployed is considerably 
lower than that of the male unemployed. But for low-earning groups 
a cut in Income is more strongly felt and even income replacement by 
regular UI benefits gets them close and sometimes below the poverty line. 
In fact, surveys reveal that the majority of the unemployed suffer 
financial hardship and there is little reason to believe that they 
voluntarily choose unemployment. Increased leisure time can only be 
enjoyed if enough income is available to spend on the leisure pursuits 
chosen by an individual. Enforced leisure on an Inadequate Income would 
hardly be an attractive proposition. For the majority of unemployed 
UI benefits do not seem to provide sufficient incentive to remain out of 
work over longer periods. Even if a small part of the unemployed prefer 
unemployment compensation to a job, their existence is relevant for the 
problem of unemployment only in the sense that it determines who of the 
unemployed is the first to obtain a job offer, which In any case are 
insufficient.
8.2 Comparing the Effects of UI In the FRG, the UK and Italy
The time series analysis applied to British and West German 
unemployment data leaves some doubts as to whether the approach can 
provide reliable estimates of the effects of UI on unemployment. In
the absence of any comparable groups with different eligibility for UI
\benefits, cross-country comparisons may provide indications on the 
effects of UI. However, the type of empirical analysis that has been 
conducted for the UK and the FRG is, for a number of reasons, not
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applicable Co the Italian case. No comparable system of income com­
pensation exists for the unemployed, and data on unemployment are 
insufficient because of the high unregistered unemployment. The very 
distinct features of Italian UI schemes would require a completely 
different type of quantitative analysis. Estimations of the effects 
of UI on unemployment in the FRG have been carried out in this thesis 
while the comparative analysis refers for the UK, to those studies 
which have recently been made and have been described in an earlier 
chapter. Similar to M. Sawyer's findings for the UK, the empirical 
analysis for the FRG does not support the hypothesis that UI benefits 
induce unemployment on aggregate level. In both countries only specific 
equations and data of a particular period of time have found significant 
coefficients for the replacement ratio, but in general, there is little 
evidence that UI Increases overall unemployment.
ti
In addition to empirical evidence from national studies, a com- 
parision of countries with different systems of social security for the 
unemployed may improve the understanding of the impact of UI. While the 
FBG and the UK both provide relatively generous income compensation to the 
unemployed, Italy protects employment rather than unemployment. An 
analysis of the three countries is of interest in view of their different 
social security schemes and the differences In the development of unemploy­
ment. It may indicate what changes can be expected on the Italian
labour market if UI schemes were adjusted to the standards of other 
industrialised countries. These findings may also have some relevance 
in respect to a coordination of economic and social policy in the frame­
work of the European Community. The comparison of employment and 
unemployment should, however, be limited 'to a qualitative analysis.
Problems concerning the comparability of data across countries are 
considerable. Quantitative estimates obtained from cross-section 
regression analysis are still less reliable than those obtained from 
time series analysis in a single country. The only attempt of an 
international comparison of UI benefits and unemployment showed so many 
weaknesses in data collection and adjustment that this approach must 
be refused for the analysis of UI and unemployment. —  ^ Italian labour
1/ See Maki, D./Spindler, Z. (1978)
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force statistics especially are not appropriate for international 
comparisons of UI and unemployment. The size of the 'black1 or unofficial 
labour market, which has been growing rapidly in Italy, renders historical 
as well as cross-country comparison of the data quite unreliable. Studies 
which calculated average Income replacement ratios for Italy, In general, 
give too high a figure which is not representative of the bulk of the 
unemployed. Average UI benefits calculated for all registered unemployed 
do not show the whole picture because the most important component of 
Italian UI compensation for short-time working is not taken into con­
sideration. Since in Italy UI benefits, their potential duration and 
eligibility rules differ among sectors of the economy any average 
replacement ratio is irrelevant for the analysis of overall uenmployment.
In none of the three countties under examination is it possible to 
conduct a good experiment which would allow us to establish the impact 
of UI on unemployment. It is also not simple to compare countries with 
unemployment benefit programmes, like the FRG and UK with countries with­
out comprehensive programmes, since the latter always provides something 
as a substitute for UI; like in Italy the short-time compensation 
programme. But a comparative analysis of the three countries In respect 
to their systems of social security and the labour market performance 
evidences some of the relations between UI and unemployment.
International comparisons of unemployment figures require adjust­
ments of definition and measurement. However, differences In the 
calculation of unemployment rates also indicate how important unemployment 
is for the economic policies of the respective countries and in what 
ways government have dealt with the problem. Labour market regulations 
and, particularly, the system of social security for the unemployed have 
a significant impact on measurement, level and distribution of unemploy­
ment. Different developments of employment in the three countries may, 
to some extent, be explained by differences in the UI schemes.
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Table 17 and Figures 11 and 12 show the variations of employment and 
unemployment in the three countries. Since 1974, 1 three countries
have been experiencing substantial increases in unemployment t while 
during the same period, employment has been decreasing only in the 
FRG. The reduction of the labour force can be explained mainly by 
re-migration of foreign workers but, to some extent, it has also resulted 
from a growing idleness that is not registered with the labour offices.
In good times in the labour market, the potential and the actual labour 
force tend to be identical, but in times of cyclical downswings they 
tend to be different. In all three countries a rise In the population 
of working age has led to large entries into the work force, which in 
recent years could not entirely be absorbed by the labour market.
Unemployment has risen but the extent to which it is reflected in official 
statistics differs. British Supplementary Benefits consisting of a flat- 
rate which is paid without previous employment records has for most population 
groups provided sufficient incentive to register as unemployed. The FRG 
and Italy do not provide unemployment payments to people searching first 
employment. This explains their higher levels of unregistered unemployment 
particularly among the youth. There is little incentive to register 
with the labour offices when unemployment compensation cannot be claimed, 
and there is still less if registering does not provide opportunities for 
finding employment. 'Hidden' unemployment has increased in the FRG 
mainly because youth unemployment has recently become a more serious 
problem. Due to its entirely insufficient social security schemes for 
the unemployed - as well as because of other labour market characteristics
- Italy has always experienced a higher level of unregistered and illegal 
employment.
The availability of UI benefits may induce people to register as 
unemployed even when they are not seriously searching employment. This 
is especially the case when the period of unemployment is regarded as a 
transitional phase to another role, such as pensioner, military service, 
or housewife. The latter group may be more relevant among registered 
unemployed In the FRG as in the UK a greater portion of married women 
Is not eligible for benefits. Therefore, the introduction of ERS in 
the UK did not Increase unemployment registering of women to the same 
extent as of men. However, in spite of a more generous provision of UI
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benefits in the UR a substantial number of unemployed do not register as 
comparisons between the registered unemployed and those who regard them­
selves as unemployed in the General Household Survey show. In the UK 
Supplementary Benefits are also paid to persons who are unable or 
explicitly unwilling to work. In the FBG they would normally qualify 
for some other type of welfare programme and thus not be counted among 
the unemployed.
The relatively liberal British system of unemployment compensation 
in which the work test is merely applied can be assumed to induce 
relatively higher registering of unemployment. There is, however, no 
evidence that the UI scheme really induces unemployment in the sense of 
voluntary quittings and of prolonged duration of unemployment. It is 
only that more people decide to join or stay in the unemployment register. 
Thus effects of UI are more a statistical phenomenon than a matter of the 
labour market. According to data on denial rates, the enforcement of 
eligibility rules appears to be stricter in the ERG. Persons who are 
unable and unwilling to accept jobs offered by the labour office are 
excluded from the unemployment register faster than in the UK. Thus the 
statistical phenomenon of higher registering due to UI although existing 
is less accentuated in the German labour market.
Since in Italy UI benefits can be claimed only by relatively 
few unemployed persons, there is little Incentive for people who 
are out of work and who are not seriously searching employment to register. 
Thus, registered unemployment is lower and 'hidden' unemployment is more 
relevant than in the FRG or the UK.
Particularly in the UK and the FRG there exists a 'quasi fixed' 
number of unemployed workers aged 55 years and above, of disabled 
persons and of women seeking part-time work. If unemployment benefits are 
not available or when UI payments cease these groups will withdraw from 
the labour market. They may still be willing to take up employment and 
will again appear on the labour market when economic recovery starts.
But without a claim on UI benefits they may not take the trouble to 
register as unemployed. These secondary labour market groups are hardly
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represented in Italian unemployment statistics. When UI benefits are 
not available many unemployed persons withdraw from the labour market and 
will often assume alternative roles like housewives and in home production 
or seek compensation from other social security schemes, such as old age 
or invalidity pensions.
Many differences in registered and 'hidden' unemployment which 
exist among countries can be expected to disappear when social security 
schemes for the unemployed are more equalized. In Italy registered 
unemployment can be assumed to rise considerably if a comprehensive UI 
system is introduced. But thi6 effect would rise from a higher register­
ing and not because of unemployment that is induced by UI.
It is misleading to look only at unemployment rates to judge how 
well labour markets are functioning. Other factors must be considered 
such as variations In the labour supply and the under-utilization of labour 
through short-time working. Italy has not experienced a similarly 
rapid increase in employment as other Western European countries whereas 
the rise in the number of hours compensated for short-time working has 
been considerable. Employment did not decrease in the past since, 
instead of dismissals, short-time working was applied. The Italian 
labour market has practically been closed for new entrants and, therefore, 
is faced with high youth unemployment. People in search of first 
employment constitute the majority among the unemployed. According to 
ISTAT data, in 1979 little more than 16 percent of the persons seeking 
employment had been employed previous to unemployment. An under­
utilization of labour has absorbed most of the decrease In employment.
This development has been the result of the opposition of the labour 
unions to dismissals of any kind due to the absence of an adequate 
social security system. The Impact of unemployment subsidies is quite 
irrevalant in Italy. The welfare programme which has been the main 
tool in assisting the unemployed is represented by the compensation 
subsidies for short-time working. The worker is not laid off, he remains 
part of the personnel of the firm and will be fully employed again as soon 
as demand recovers. In recent years the unions have played a vital role by 
introducing factors of rigidity into the labour market. They have
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made it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers and social 
insurance contributions and labour regulations in respect to short-time work­
ing have been implemented. The low mobility and the high protection of 
jobs in the Italian labour market, coupled with insufficient income 
compensation in unemployment have led to increasing inequalities in the 
labour market to tbe disadvantage of new entrants. Employment has to be 
protected because financial security in unemployment is not provided.
The Italian social security schemes have a considerable impact on the way 
unemployment is distributed among the labour force. The decrease in 
demand for labour in the presence of demographic changes has produced high 
youth unemployment. The burden of lower economic activity has been shifted 
to the group of people who are seeking employment and particularly to 
the youth who are not eligible for UI benefits.
Different types of social security for the unemployed have resulted 
in different degrees of labour market segmentation in the three countries *
In the FRG unemployment has been concentrated on marginal groups of 
the labour market, mainly unskilled workers, old people and married 
women because they have been the first to be dismissed when production 
decreased. They are, to 6ome extent, and for some time, protected 
by UI. But many of them become long-term unemployed and may withdraw 
from the labour merket when UI payments cease. In Italy labour market 
legislation and compensation for short-time working have placed the 
burden of diminished economic growth on those who have never been employed.
Members of this labour market group can find income possibilities only in
unstable employment which is not protected by normal labour legislation.
They will either assume temporary jobs or join the Illegal 'black* labour 
market (the 'economia sommersa*). While the FRG has managed to export 
a part of her unemployment through a reduction in the number of migrant 
workers until the late 1970s, the UK has experienced an unprecedented 
increase in unemployment in all labour market groups. Unemployment 
compensation is provided theoretically to all who are in need, although 
the Government has more and more cut benefits in reaction to the massive 
increase in welfare expenditures.
In general, employers can be assumed to be less reluctant to
dismissals If a comprehensive UI system exists. Correspondingly also the
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labour unions * strategy in respect to job protection will be influenced 
by the availability of unemployment benefits. In the FRG income 
replacement is sufficiently high to make unemployment - at least short 
spells - acceptable from a social point of view. The British social 
security system is more comprehensive but payments are low and often 
merely reach the subsistence level. In both countries unemployment is 
concentrated on the secondary labour force, as less productive workers 
are, in most cases, the first to be laid off. In Italy the absence of 
an adequate social security scheme for the unemployed has brought about 
lower labour market mobility. In order to match growing demand 
enterprises tend to hoard labour when demand falls. The cost of labour 
hoarding is, however, reduced by short-time working subsidies while the 
economy as a whole bears the burden of an inefficient production 
structure. Lay offs are unacceptable for labour unions because income 
losses in unemployment are not compensated. Consequently, unemployed 
workers face great difficulties in finding new job openings because of 
labour market rigidities and extremely low turnover rates. Youth 
unemployment has not become a similarly serious problem in the FRG as it 
is in Italy, since duration of unemployment among young workers has 
been lower than average. But In both countries the fast rise of unem­
ployment among young labour market participants is of increasing concern, 
particularly because in most cases income maintenance has to be provided 
by their families.
West German and British unemployment rates react more quickly 
to output fluctuations than Italian rates because of a smaller incidence 
of economic, moral and legal sanctions against lay offs and discharges.
The Immediate response to macro-economic disturbances appears to be such 
greater in countries where legal and traditional sanctions against 
temporary and permanent lay offs are prevailing. In the United States 
the unemployment rate reacts rapidly to disturbances in GNP while in the 
FRG, labour force response is small. Contrary to the Italian economy, 
the comprehensive UI system of the US results in high fluctuations in 
employment being socially acceptable. In the FRG the flexibility of labour 
supply has acted as a cyclical shock absorber, helping to keep unemploy­
ment rates low during recession. The reduction in foreign employees has 
been due for the most part to a re-migration, but to some extent also to
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an increasing number of unemployed foreigners who do not register 
often because of ignorance and lack of information on how to claim 
UI benefits. Recently the outflow of workers has not been as great as 
in the previous recession. As migrant workers became progressively 
aware of being eligible for UI, unemployment benefits exceed any wage they 
can hope to receive at home. The growing tendency for unemployed 
foreign workers to remain in the host country has contributed to the sharp 
rise in unemployment rates recorded recently in the FRG. Foreign 
workers now present a significant unemployment problem. The UK. had 
less possibilities of exporting unemployment. As Figure 11 shows, 
civilian employment has shown lower fluctuations than in the FRG and 
the decrease in demand for labour had less effect on the supply side.
In spite of the economic downswing Italian labour force and employment 
have continued to rise. To some extent the importation of unemployment 
occurred as quite a number of migrant workers have returned to Italy.
Subsidies from the state for short-time working have enabled numerous 
enterprises to maintain their employment levels and limit dismissals.
The lack of an appropriate UI scheme in Italy has led to inefficiencies 
and Immobility in the labour market. Different levels and structures 
of unemployment in the three countries can be traced back to different 
economic factors and different features of the labour market. But 
the main reasons for the actual increases in unemployment in most industrialized 
countries lie in lower demand for labour due to the considerable decrease 
in the demand for commodities and services and hence a lower production 
level. Demand deficiency coupled with structural factors appear 
to be the wain causes for lower levels of employment. Increases In 
unemployment benefits and the number of secondary earners for instance 
may increase search activity and possibly increase the rate of unemploy­
ment independently of any changes In. labour demand. But when unemploy­
ment levels are high, the availability of UI benefits cannot be considered 
as an important contribution to the explanation of unemployment. UI 
compensation may have a small impact on individual search unemployment, 
but the impact on aggregate unemployment appears to be insignificant.
The UK, the FRG and also to a lesser extent Italy, have recently 
experienced an unprecedented increase in unemployment although UI 
benefits have not risen in real terns, but in some instances have even 
undergone cuts.
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A comparison of the three countries evidences that Italy has 
had high unemployment over long periods In spite of fundamental in­
sufficiencies In its social security schemes for the unemployed» 
whereas countries with far more generous UI provisions managed for quite 
some time to keep unemployment low.
It can be concluded that UI benefits have only minor effects 
on unemployment through prolonged job search while the initiation of 
spells is an exception because of waiting periods previous to benefit 
receipt. The empirical analysis on the impact of UI on unemployment in 
this thesis does not confirm findings from studies of the Grubel/Maki type 
which put forward that a significant portion of labour unemployment 
arises from the withholding of supply rather than from a lack of 
demand. Cross-country comparisons indicate that the availability and 
the type of unemployment compensation, rather than having an effect on 
the supply of labour, determine the distribution of unemployment among 
different segments of the labour market . The extension of coverage 
by the UI system determines what portions and which groups among the 
unemployed will register when out of work. When vacancies are scarce 
few unemployed persons will be able to shorten unemployment in response 
to a denial of benefits. But many will end registering if no income 
compensation can be claimed and thus they will appear with shorter 
duration In unemployment statistics. The prevailing types of social 
security scheme, combined with other labour market legislations determine 
which labour market segments are mainly affected by unemployment. In 
countries which have enacted comprehensive UI schemes unemployment appears 
to be more equally distributed among labour market participants, while 
in the absence of an adequate UI system, unemployment is concentrated 
on marginal groups with low bargaining power. This in turn indicates 
that job turnover rates are higher when UI benefits are made available. 
Without unemployment compensation fluctuations in employment would be 
lower due to more reluctance to layoffs.
Although only briefly mentioned in this thesis, the role of UI 
as demand stabilizer appears to be an important one which may offset 
any negative effect of UI benefits on labour supply.
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8.3 Conclusions
When unemployment rates axe rising to such levels as we are 
experiencing now In Western European countries, the effect of UI on 
aggregate unemployment can be assumed to be negligible. Empirical 
findings lead to the conclusion that unemployment levels in the UK and the 
FBG would at present be approximately the same if UI benefits were not 
available. The main difference can be expected in the proportion of 
unemployed persons registering with the labour offices. 'Hidden' 
unemployment and the 'discouraged workers effect' would become more 
accentuated. Since people out of work would in some way have to 
bring up the means for living, a lack of social security for the un­
employed would result in various forms of under-employment and unofficial 
labour, similar to that observed in Italy. In the discussion on 
disincentive effects of unemployment compensation, we should not forget 
that the explicit objective of the UI system is to provide temporary 
income maintenance for unemployed workers, which keeps them from poverty 
and allows them to engage in productive job search. As there is no 
satisfactory vay of drawing a distinction between the voluntary and 
Involuntary unemployed, any attempt to do so within the current social 
security policies would only maximize the impact of sanctions on those 
who are, anyway, In the weakest position in the labour market. If 
a country's policy aims at a tight network of social security for the 
unemployed it has also to accept a certain part of unemployment which is 
not entirely involuntary.
Public discussion has placed emphasis on disincentive effects of 
UI benefits particularly when unemployment rates and consequently, expen­
ditures on social security for the unemployed are high. Even in the 
presence of a rapidly increasing army of jobless workers, the argument 
of unemployment inducing effects of UI has remained a widely discussed 
issue. But empirical evidence shows that significant effects of UI 
benefits on labour supply can be expected mainly during periods of low 
unemployment. In recessions duration of unemployment appears to be 
far more affected by different risks and chances on the labour market 
than by the availability of UI benefits.
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UI schemes and the level of benefits are a highly political 
Issue. Unemployment has remained on high levels in all industrialized 
countries and in response to these developments, more restrictions have 
been imposed on compensation payments in unemployment. Although the 
main scope behind these saving measures has been the financial shortage 
of UI schemes, to some extent, they also reflect the discussion on dis­
incentive effects of UI benefits. Table 1 indicates that expenditures 
by UI schemes in relation to GDP have fallen In spite of rising levels of 
unemp loyment.
In terms of the problem of unemployment in a recession one 
could also argue that the unemployed play a crucial role in bringing about 
the type of adjustment required to stimulate recovery. The cost of 
employment fluctuations should not be paid disproportionately by those 
who are unlucky enough to be unemployed. Thus society could rationally 
choose to bear part of the costs of unemployment as a matter of equity.
It has been postulated that in the absence of UI benefits real wages 
would fall in the presence of high unemployment rates. But more recent 
developments have shown that cuts in real Income are possible also when 
unemployment compensation is available. UI may lessen the pressure to 
reduce wages but it can stimulate consumer demand sufficiently to offset 
that effect.
A discussion of the effects of social security for the unemployed 
should not neglect the fact that UI schemes also provide for a 'social 
molllfier'. As long as the system of social security compensation for 
the total loss of income or for short-time working works to counteract the 
negative consequences of the economic crisis, those directly affected 
are not compelled to seek radical solutions for their problems. Ex­
periences of the late twenties and early thirties have shown that the 
armies of unemployed deprived of any income sources are a serious political 
factor. —
1/ The rise of Fascism in Europe was certainly favoured by the desperation 
of the millions of unemployed. In Spring 1930 the Great Coalition 
in the Weimar Republic fell apart on the issue of financing the unem­
ployment insurance, marking the end of the parliamentary republic 
in Germany.
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High unemployment is not so much any more of public concern, even 
at such levels as ve are presently experiencing, because social security 
provisions are so generous that great part of the unemployment is nov 
considered as voluntary. Theoretical or empirical analysis which finds 
that unemployment is of voluntary nature or Induced by UI benefits, will 
recommend passive or negative economic policies, i.e. the absence of 
fiscal and governmental Interventions and reduction of UI benefits.
If one accepts theories on deficient demand as the cause for unemployment, 
UI can, however, not be found to have any important impact on unemployment. 
UI benefits may rather be regarded in view of their demand creating 
effects. But empirical findings on the impact of UI on unemployment are 
still too ambiguous to justify decisions which intend to reduce unem­
ployment by cutting UI compensation or by denying it to certain groups. 
More research in respect to voluntary unemployment and disincentive 
effects of UI is needed in order to formulate appropriate policies on 
social security schemes for the unemployed.
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APPENDIX A
Calculation of Replacement Ratios
REPL1 has been calculated as the total monthly expenditures on UI 
benefits per registered unemployed divided by the average monthly net 
incone of all employed persons.
REPL2 has been calculated in the same way but with the average income 
of all unemployed persons before unemployment (AVWUNM) in the denominator. 
The only data available on income before unemployment are distributions 
of the weekly income of the registered unemployed. The statistics are 
classified according to income groups which are generally quite large 
(in some cases more than 30 percent of all observations are included in 
one group). The amounts are very much approximated. Upper income 
classes are open, but often high percentages of the observations are in 
this group. Because of the quite limited exactness of available data 
and open marginal groups, a median rather than the means was chosen for 
the computation of average incomes before unemployment. Income distri­
butions are separate for recipients of unemployment aid and benefit 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe and -geld) and for males and females. The incomes 
before unemployment of recipients of UI benefits (AVWBEN) and of UI aid 
(AVWAID) are weighted averages of the salaries of male and female 
recipients. AVWUNM then has been calculated as a weighted average of 
the income that UI benefit and aid recipients had previous to unemploy­
ment.
BEPL3 is the ratio of average UI benefit per UI recipient in relation 
to average income of all employed persons.
In BEPL4, half of the contributions to health insurance paid by 
the UI scheme has been subtracted from the total expenditures on UI.
Since benefits are related to net Income, they should not include those 
contributions to social security that normally have to be paid by the 
employer.
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REPL5 is similar to REPL4 but UI benefit is an average calculated 
for all recipients.
REPL6 has the same nominator as REPL5 but the average income before 
unemployment is in the denominator.
REPL7 and REPL8 are calculated for a hypothetical average UI 
benefit. The incomes of UI recipients previous to unemployment are mul­
tiplied with the potential income replacement by UI and weighted accord­
ing to the distribution of aid and benefit recipients. REPL7 is the 
ratio of this hypothetical average benefit to average income of the 
employed, REPL8 to average income before unemployment.
EEPL9 is a ratio of the hypothetical UI benefit for all unemployed 
people (including non-recipients) to average income.
The first six ratios show very similar variations, although at 
different levels. Reasons for the smaller fluctuations of the ratios 
which have been calculated from hypothetical benefits lie in the changing 
composition of the unemployed in respect to income level, eligibility 
and family support, as has been described in Chapter 6.1. A consider­
able number of UI recipients does not obtain the full potential percentage 
of income compensation.
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APPENDIX B
Box-Cox Transformation
The following relation shall be transformed in order to find out 
whether UNR. or InUNR should be chosen as dependent variable,
30 + 0,.
where y^ is the dependent variable in a regression model with y^ >  0, 
a * 1*2, ...n. The ¡3's and X are unknown parameters, the x's are 
observations on the independent variables and is the error term.
For X * 1 (3?' ^ - 1)/ X * ya - 1 and the model is linear in the y.
• >For X * 0 (ya X - 1)/ \ * In ya . In this case the model has In y
as the dependent variable. For other values of X powers of y appear as
the dependent variable. Since X is an unknown parameter it is estimated
2along with the other unknown parameters f3 and the variance O' . Informa­
tion in the data is used to determine the appropriate transformation of 
y. This estimation problem can be solved by using the maximum likelihood 
method.
n A n
L ( X ) * const. + (X-l) I In y - f In O' (X)max a -1 a 2
( X-l ) -
L ( X ) can now be calculated for various values of X until we find the max
value, say X for which the equation attains its maximum value. The 
calculations have been carried out for the equation
+) lim a* - 1-------  m In a■ o x
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^  SP o + f\REPL + i32DENI .fijPCOV + j3^ PCGNP + 35PCGNP 1 
The figures and the plot of the X's against L ( X ) show that the
TT1
maximum value is close to X -0. Thus the choice of In ya as 
dependent variable is justified.
LMAX LAMBDA Sj
1 0. 971816 - 1 . ooooo 0. 564400
2 1.41236 -0. 900000 0. 252980
3 1. 46527 -0.800000 0. 246200
4 1. 51327 -0. 700000 0. 241960
5 1. 55466 -0. 600000 0. 240960
6 1. 58737 -0. 500000 0. 244170
7 1. 60914 -0. 4Q00C0 0. 252890
cwI 1. 61801 -0. 300000 0. 268770
Q 1.61243 -0. 200000 0. 294020
10 1. 59176 -o. iooooc 0. 331500
1 1 1. 55620 o. oooooo 0.385060
12 1. 50713 0. 1 ooooo 0. 459520
13 1.44639 0. 200000 0. 561318
14 1.37618 0.300000 0. 698796
15 1.29861 0. 400000 0. 882830
16 1. 21559 0. 500000 1. 12756
17 1. 12868 0. 600000 1. 45140
13 1.03905 0. 700000 1. 87839
1? 0. 947640 o. 800000 2. 43971
20 0. 855077 0. 900000 3. 17607
21 0. 761819 1 . ooooo 4. 14044
1 2  3
LM
AX
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List of 
ADUR
AMINC
AVWDMN
BEN
CDÜR
COV
DENI
EMP
F Y A T D
EXBEN
APPENDIX C 
Variables and Sources of Data
- Average duration of spells of unemployment in months, in 
September (ANBA, various issues, and calculations by the 
IAB).
- Monthly net income per average employed worker,in DM (Statistisches 
Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various volumes)
- Average monthly income of ÜI recipients before^unemployment, in 
DM (ANBA, own calculations)
- Average UI benefit of all unemployed persons, in IM
- Duration of completed spells of unemployment in months, in 
September (calculations by the IAB)
- Employees covered by the UI scheme, in *000 (ANBA, various issues)
- Denial rates, waiting periods because of voluntary quitting
and refusals of job offers as percentage of flows into unemploy­
ment (Egle, F. (1979) and ANBA, various issues, own calculations)
- Employed persons, in '000 (Statistisches Jahrbuch der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various volumes)
- Yearly expenditures on unemployment aid, in million DM (ANBA, 
various issues, own calculations)
- Yearly expenditures on unemployment benefits, in million DM 
(ANBA, various issues)
GNP - Gross national product, actual prices, in billion DM
(Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
various volumes)
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ILSET
INEL
KVERS
MGSAL
NPOP
P
PCGNP
PCOV
PI
POP
PROD
- Labour force index multiplied by productivity, (TOTLA/TOTLA 
X PROD
- Ineligibility for UI benefits, residual from an equation with 
the denial rates as the dependent variable and the current and 
one-period lagged percentage change in real GNP as the 
independent variables
- Contributions to the health Insurance schemes by Cl, in 
million DH (ANBA, various issues)
- Monthly gross salary per average employed worker, in Mi 
(Sachverständigenrat, Jahresgutachten, various issues)
- Population bot atrrlbutable to the primary segment of the labour 
market - population excluding males between 25 and 55 years
in '000 ( Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
various volumes)
- Activity rate (T0TLA/P0P)
- Percentage changes in gross national product in 1970 prices; 
before 1960 GNP in 1962 prices, excluding West Berlin and the 
Saarland (Sachverstandlgenrat, Jahresgutachten,various issues)
- Percentage of total labour force covered by UI
- Price index for a four person household, 1970 ■ 100 
(Sachverstandlgenrat, Jahresgutachten, various issues)
- Total population, in '000 (Statistisches Jahrbuch der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various volumes)
- Productivity, output per person in 1970 prices (Sacbver 
stSndigenrat, Jahresgutachten, various issues)
REAID
REBEN
REC
REPL
TOTLA
UNIMP
UNF
UNR
VAC
VACPEMP
- Recipients of unemployment aid, in '000 (ANBA, various 
issues)
- Recipients of unemployment benefit, in ’000 (ANBA, various 
issues)
- UI recipients, in '000 (ANBA, various issues)
- Replacement ratio; average UI benefit in relation to average 
income (ovn calculations, see above)
- Total labour force in *000 (OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 
various volumes)
J Registered unemployed, in '000 (ANBA, various issues)
- Persons entering unemployment, in '000 (ANBA, various 
issues)
- Unemployment rate, UNEMP/(EMP + UNEMP) x 100
- Notified vacancies in '000 (ANBA, various issues)
* Vacancies per employed persons, VAC/EMP
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